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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the concept of guarantees of non-repetition 
(GNR) in international law and to consider how to apply GNR in violations of the right 
to health. GNR are, together with compensation, restitution and satisfaction, forms of 
reparation. Although international tribunals and UN bodies have increasingly made 
use of this form of reparation, there is no clarity about both the legal status of the 
obligation to provide GNR, and the scope and reach of this obligation. Moreover, as 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) are often targeted with the claim that 
their redress requires complex and expensive forms of reparation, there is a lack of 
clarity as to whether GNR are applicable to this type of rights and, if they are, how 
so. This thesis aims to make a twofold contribution to the literature. On the one hand 
it aims to unpack the elements of the duty of states to provide GNR in international 
law, whilst on the other, it aims to show a practical application of this form of remedy 
in a particular ESCR: the right to health.   
It is argued in this thesis that the obligation to provide GNR has been increasingly 
recognised in public international law and international human rights law. This thesis 
will also argue that GNR are best granted in cases of large-scale, gross and serious 
violations of human rights and when there is a risk of repetition.  
It will also argue that GNR are equally applicable to all civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights; and that there is nothing in either the nature or the concept 
of the right to health that prevents the application of GNR to the redress of violations 
to the this right.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
Basic Principles and Guidelines Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for victims 
CAT Convention against Torture 
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women 
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
CPPCG Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide  
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
GNR     Guarantees of non-repetition 
IACmHR    Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
IACtHR     Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICERD  International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination  
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ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICPPED  International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
ILC Draft Articles Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 
OP3 – CRC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on a communications 
procedure 
OP-CEDAW Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
OP-CRPD Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
OP-ICESCR Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
PIL  Public International Law 
Protocol of San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis critically examines the concept of guarantees of non-repetition 
(hereinafter GNR) in international law and its application to redress violations of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (hereinafter ‘the right to 
health’ or ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of health’).1 
GNR refer to all the measures states should take, not only legislative, to ensure that 
violations of international norms do not happen again. They are understood as a 
form of reparation that is future-oriented and has a preventive dimension, aimed at 
ensuring that human rights violations will not recur.2 By awarding GNR, international 
tribunals have ordered states: to remove or modify legislation;3 to allocate specific 
budgets for the creation of certain programs;4 to create databases;5 to provide 
                                                             
1 In this thesis the expressions ‘right to health’ and ‘right to the highest attainable standard of 
health’ are used interchangeably. 
2 UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147, para 23; and ILC, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (November 2001) 
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, article, para. 9. 
3 Case of ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 73 (5 February 2001) para 
103 Orders (4). 
4 Case of Fornerón and Daughter v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 242 (27 April 2012) para 182. 
13 
 
mechanisms to guarantee adequate redress to victims;6 to undertake reforms in 
state institutions, particularly, in the judicial power7 and the police;8 to update 
protocols in accordance with international standards;9 and, to provide human rights 
training to public servants.10  
Despite the relevance of these measures for social change, to date there is no 
systematic legal study concerning GNR.11 Nevertheless, there is an increasing need 
                                                                                                                                                                              
5 Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparation 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.205 (16 November 2009) 
para 512. 
6 Case of Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App no. 35014/97(ECtHR, 19 June 2006) para 239; 
Burdov v. Russia (No 2), App. no. 33509/04 (ECtHR, 15 January 2009) operative paragraph 
(6) 
7 Egyptian initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Arab Republic of Egypt, African 
Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 334/06 (2011) para 223 (III); Sudan Human Rights 
Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Cohre) v. Sudan, African Comm 
Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 279/03, 296/03 (2009) para 229 (2); Kevin Mgwanga Gunme 
et al /Cameroon, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 266/03, (2009) para 215 
(1.7) 
8 Egyptian initiative v. Arab Republic of Egypt para 223 (IV). 
9 Case Fernández Ortega et al v. Mexico (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, para 239 (30 August 2010); Rosendo 
Cantú et al v. Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 216 (31 August 2010) para 242. 
10Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 209 (23 November 2009) para 
182. 
11 General studies have been carried out regarding the understanding of reparations in 
international law, however, so far no systematic studies have been carried out about GNR. 
For general studies on remedies see: Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human 
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in international law to understand the meaning, scope and application of this 
concept, as its use has increased during the last decade. While this is the practice, 
some states still see orders from courts regarding GNR as breaching the margin of 
appreciation the states should have in the definition of their own policies.12  
This thesis aims to both fill the gap in the relevant academic literature and, to provide 
tribunals and litigants with better legal foundations to request and award GNR. The 
thesis constitutes a legal contribution to the understanding of the concept of GNR in 
international law and human rights law. It particularly explores key questions such 
as, whether there is an obligation to provide GNRs in public international law 
(hereinafter PIL) and international human rights law; under what circumstances it 
applies; how GNR should be crafted; and, what is the scope of the measures. As 
GNR have been traditionally awarded in the protection of civil and political rights, 
particularly in cases concerning unlawful and arbitrary killings, torture and other 
gross human rights violations, this thesis also explores the application of GNR in 
relation to a particular economic, social and cultural right (hereinafter ESCR or socio-
economic rights)13: the right to health. The reason to select this right for the analysis 
is twofold: on the one hand, the right to health has been the object of rich litigation 
during the last decade, in both domestic and international courts, so several cases 
can be used in the analysis. On the other hand, there has been great conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd, 2005); and Christine Evans, The Right to 
Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (Cambridge, 1st edtition, 2014). 
For studies on compensation see: Ewa Baginska (ed) Damages for Violations of Human 
Rights: A comparative Study of Domestic Legal Systems (Springer, 2015).  
12 See the position of the United States in: LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of 
America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, para 119. 
13 The expressions ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ and ‘socio-economic rights’ are used 
interchangeably.  
15 
 
development about the foundations of the right to health, so the nature of the 
obligations that derive from it have been largely clarified. 
While we understand better the content, scope and reach of the right to health, this is 
not the case with the consequences of breaching it. There is little clarity under 
international law or human rights law as to what forms of reparations can be applied 
in relation to this right, whether GNR could be used to this end, and, which GNR 
could be awarded. In fact, many critics of the justiciability of socio-economic rights 
have emphasized that the redress of this type of rights very often requires the award 
of complex, usually future oriented, remedies which obstruct the competence of other 
branches of power, and, are difficult to implement.14 In this regard, one of the 
questions that this thesis will explore is whether the treatment of GNR in relation to 
civil and political rights is similar or different to that applied in relation to violations of 
the right to health. It will also analyze whether the progressive character of the right 
to health is also compatible with the adoption of GNR. As a result, while this thesis 
contributes to understanding GNR in relation to all rights, it sheds particular light in 
relation to the right to health.  
The focus of this thesis will be the conceptual understanding and legal development 
of GNR, and its particular application to the right to health. Other important aspects 
related to GNR such as its compliance, will not be developed in this work. The 
reason for this is practical: before understanding how GNR can be better 
implemented, we must understand what they precisely mean, what is their scope and 
in which circumstances can they be awarded. As this gap has not been completely 
filled in the literature, this thesis aims at making a contribution on this aspect.   
                                                             
14 Kent Roach, ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic 
Rights’ in, Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.2. 
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Methodology 
 
Research questions were answered using qualitative research methods, involving 
desk-analysis of judicial decisions by different domestic and international tribunals, 
including the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the European Court of 
the ECtHR), the Inter-American Commission and Court (hereinafter IACmHR), the 
African Commission and Court, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ), 
UN treaty monitoring bodies, as well as domestic courts such as the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, and, the review of specialized literature on the topic. This was 
necessary as no detailed analysis of the work of these tribunals and international law 
exist to show the legal foundations of GNR.  
In the analysis of the case law of the ICJ, all decisions where GNR were sought were 
analyzed. In the case of the African Court, and the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, all decisions on the merits were studied, up until February 
2015. Regarding the European Court of Human Rights, all pilot judgments decided 
by the Court until February 2015 were examined. As explained in Chapter II, a pilot 
judgment is a special type of procedure applicable to structural or systemic problems 
that may give rise to similar applications before the European Court. While in the 
redress of most of its cases the European Court has awarded just compensation and 
has refused to award any GNR, when recommending general measures in the 
analysis of pilot judgments, the European Court has awarded more ambitious 
measures oriented to, for example, modify legislation or to create mechanisms for 
the adequate redress of victims. This explains the focus of the research in these type 
of judgments. In the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Human 
Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (hereinafter CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, all relevant decisions until February 2015 were critically studied. While 
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this thesis looks at the jurisprudence of all these bodies, it focuses its attention on 
those where the concept of GNR was traceable, or, where the bodies awarded some 
form of measure to avoid recurrence. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided in two main parts. Whereas part one aims to understand the 
nature of GNR by analyzing its features in PIL and international human rights law, 
part two analyses GNR in relation to violations of the right to health.  
Part one is composed of three chapters. Chapter I analyzes the concept of GNR in 
PIL. It examines the law and practice of the ICJ in order to understand whether there 
is an obligation under international law to provide GNR and, if so, in which 
circumstances should they be awarded and what is the scope of such measures.  
Chapter II explores the concept of general measures awarded in the UN treaty 
bodies. The chapter examines the origin of the obligation to provide GNR in 
international human rights law, as well as the awards of general measures by the 
main UN treaty monitoring bodies. In the analysis of the case law of the UN treaty 
monitoring bodies, the regularity and scope of the measures was analyzed. The 
chapter also explores the concept of GNR in the jurisprudence of regional systems of 
human rights, mainly, the European Court of Human Rights, and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In each case, the origin of the 
obligation to provide general measures, the scope of the measures, and the 
circumstances that triggered their award, were analyzed.  
Chapter III examines the concept of GNR in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the tribunal 
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that has, in a more consistent manner, awarded GNR in the redress of human rights 
violations, a whole chapter is dedicated to it. This chapter presents a historical 
overview of the use made by the Court of this legal concept. It also presents the 
measures awarded by the Inter-American Court as GNR, and critically analyzes the 
circumstances in which the Court has ordered them.   
Part two analyses the award of GNR in right to health and health related cases. It 
includes two chapters: Chapter IV analyzes the award of GNR in violations of right to 
health and health related cases in regional courts of human rights, mainly, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In each jurisdiction, it investigates 
whether the right to health is directly or indirectly justiciable and critically analyses 
how the award of GNR has materialized in the protection of right to health and health 
related cases. 
Chapter V provides some insights as to how the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) should award GNR in the redress of right to 
health cases. Drawing on the experiences of regional and domestic courts discussed 
in chapter IV, this chapter explores the scope of the measures that the ESCR 
Committee could use, the circumstances for their award in right to health cases, and 
how the Committee could award GNR in the redress of violations of the obligation to 
respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfil the right to health. In the 
redress of violations of the duty to fulfil the right to health, this chapter explores 
whether the progressive nature of the right to health has implications in the type of 
GNR that could be provided.  
The thesis argues that the obligation to provide GNR is crystallising in PIL, among 
other reasons, thanks to its existence under international human rights law. The 
scope of the measures awarded is quite extensive, ranging from human rights 
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training, drafting of protocols and manuals, to legislative changes, institutional 
reforms and even the design of public policies and programs. Regarding the 
circumstances for their award, this thesis will argue that GNR are better placed in 
those cases of systemic and large violations of human rights, as well as in cases of 
repetition. 
Regarding the award of these measures in violations of the right to health, the thesis 
suggests that there is nothing in theory, law, or practice that prevents the application 
of GNR in cases concerning this right. It also suggests that when GNR are granted in 
violations to the right to health, they do not differ from those awarded in relation to 
violations of civil and political rights. However, the lack of full justiciability of the right 
to health, mainly in the Inter-American and European systems of human rights, has 
made difficult the award of this type of measures in health-related cases. Based on 
the experience of regional and domestic tribunals, chapter V will propose some 
elements that the ESCR Committee could take into account when awarding general 
redress in the analysis of individual cases related to the violation of the right to 
health.  
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PART I: EXPLORING THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
GNR UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
GNR are a form of redress which aims to prevent the repetition of an international 
law violation by addressing the root causes that trigger the violation. Unlike other 
forms of reparation such us compensation, restitution and rehabilitation, which focus 
on the reconstruction of the status quo ante, GNR are future-oriented, aimed at 
preventing recidivism. It finds its origins in PIL as one of the obligations under 
international law in cases of wrongdoing, side by side with reparation. It was further 
developed as a form of redress in international human rights law and has been 
extensively applied by UN and regional human rights mechanisms.  
The first part of this thesis (chapters I to III) considers the origins of the concept in 
international law while looking at both PIL and international human rights law. While 
chapter I deals with the meaning of assurances and GNR in PIL, chapters II and III 
explore the meaning of GNR in international human rights law. 
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CHAPTER I: GNR IN PIL 
 
The reparations’ regime in PIL has influenced international human rights law and its 
reparations’ scheme, providing a general framework for the interpretation and 
application of reparation measures. The analysis of GNR as one of the 
consequences of the wrongful act shows that there is potential for the 
implementation of general and far-reaching reparations in PIL. According to the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Draft 
Articles), GNR ‘are concerned with the restoration of confidence in a continuing 
relationship.’15 Their nature is future looking as long as they focus on preventing new 
breaches of the law. The first half of this chapter will critically analyse (i) the general 
principles of responsibility applicable to PIL and the general forms of reparation 
established by it; and (ii) the role of GNR in the general scheme of reparations for 
breaches of international law. The second half will emphasise the nature of such 
obligation, the existence of a duty to provide assurances and GNR; and the specific 
measures provided. 
 
1. General principles of State responsibility and forms of 
reparation  
 
                                                             
15ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries’ (2001) Doc. A/56/10 in II ILC Yearbook (2001) Part two, commentary article 
30, para 9.   
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PIL has developed a reparations’ regime applicable to states in cases of breaches of 
international obligations. According to this regime there are three traditional forms of 
reparation: restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. In addition to this, PIL has 
developed other applicable tools, such as assurances and GNR, in order to wipe out 
the consequences of a breach of international law if circumstances so require. This 
section will develop, in depth, the general regime of reparations in PIL. 
 
1.1. The general principle of State responsibility 
 
The principle according to which States have the duty to repair the consequences of 
the wrong committed, was first established in international law in the case Factory at 
Chorzów (Indemnity). In this case, Germany requested the Polish Government to 
pay compensation for its expropriation of two German companies, inside Poland. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice elaborated a general principle of 
reparations, according to which: 
‘the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act […] 
is that reparations must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed.’16   
The obligation to repair has been recognized by the International Law Commission in 
the ILC Draft Articles. The ILC was created after the Committee on the Progressive 
Development of International Law and its Codification recommended to the General 
                                                             
16 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (German v Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ Series A 
No. 17, p. 48. 
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Assembly of the United Nations the establishment of an international law 
commission, in order to promote ‘the progressive development of international law 
and its codification.’17 While Article 15 of the Statute of the International Law 
Commission distinguishes between progressive development, which refers to ‘the 
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not been yet regulated by 
international law’, and codification, which is ‘the more precise formulation and 
systematization of rules of international law;’18 in practice, the ILC gets involved in 
both functions indistinctively. The ILC is composed of highly qualified lawyers, 
elected in their individual capacity, and on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution. The ILC studies have been cited by the ICJ and other organisations to 
determine the content of the current law.19 The ILC Draft Articles have been used as 
the most authoritative ‘word’ in terms of international responsibility and constitute 
evidence of opinio juris.20 According to Brownlie, the fact that the ILC includes a 
large variety of political and regional representation, provides a ‘realistic basis for 
legal obligations’ in its agreed drafts.21 Similarly, according to Caron, the ILC’s work 
has a high level of recognition among experts due to the varied range of experts that 
it is composed of.22 One of the tasks of the ILC was to produce a compilation of 
                                                             
17 UNGA, Statute of the International Law Commission (adopted 21 November 1947) UNGA 
Res 174 (II) article 1, para 1. 
18 Ibid article 15. 
19 The ICJ referred to the ILC Articles in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Proyect (Hungary/Slovakia) 
(Judgment) [1997] ICJ Reports 7. 
20 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 8th edition, 2012) p.44. 
21 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edition, 
2008) p.29. 
22David Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship 
between Forms and Authority’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 857, p. 867. 
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Articles on State Responsibility, aiming ‘to formulate, by way of codification and 
progressive development, the basic rules of international law concerning the 
responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts.’23  
Article 31 of the ILC Draft Articles provides the obligation to make full reparation for 
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. According to this article ‘the 
responsible state is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused 
by the inter-nationally wrongful act.’24  
According to the same article, ‘injury includes any damage, whether material or 
moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.’25 While material 
damage refers to ‘damage to property or other interest of the State and its nationals 
which is assessable in financial terms;’26 moral damage covers items such as ‘loss of 
loved ones or personal affront associated with an intrusion on one’s home or private 
life.’27 The formulation of the article seems to exclude the abstract interest of a State 
which has not been affected by the breach.28 
An important clarification is that PIL governs primarily relations between sovereign 
states. Treaty and customary obligations in international law have a reciprocal or 
contractual nature.29 A breach in international law committed by one state against the 
nationals of another state, constitutes mainly an injury to that state, and subsidiary to 
the individuals that suffer harm. This has an important consequence in terms of 
                                                             
23 ILC Draft Articles, General Commentary, p. 31 para. 1.  
24 ibid article 31. 
25 ibid 
26 ibid, commentary article 31, paragraph 5. 
27 ibid 
28 ibid 
29 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
Edition, 2005) p.97. 
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reparations that distinguish the responsibility of states for injury to aliens from a 
human rights violations. While in international human rights law, reparations are 
originally granted in order to wipe out the victims’ harm, in PIL reparations are 
granted mainly in order to redress the state’s harm.30 It does not mean that PIL does 
not take into account individual’s harm, but rather, than its focus is to repair 
principally the state’s injury.31  
 
1.2  Forms of reparation in International Law 
 
Article 34 of the ILC Draft Articles refers to the forms of reparation, according to 
which, ‘full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall 
take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction.’32 These forms of 
reparation are not mutually exclusive but can be used ‘either singly or in 
combination.’33 The ILC Draft Articles provide a hierarchical system of preference, 
according to which restitution should be preferred over compensation34 and 
satisfaction only in those cases where restitution or compensation is not possible.35 
However, the decisions of arbitral an international tribunals show a different practice 
in the application of these rules. First, cases of restitution are rare in practice.36 In a 
                                                             
30 ibid p.103. 
31 This difference will be further explained in Chapter II, Section 1. p. 57. 
32 ibid article 34. 
33 ibid article 34. 
34 ibid article 36 (1). 
35 ibid article 37 (1). 
36 Yann Kerbrat, ‘Interaction Between the Forms of Reparation’, in James Crawford, Alain 
Pellet, and Simon Olleson, The Law of International Responsibility, (Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 584. 
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large number of cases compensation has been granted, even when restitution could 
have been possible.37 Second, Kerbrat has stated this ‘has not been supported 
whether by practice or jurisprudence.’38 According to this author, since different 
forms of reparation are not exclusive, whichever form of reparation awarded 
generally entails satisfaction.39 
What seems to be a more consolidated rule in international law is the principle of 
proportionality in the application of any form of reparation. In order to avoid 
excessive requirements, the principle of full reparation must be applied so that every 
modality of reparation is proportionate to the loss. Therefore, restitution should be 
excluded if it involves a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from 
restitution, instead of compensation;40 compensation should be provided only for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act;41 and satisfaction should not be 
provided ‘out of proportion to the injury.’42  
This is also coherent with the idea that reparations must not be intended to be 
punitive. This means that compensation cannot be used to punish the responsible 
State, or be imposed with an exemplary character.43 Similarly, satisfaction should not 
be intended to be punitive in character or humiliating to the responsible State.44  
                                                             
37 ibid p. 585. 
38 ibid p. 581. 
39 ibid p. 581. 
40 ILC Draft Articles, article 35 (b). 
41 This is implicitly provided in ibid article 31 (1). 
42 ibid commentary article 37, para 3. 
43 ibid commentary article 36, para 4; and Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Reparations and 
Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 7 (21 July 1989), para 38. 
44 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 37, para 8. 
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1.2.1 Restitution 
 
The first form of reparation for the injury caused by a state is restitution. According to 
the ILC Draft Articles, the purpose of restitution is ‘to re-establish the situation which 
existed before the wrongful act was committed.’45 Under international law, restitution 
is the primary form of redress. This principle was confirmed in the already referred to 
Factory at Chorzów case,46 when saying that the responsible State was under ‘the 
obligation to restore the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at 
the time of the indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of 
restitution which has become impossible.’47 Despite this general principle, the 
practice in the jurisprudence of both arbitral and judicial tribunals, shows that 
restitution has been rarely awarded.48 This can be partially explained by considering 
the practical difficulties of this remedy. Very often, by the time that the object should 
be restituted, its value has diminished, or the object has either deteriorated or 
disappeared. In the Factory at Chorzów Case, for example, the German Government 
changed its original claim for the restitution of the factory, arguing that the present 
condition of the Chorzów factory did not correspond with the situation of the factory 
before it was taken over in 1922.49 At this point, article 35 (a) of the ILC Draft Articles 
provides that restitution will be awarded when the re-establishment of the prior 
                                                             
45 ibid article 35. 
46 See footnote 2. 
47 Chorzów 48. 
48 Christine Gray, (et al) ‘The Different Forms of Reparation: Restitution’ in James Crawford, 
Alain Pellet, and Simon Olleson, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) p. 595. 
49 Chorzów 17. 
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condition ‘is not materially impossible.’50 This has been recognized as a widely 
accepted general principle of international law.51 
Restitution may take different forms. According to the ILC it may imply ‘material 
restoration of return of territory, persons or property, or the reversal of some juridical 
act, or a combination of them.’52 Particularly ‘juridical restitution’ may involve the 
modification of certain normativity, either within the domestic law of the responsible 
State, or in its legal relations with the injured state. This may include, for example, 
the ‘revocation, annulment or amendment of a constitutional or legislative provision’53 
that was enacted against a rule of international law. In respect of whether the mere 
enactment of legislation breaches an international obligation, the ILC has recognized 
there is no general standard. Whereas in some cases the mere passage of 
incompatible legislation may be considered a breach, in other cases the enactment 
of legislation may not be a breach in itself, especially if it is open to the state to give 
effect to the legislation. In those cases, the ILC has mentioned that the breach will 
depend on whether the legislation is given effect.54  
 
1.2.2 Compensation 
 
Compensation is the second form of reparation established in article 36 of the ILC 
Draft Articles. The function of this type of remedy is to ‘cover any financially 
                                                             
50 ILC Draft Articles, article 35 (a). 
51 Gray The Different Forms of Reparation: Restitution 596. 
52 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 35, para 5. 
53 ibid commentary article 35, para 5. 
54 ibid commentary article 12, para 12. 
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assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.’55 This 
normally covers any material injury or pecuniary loss that can be quantified in 
monetary terms. Pecuniary loss includes both material harm, such us loss of 
earnings and medical expenses, and non-material harm, such us the pain and 
suffering for the loss of loved ones.56 In domestic systems, non-material harm is also 
known as ‘moral damage’. However, according to the traditional doctrine, non-
material injury of the state (or ‘moral damage’ of the state), which is the injury caused 
by a violation of rights not associated to the damage of any person or property, 
should be covered by satisfaction and not by compensation.57  
Although the application of compensation rules remains a challenge, the practice of 
different international courts has created a set of principles in the measure of 
compensation for different injuries. Several principles have been developed, in 
practice, giving compensation in cases where, among others, State property such us 
ships, roads, embassies or infrastructure have been damaged;58 individuals have 
suffered personal injury;59 individuals, corporate entities or States have been 
subjected to incidental expenses, when money is owed, and when property rights 
have been trespassed.60  
According to the ILC Draft Articles, compensation must be awarded only ‘insofar as 
such damage is not made good by restitution.’61 Even in those cases when restitution 
                                                             
55 ibid commentary article 36, para 1.  
56 ibid commentary article 36, para 16. 
57 ibid commentary article 36, para 1.  
58 ibid commentary article 36, paras 8 and 12. 
59 ibid commentary article 36, para 16. 
60 ibid commentary article 36, paras 21-34. 
61 ibid commentary article 36, para 1. 
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is available, compensation should be awarded in order to ensure full reparation.62 
For example, in the Factory at Chorzów Case, the ICJ commented on the role of 
compensation, stating that:  
‘Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be 
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it such are the 
principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation 
due for an act contrary to international law.’63   
In that case, considering the impossibility of restoring the Chorzów factory, the ICJ 
ordered the Polish Government to pay compensation to the German Government in 
order to redress the harm.64 
  
1.2.3 Satisfaction 
 
The last form of reparation established in ILC Articles is ‘satisfaction’. Article 37 
establishes satisfaction as a secondary form of reparation available only when 
restitution and compensation are not possible. However, international practice tends 
to award satisfaction in a complementary way, on the basis that the granting of just 
restitution, or/and compensation, may not provide full reparation for the injury 
caused.65 For example, in both the Rainbow Warrior Case66, and the I’m Alone 
                                                             
62 ibid commentary article 36, para 3.  
63 Chorzów  47. 
64 Chorzów  63. 
65 Gray The Different Forms of Reparation: Restitution 633 [footnote 58]. 
66 Rainbow Warrior, (Ruling) Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol XIX, (6 July 1986). 
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Case67, requests for satisfaction were made in addition to the request for 
compensation. In the Rainbow Warrior Case, both compensation and apologies were 
granted in favour of New Zealand, after the French military security service, in an 
undercover operation, sank the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior. The ship set sail 
from Auckland Harbour (New Zealand) with the purpose of disrupting nuclear tests 
that the French government wanted to conduct on the French Polynesia Islands. In 
the case, the arbitral ruling established that the Government of France should give to 
the Government of New Zealand ‘a formal and unqualified apology for the attack.’68 It 
also ruled that the French Government should pay US $7 million ‘as compensation 
for all the damage suffered.’69 In the I’m Alone Case, the United States was ordered 
to both formally acknowledge the illegality of the sinking of a Canadian-British vessel, 
the I’m Alone, and to pay US$ 25,000 in compensation to the Canadian 
Government.70 The vessel was suspected of smuggling liquor into the United States 
and the sinking took place outside of U.S territorial waters after the ship refused to 
stop. 
Satisfaction may consist of, apologies and statements of regret, punishment of 
responsible persons, declaration of wrongfulness, or any other appropriate 
modality.71 Although it is not clear the nature of the injury for which satisfaction 
attempts to make reparation, it is generally established that satisfaction is awarded to 
redress ‘non-material injury.’72 This means injury usually of a symbolic character, 
                                                             
67 S.S. “I’m Alone” (Canada v. United States) [1935] 3 Report of International Arbitral Awards 
1609. 
68 Rainbow Warrior 213. 
69 idem. 
70 I’m Alone 1618. 
71 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 37, para 2. 
72 ibid commentary article 37, para 4. 
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originated in the breach of the obligation, regardless of the material consequences 
created for the state concerned.73  
 
1.3 Other obligations under International Law in cases of wrongdoing: 
cessation and GNR 
 
Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles establishes that the State responsible for the 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation ‘(a) to cease that act, if it is 
continuing, [and] (b) to offer appropriate assurances and GNR, if circumstances so 
require.’74 Although directly related to the repair of the affected relationship, these 
are considered as additional obligations for the responsible State, and are not, 
strictly speaking, forms of reparation.  
According to the ILC Draft articles, cessation refers to ‘the negative aspect of the 
future performance, concerned with securing an end to continuing wrongful 
conduct.’75 The function of cessation, as is established in the ILC Draft articles, is ‘to 
put an end to a violation of international law and to safeguard the continuing validity 
and effectiveness of the underlying primary rule.’76 The obligation of cessation covers 
all relevant wrongful acts including both acts, and omissions. This means that, whilst 
sometimes cessation implies that the State should abstain from certain actions, in 
other circumstances it may require the responsible State to act in a certain way.77  
                                                             
73 ibid commentary article 37, para 3 and 4.  
74 ibid commentary article 30. 
75 ibid commentary article 30, para 1. 
76 ibid commentary article 30, para 5.  
77 ibid commentary article 30, para 2.  
33 
 
Some cases of cessation can be easily confused with restitution. In these situations, 
the ILC Articles have emphasised that the continuing character of the breached 
obligation, or whether it is a peremptory norm of general international law, is key in 
clarifying the difference. For example, in the case of an unlawful annexation of 
territory, the withdrawal of the military forces and the annulment of the decree of 
annexation, can be understood as a case of cessation rather than restitution.78  
In turn, according to the ILC Draft Articles, GNR ‘are concerned with the restoration 
of confidence in a continuing relationship.’79 Their nature is future looking as long as 
they focus on preventing new breaches of the law. 
The relation between cessation and GNR is established in the commentaries to the 
ILC Draft Articles. According to these, both cessation and GNR are aspects of the 
restoration and repair of the wrongdoing. However, while cessation represents ‘the 
negative aspect of future performance, concerned with securing an end to continuing 
wrongful conduct,’80 GNR ‘serve a preventive function and may be described as a 
positive reinforcement of future performance.’81   
It must be noted that, according to the ILC Articles, the GNR located in its chapter 1, 
relate to the ‘General Principles’ of State responsibility. This could suggest that such 
guarantees are applicable to any case of wrongdoing. However, as the wording of 
Article 30 (b) suggests, these are applicable only ‘if circumstances so require’. The 
analysis of the type of circumstances that are relevant to the application of GNR will 
be developed in section 2.4.82 
                                                             
78 ibid commentary article 35, para 6.  
79 ibid commentary article 30, para 9.  
80 ibid commentary article 30, para 1. 
81 ibid commentary article 30, para 1. 
82 See pp. 60-70. 
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2. The role of GNR in PIL 
 
As presented in the previous section, GNR are incorporated in PIL as a 
consequence of the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Since the nature 
of such guarantees is not completely clear, this section will analyse (i) the nature of 
GNR; (ii) the existence of such obligation in PIL; (iii) the type of measures that have 
been granted under this type of guarantees, and (iv) the circumstances in which this 
type of measures are awarded.  
 
2.1  The nature of GNR 
 
Traditional forms of reparation in international law, such as restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction, are characterized for being primarily restorative or backward 
looking. As outlined in the previous section, the purpose of restitution ‘consists in re-
establishing the status quo ante, i.e. the situation that existed prior to the occurrence 
of the wrongful act.’83 Similarly, compensation operates when restitution is not 
possible.84 As for satisfaction, this has an exceptional character, as its purpose is to 
redress ‘those injuries, not financially assessable, which amount to an affront to the 
State.’85 All such forms are oriented to repair the wrong committed in the past. Their 
aim is to wipe out, as much as is possible, the consequences of the wrongdoing, 
rather than preventing future harm. 
                                                             
83 ibid commentary article 35, para 2.  
84 Chorzów  48. 
85 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 37, para (3). 
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In contrast, GNR are future-oriented rather than past-oriented, even if they are 
anchored in past events and violations. This characteristic has been emphasised by 
the ILC commentary in several of its sections. For example, when explaining the 
difference between cessation and GNR, the ILC commentary states that, while 
cessation is concerned with ending the continuing wrongful conduct, GNR ‘may be 
described as a positive reinforcement of future performance.’86 According to the ILC, 
even though states may not always express their claims in terms of assurances or 
guarantees, ‘they share the characteristics of being future-looking and concerned 
with other potential breaches.’87 This section of the commentary also emphasizes 
that the purpose of GNR is to restore the confidence between states, especially in 
those cases when the mere restoration of a pre-existing situation does not constitute 
an adequate protection for the injured State.88 As a result, it is stated that ‘[GNR] 
focus on prevention rather than reparation.’89 Also, when explaining the difference 
between assurances, or GNR and satisfaction, the ILC Articles emphasize how they 
are aimed at ‘the reinforcement of a continuing legal relationship and the focus is on 
the future, not the past.’90 
 
2.2 The existence of a duty to provide GNR in PIL 
 
Unlike the forms of reparation provided in Article 34 of the ILC Draft Articles, the duty 
to provide GNR in PIL, has largely been discussed. During the discussion of the ILC, 
                                                             
86 ibid commentary article 30, para. 1. 
87 ibid commentary article 30, para. 9.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 ibid commentary article 30, para. 11. 
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Germany, for example, argued that ‘to impose an obligation to guarantee non-
repetition in all cases would certainly go beyond what State practice deems to be 
appropriate.’91  
In order to analyse whether there is a duty of states to provide assurances and GNR 
as a consequence of wrongdoing, this section will analyse such measures in both 
the work of the International Law Commission in the ILC Articles, and the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ.92  
   
2.2.1 GNR in the work of the ILC Articles 
 
Assurances and GNR are established in several drafts of the ILC articles. Various 
special Rapporteurs on State Responsibility consistently proposed the inclusion of 
GNR in the draft articles on state responsibility.93 The first precedent of the inclusion 
of GNR in the ILC Articles may be found in the report presented to the General 
Assembly in 1961, by the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Garcia 
                                                             
91 ILC, ‘State responsibility, Comments and observations received from Governments’ (25 
March 1998) A/CN.4/488, p.103. 
92 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes as sources of 
international law ‘(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the teaching of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law’.  
93 Five Special Rapporteurs on State Responsibility have been appointed: Francisco V. 
Garcia Amador (1956-1961); Roberto Ago (1969-1972, 1976-1980); Willem Riphagen (1980-
1986); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (1988-1989, 1991-1996); James Crawford (1998-2001).  
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Amador. Proposing, in Article 27, paragraph 2, titled ‘Measures to prevent the 
repetition of the injurious act’, he stated that:  
‘the State of nationality shall have the right, without prejudice to the 
reparation due in respect of the injury sustained by the alien, to demand 
that the respondent State take the necessary steps to prevent the 
repetition of events of the nature of those imputed to that State.’94 
GNR as such, were then proposed in 1985, under the work of the Special 
Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Willem Riphagen. Article 6 of the articles 
proposed that the injured State may require the State which has committed an 
internationally wrongful act to (a) discontinue the act, (b) apply the remedies 
provided in internal law, (c) re-establish the situation as it existed before the act, and 
also: 
 (d) ‘provide appropriate guarantees of non-repetition of the act.’95  
In this article, GNR appear as a direct consequence of the internationally wrongful 
act and are not a form of reparation. 
The wording ‘guarantees of non-repetition’ was maintained during the mandates of 
the following Rapporteurs. In the report presented by the Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility, Arangio-Ruiz, Article 10, titled ‘Satisfaction and guarantees of 
                                                             
94 ILC, ‘Sixth Report on International Responsibility by Mr. F.V. García Amador Special 
Rapporteur’, (1961) Doc. A/CN.4/134 & ADD 1 in II ILC Yearbook Addendum, article 27 para 
(2), p.49.  
95 ILC, ‘Sixth report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility (part two 
of the draft articles); and ‘implementation’ (mise en oeuvre) of international responsibility and 
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non-repetition’, incorporates GNR as a form of satisfaction. Article 10 paragraph (1) 
establishes that:  
‘In the measure in which an internationally wrongful act has caused to the 
injured State a moral or legal injury not susceptible of remedy by 
restitution in kind or pecuniary compensation, the State which has 
committed the wrongful act is under an obligation to provide the injured 
State with adequate satisfaction in the form of apologies, nominal or 
punitive damages, punishment of the responsible individuals or 
assurances or safeguards against repetition, or any combination 
thereof.’96 
In this proposal, GNR are understood as a form of reparation, specifically as a form 
of satisfaction, thus losing its autonomy as an independent consequence of the 
wrongdoing of a state. Both satisfaction and GNR are conditioned to the impossibility 
of remedying the wrong by restitution in kind, or pecuniary compensation; therefore, 
they are conceived as an alternative form of reparation, rather than a complementary 
one. 
In the Report presented by the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James 
Crawford, GNR are included in Article 36 bis, titled “Cessation’. Numeral (2), 
paragraph (2), of the Article establishes that the State which has committed an 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:  
‘(a) where it is engaged in a continuing wrongful act, to cease that act 
forthwith; 
                                                             
96 ILC ‘Second Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special 
Rapporteur’ (1989) A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, in II ILC Yearbook 1989 (1), 
p.56, para 191, article 10 (1). 
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(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.’97 
Under this article, GNR are conceived as an independent consequence of the 
wrongdoing, again, different from any form of reparation, and especially different 
from satisfaction. As such, it operates in addition to the traditional forms of reparation 
(i.e. compensation, restitution, satisfaction) established in Article 37 bis.  
This proposal is very similar to the one finally adopted for the Drafting committee, in 
the 53rd session of the international Law Commission (2001), establishing in Article 
30, titled 
‘Cessation and non-repetition’, that: 
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation: 
(a) To cease that act, if it is continuing; 
(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if 
circumstances so require. 
As in the version that immediately preceded this, cessation, as well as assurances 
and GNR (Article 30), are understood as an independent consequence of the 
wrongdoing that operates, in addition to reparation (Article 31). Although they are 
both general consequences of an internationally wrongful act, the fact that they are 
placed in different articles, may have important consequences. Unlike reparation, 
cessation and GNR are ‘an aspect of the continuation and repair of the legal 
relationship affected by the breach.98 Thus, they have a central role in the 
restoration of the breached legal relationship. In contrast, reparation may not be so 
                                                             
97 ILC, ‘Third report on State responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’ 
(2000) A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4., p. 39, article 36 Bis, numeral (2), paragraph (2). 
98 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 30, para 11. 
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central in a dispute between states.99 This may imply a more primary duty in the 
establishment of cessation and assurances and GNR than in the setting of 
reparations, in cases of a breach to an international obligation.100 
 
2.2.2 GNR in the work of the ICJ 
 
GNR have also been included in the work of the ICJ. LaGrand (Germany v. United 
States) Case101 is probably the most important precedent in the granting of this type 
of remedy. In this case, two brothers who were German nationals residing in the 
United States, were arrested for participating in an attempted bank robbery in 
Arizona, where one person was killed. Both men were convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to the death penalty. Germany alleged that the LaGrand 
brothers were not informed of their right to consular assistance by a third party during 
the trial. Before the ICJ issued its decision on the case, both brothers were executed.  
During the proceedings, Germany requested ‘that the United States shall provide 
Germany an assurance that it will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future 
cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United 
States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.’102 Even though Germany did 
not state in detail the specific measures that the United States should take, it 
                                                             
99 ibid commentary article 30, para 4. 
100 For an application of this argument in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia Case, see 
Christian Tomuschat, ‘Reparation in Cases of Genocide’, [2007] 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 905, pp. 911-912. 
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requested that ‘In particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the 
United States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions 
impaired by a violation of the rights under Article 36.’103 
The United States answered that, the requirement of assurances of non-repetition 
sought by Germany, ‘has no precedent in the jurisprudence of this Court and would 
exceed the Court's jurisdiction and authority in this case.’104 According to the United 
States, assurances of non-repetition are exceptional and not clearly established in 
State practice.105  
The United States also informed the ICJ of the ‘substantial measures aimed at 
preventing any recurrence’, and the intense work carried out in order ‘to improve 
understanding of and compliance with consular notification and access requirements 
throughout the United States, so as to guard against future violations of these 
requirements.’106 As a result of this effort the United States published a booklet about 
‘Consular Notification and Access’ which was widely distributed. The United States 
also offered an apology to Germany for the breach of its obligations.  
In the decision, the ICJ favoured Germany in its request by stating: 
‘an apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases 
where foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their 
rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have 
been subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties. 
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In this respect, the Court has taken note of the fact that the United States 
repeated in all phases of these proceedings that it is carrying out a vast 
and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance by its competent 
authorities at the federal as well as at the state and local levels with its 
obligation under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.’107  
Even though this is the first case where the ICJ recognized a duty of states under 
international law to offer GNR, the Court does not provide any explanation about the 
legal basis for such measures.  
The recognition of GNR by the ICJ in this case, has led to opposing opinions by 
commentators. Upholding the recognition of these measures, Tams has pointed out 
that:  
‘No doubt caution is required, but it seems safe to say that this 
recognition could indeed mark a trend towards a broader approach to the 
law of state responsibility. By recognizing, for the first time, a state’s right 
to obtain guarantees and assurances of non-repetition, the Court has 
accepted a remedy that is not only new, but also qualitatively different 
from the traditionally accepted forms of reparation.’108  
In response to this argument, authors like Sullivan have criticized the recognition of a 
duty to provide assurances and GNR, by stating that: 
‘The ICJ’s and ILC’s surreptitious movement toward AGNRs resulted in 
an illegitimate and artificial production of an international rule, which is 
both bad public policy and which stains both the institutions and the 
                                                             
107 ibid para 123. 
108 Christian Tams, ‘Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: LaGrand 
and the Law of State Responsibility’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 441, p. 443. 
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principle. A change in international law to a future-oriented approach 
empowered to interfere directly with domestic law redefines international 
court power under the doubtful guise of custom.’109  
The fact that GNR includes a new perspective on the nature of reparations, different 
to the one established in the traditional forms of remedies, may explain the extreme 
caution of the ICJ in awarding this type of remedy.  
In the case law after LaGrand, and as Barbier has emphasised,110 the ICJ has 
consistently recognized that there is a duty of states to offer GNR. After LaGrand the 
ICJ has been requested to order GNR in at least the following nine cases, with 
different results: In the cases of Cameroon v Nigeria (2002)111, Bosnia v Serbia 
(2007)112, Costa Rica v Nicaragua (2009)113 and Argentina v Uruguay (2010)114, the 
Court denied the ordering of such measures by considering that they should be 
granted only under ‘specific circumstances’, that analysis of the situation showed that 
there was no reason to think that the acts would happen again, and that ‘good faith’ 
must be presumed. In the cases Mexico v. United States of America (Avena) 
                                                             
109 Scott Sullivan, ‘Changing the premise of International legal Remedies: the unfounded 
adoption of assurances and guarantees of non-repetition’ (2003) 44 UCLA Journal of 
International Law & Foreign Affairs 265, p. 301.  
110 Sandrine Barbier, ‘Assurances and Guarantees of Non-repetition’, in James Crawford, 
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(2004)115 and DRC v Uganda (2005)116, the Court held that, the commitment of the 
respondent state to comply with its obligations must be sufficient in order to satisfy 
the request of GNR.117 In the advisory opinion Construction of a wall in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (2004)118, and in the cases Liechtenstein v. Germany (2005)119 
and Djibouti v. France (2008)120 the Court did not discuss the request made by the 
complainant states to provide GNR. 
Despite the fact that the Court has applied a very restrictive criteria in ordering 
assurances and GNR in just one case out of nine (i.e. LaGrand Case), what is 
important to highlight here is that, in none of these cases, did the Court question the 
existence of a duty of the respondent state to offer GNR. In fact, following LaGrand, 
in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria Case (2002), 
the Court clearly stated that a request for an end of military presence in 
Cameroonian territory and GNR in the future, are ‘undoubtedly admissible.’121 
Despite the criticism that the criteria held by the Court, in its case law, may 
engender, the repeated acceptance of the Court of a duty of the responsible state to 
                                                             
115 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Judgment) 
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provide GNR, is a clear and strong argument in favour of the existence of such 
obligation. 
 
2.2.3 Is there an international obligation of the responsible state to provide 
GNR? 
Scholars have discussed the mandatory character of the duty of responsible states 
to provide GNR, as incorporated in Article 30 of the ILC Articles. Criticizing the 
binding character of this obligation, Sullivan has stated that, by the time that the ILC 
was drafted, there was not enough state practice or evidence of opinio juris to 
consider this remedy as customary international law.122  
The ILC recognizes in the commentary of Article 30 that, while assurances and GNR 
are one of the consequences of the wrongdoing in international law, there was little 
customary practice to support such obligation. In 1989, the Special Rapporteur, 
Arangio-Ruiz, presented a list of examples that seems to justify the existence of an 
international practice to request GNR. The examples refer to cases such as Dogger 
Bank (1904), in which the United Kingdom requested from Russia ‘security against 
the recurrence of such intolerable incidents;’123 Doane Case (1886), related to an 
American missionary in the Philippines who was deported to Manila, in which ‘the 
Spanish Government endeavoured in a measure to repair the wrong it had been 
done by restoring Mr. Doane to the scene of his labours and by repeating its 
assurances with preference to the protection of the missionaries and their 
                                                             
122 Sullivan Changing the Premise 283. 
123 G.F. de Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 2nd series, vol. XXXIII, p. 642. Cited 
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property;’124 Wilson Case (1894), linked to the murder of an American citizen in 
Nicaragua, in which the United States demanded that ‘the Government of 
Nicaragua...adopt such measures as to leave no doubts as to its purpose and ability 
to protect the lives and interest of citizens of the United States dwelling in the 
reservation, and to punish crimes committed against them;’125 and Vracaritch case 
(1961), related to the arrest, in Munich, of a former captain in the Yugoslav 
resistance forces, in which Germany declared that ‘the arrest ... is a regrettable, 
isolated case and the competent authorities have taken the necessary measures to 
ensure that such a case does not occur again.’126 These are cited as examples of 
cases where the injured state has demanded safeguards against the repetition of the 
wrongful act. These cases, however, refer not to situations decided by domestic or 
international courts, but to diplomatic requests made from one state to another.127 In 
the reports it is not mentioned whether these requests were actually awarded by the 
states or not. Also, they mainly refer to practices used in the 19th and beginning of 
the 20th centuries, so they do not clearly show more up-to-date state practice.128 
The argument of the out-dated nature of the cases was raised during the discussion 
of Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles in 1993. Mr Mikulka, chairman of the drafting 
committee, observed that it was regrettable that the rule governing assurances and 
                                                             
124 Moore, Digest, vol. II, pp. 903 et seq., at pp. 903 and 907. Cited at A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 
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GNR was based on such old cases and, since it was not possible to find an updated 
example, the validity of the rule should be called into question.129 In this regard the 
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz recognized that, at the time the article about GNR 
was drafted in 1989, he was not able to produce modern examples and, therefore, 
the Commission was involved in progressively developing international law rather 
than codifying the existing one.130  
Despite the lack of up-to-date sources in the ILC Draft Articles, authors such Barbier 
have argued that, in the last years, the obligation of states to provide GNR as a 
consequence of a breach of international law has increasingly being recognised as a 
norm of customary law.131 Several arguments have been expressed in this regard:  
First, the work of the ILC should not be considered just as mere codification but as 
relevant opinio juris. According to the statute of the ILC its main object is ‘the 
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification.’132 
In practice, the ILC has found it difficult to distinguish between its function of 
codification and ‘progressive development.’133 In as much as the ILC drafts may 
constitute evidence of opinion juris, the work of the ILC undoubtedly contributes to 
the creation of new law.134  
                                                             
129 ILC, Summary records of the meetings of the 45th Session, 2123rd meeting (19 July 
1993) I ILC Yearbook 164, para 26. 
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In addition to this, and following Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, the ILC articles 
can be understood as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’135. As 
a consequence, and in the opinion of several commentators, the work of the ILC is 
similar136 or even higher in authority to the writings of highly qualified publicists, in as 
much as the Articles count with very high level experts, have the active participation 
of states, and work within the framework of the United Nations.137  
The work of the Commission has been backed up by UN member states. In fact, 
during the discussion of article 46 on GNR, the few governments that commented on 
the article were generally supportive. Mongolia found the provisions on satisfaction, 
assurances and GNR of highly importance.138 The Czech Republic was supportive of 
an enforced regime of GNR, at least in cases of ‘crimes’.139 Uzbekistan commented 
that the article should stipulate what form of assurances the injured state is entitled 
to. 140 Argentina considered that states affected by a wrongful act should be able to 
request cessation and GNR but not necessarily reparation. Among all these 
opinions, only Germany and the United States questioned the provision. Whereas 
Germany debated whether the duty to provide GNR can be imposed in all cases,141 
the United States strongly objected to the inclusion of an article on GNR, arguing 
they are not ‘legal obligations, have no place in the draft articles on State 
                                                             
135 ILC, Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38 (1) (d) 
136 David Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship 
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responsibility and should remain as an aspect of diplomatic practice.’142 This position 
can be understood as a normal reaction of the American government after LaGrand, 
which was decided in 2001. Apart from these opinions, states have not expressed 
relevant views in relation to this article. This should be taken into account as an 
indicator of the tacit support of states to the wording of the article.143  
Second, following Barbier’s argument, the practice of the ICJ shows there is an 
increasing recognition of a duty to provide GNR as a consequence of an 
international breach. As discussed in section 2.2.2.,144 following LaGrand, the ICJ 
has not doubted the existence of a duty to provide GNR, even though it has not 
always awarded specific and concrete measures. Whereas in some cases it has 
recognized that the request cannot be upheld, in others it has considered that the 
request is satisfied by the commitment of the state to uphold its obligations. In other 
cases, such as Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria Case 
(2002), the Court clearly stated that a request for an end of military presence in 
Cameroonian territory and GNR in the future are ‘undoubtedly admissible.’145 More 
importantly, States have continuously requested the ICJ to provide GNR on the basis 
that they are a consequence of an unlawful act. This was clear in the previously 
mentioned cases: Cameron v. Nigeria (2002); Liechtenstein v. Germany (2005); 
DRC v. Uganda; Bosnia v. Serbia & Montenegro (2007); Djibouti v. France (2004); 
Mexico v. United States (Avena) Case (2009); Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (2009); 
Argentina v. Uruguay (2010), and Georgia v. Russia (2011), as well as in the 
advisory opinion on the Construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory 
                                                             
142 ILC, ‘Comments and observations received from Governments’ (1-3, 19 March, 3 April, 1 
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143 Barbier Assurances and Guarantees of Non-repetition 554. 
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(2004). These arguments have allowed some authors to argue that GNR are ‘indeed 
a rule of positive law’146 or that ‘[e]ven if caution is in order, it can without doubt be 
considered that GNR are now part of the legal consequences of an internationally 
wrongful act.’147  
However, besides the positivism of Barbier, the evidence in favour of the existence of 
a clear and undoubted customary obligation to provide GNR is still not conclusive. 
On the one hand, although the ILC articles are the most important codification of 
international law and can even constitute evidence of opinio juris, not all their articles 
are strictly legally binding for states as they do not necessarily constitute sources of 
international law. While some of the articles included in the Draft Articles may reflect 
customary law and be clearly binding for states, some others may simply reflect an 
emerging practice and a product of the progressive development of international law. 
On the other hand, even if LaGrand constitutes an important precedent in the 
recognition of such obligation in the practice of the ICJ, it is also true that after that 
precedent was rendered, the ICJ has not awarded GNR in any other case, although 
it has not denied the existence of a duty to provide such measures either.  
In these circumstances, as will be shown in the following chapters, it is important to 
note that, whilst keeping the differences in perspective and content, it is possible to 
state that there is an emerging practice of providing GNR in the work of various 
international human rights tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies. The Human Rights 
Committee, for example, has recognised that states have a duty ‘to take steps to 
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prevent similar violations in the future.’148 Similarly, the Committee against Torture 
(hereinafter CAT) has stated that an ‘effective remedy’ entails ‘GNR’ among other 
forms of reparations.149 In turn, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
consistently required states to provide GNR in many cases.150 These obligations are 
based on article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter ICCPR),151 article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter CAT),152 and article 1 
of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR),153 
respectively, which establish a generic duty of states to provide redress, although 
they do not explicitly incorporate a duty to provide GNR. Specific provisions 
introducing GNR as a form of reparation can be found in articles 18 and 23 of the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (hereinafter ‘Basic Principles and 
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para 9; HRC, Andrei Olechkevitch v. Belarus (2013) Comm. No. 1785/2008, U.N. Doc 
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Guidelines’ or ‘Basic Principles’)154. According to the Preamble, such Basic 
Principles ‘do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing 
legal obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.’155 
Outside of the judicial context, James Crawford has referred to two additional 
examples of state practice. The first one is the allegation, in 2009, of China to the 
United States, that the United States had entered its exclusive economic zone. In 
that case, the Chinese spokesman stated ‘we demand the United States respect our 
legal interests and security concerns, and take effective measures to prevent a 
recurrence of such events’156. Similarly, in 2010, Japan alleged that Chinese ships 
had entered its territorial waters and, as a consequence, demanded that China 
prevent a recurrence.157  
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In addition to this emerging practice, the duty to provide GNR has also been recently 
included in treaty law. Article 24 of the International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (hereinafter ICPPED) establishes GNR as 
one of the forms of reparation.158 Adopted on 20 December of 2006, it is the last 
human rights core convention adopted within the United Nations. The explicit 
incorporation of GNR as a form of reparation should be indicative of the increasing 
recognition of such a duty among states. These examples, from international 
tribunals, as well as diplomatic practice and treaty law, provide support for the idea 
that: there is certainly an emerging practice among states and international tribunals 
to offer and provide GNR for the redress of violations. Such practice is particularly 
strong under international human rights law. 
 
2.3  Specific measures provided 
 
Even though both the ILC and the ICJ have recognized the existence of a duty to 
offer assurances and GNR, none of these sources are clear about the type of 
measures that should be granted. In the study elaborated by Arangio-Ruiz, he 
presents a characterization of GNR. According to his report the injured State may 
demand: 
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‘(a) safeguards against the repetition of the wrongful act without any 
specification; or (b) where the wrongful act affects its nationals, that a 
better protection of the persons and property of the latter be ensured.’159 
In the same report it is also mentioned that, on some occasions, the injured State 
may also ask the offending State to adopt specific measures in order to avoid 
repetition. In those cases the injured State may request: 
a. Formal assurances from the offending State that it will in the future 
respect given rights of the offended State.160 
b. The adoption of specific measures such as to give specific instructions 
to state agents.161 
c. The adoption of a certain line of conduct that is considered to be 
necessary to prevent the creation of conditions that allowed the wrongful act to 
take place.162  
d. The adoption of, or derogation from, specific legislations.163   
 
This characterization is generally followed in the ILC Comments which states that, on 
some occasions the injured State may ask specific measures from the responsible 
state, such us ‘[to] seek[] assurances from the responsible State that, in the future, it 
will respect the rights of the injured State. In other cases, the injured State requires 
specific instructions to be given, or other specific conduct to be taken.’164 
                                                             
159 A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, para. 154.  
160 idem para 158 (a) 
161 idem para 158 (b)   
162 idem para 158 (c) 
163 idem para 159 
164 ILC Draft Articles, commentary article 30, para 13. 
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In the few cases were GNR have been considered, the ICJ has opted for a generic 
formula recognizing that the commitment of the state to comply with its international 
obligations should be considered sufficient to meet the request for guarantees and 
assurances of non-repetition. In LaGrand Case, the ICJ upheld the request of 
Germany to provide GNR but without detailing the specific measures that can be 
considered as such, limiting itself to state that:  
‘But no State could give such a guarantee and Germany does not seek 
it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by the United 
States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in 
performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must 
be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a general assurance of 
non–repetition.’165 
In Congo v. Uganda,166 the ICJ considered that the measures already taken by 
Uganda should be understood as a legally binding commitment that Uganda will not 
repeat the wrongful acts.167 Similar results were found in Avena, where Mexico 
requested the United States to provide appropriate guarantee and assurances in 
order to achieve compliance with Article 36.168 In this case, the ICJ found that the 
                                                             
165 LaGrand para 124. 
166 Congo had requested as part of the guarantees of non-repetition both ‘a solemn 
declaration that it will in future refrain from pursuing a policy that violates the sovereignty of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rights of its population’ and ‘demands that 
specific instruction to that effect be given by the Ugandan authorities to their agents’, Congo v 
Uganda para 255. 
167 Congo v. Uganda para 257. 
168 Avena para 144.  
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commitment expressed by the United States since LaGrand, should be considered 
sufficient.169  
 
Regarding the inclusion of specific remedies, such as the modification of particular 
pieces of legislation, they are clearly established in the ILC Articles, but its practice 
remains rare in inter-state complaints.170 In the Report elaborated by Arangio-Ruiz, 
the adoption or derogation of specific legislation was included as one of the specific 
measures that the injured State could request, in order to avoid the repetition of the 
facts. The Report cites several cases in this regard, such as the Boxer Case,171 the 
Matheof Case,172 the case between France and Belgium in 1854,173 the case 
between Mexico and the United States in 1886,174 the lynching of Italian nationals in 
Erwin,175 and the ‘Alabama’ Case.176 In the case between Mexico and the United 
States, for example, a case was raised for the prosecution and conviction in Mexico 
of an American national who published an article in the United States that was 
                                                             
169 Avena para 150. 
170 James Crawford (et al), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 
2010) p. 559; and Arango-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility para 161. 
171 Moore, Digest, vol. V. pp. 515-516; reproduced in Arango-Ruiz, Second Report on State 
Responsibility para 124, footnote 312. 
172 Jacques Dumas, ‘La responsabilité des Etats á raison des crimes et délits commis sur leur 
territoire au préjudice d´etrangers’, Recueil des cours…, 1931-11, vol. 36, p. 188, partially 
reproduced in A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr., footnote 383. 
173 Dumans, La responsabilité des Etats 189-190, cited in A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & 
Corr.1, para 159 [footnote 384]. 
174 idem [footnote 385].  
175 Moore, Digest, vol. VI. pp. 848-849; cited in A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, para 
159 [footnote 386]. 
176 Nicolas Socrate Politis, La justice international (Hachette, 1924) p.41, partially reproduced 
in A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, para 159 [footnote 387]. 
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considered defamatory of a Mexican citizen. Since the prosecution was in conformity 
with Mexican legislation, the United States requested the modification of the related 
provision in the Mexican Penal Code. Mexico agreed to the request.177 Also, in the 
case of the lynching of Italian nationals in Erwin, Mississippi, Italy requested that the 
United States modify its law which did not allow federal courts to exercise jurisdiction 
in certain cases, and thus prevented the punishment of authors of crimes against 
foreigners.178 These cases illustrate some scenarios where legislative provisions 
were requested in order to prevent the commission of future wrongdoing.  
However, as discussed in the previous section, these references are not necessarily 
sufficient to prove consistent state practice. They only refer to diplomatic use in the 
19th century so they do not clearly reveal current state practice.  
In LaGrand Case, changes in the legislation were suggested by Germany and briefly 
discussed by the Court, but changes were not actually granted. In this case, 
Germany requested, as part of the fourth submission, that ‘[v]iolations of Article 36 
followed by death sentences and executions cannot be remedied by apologies or the 
distribution of leaflets. An effective remedy requires certain changes in US law and 
practice.’179 When analyzing this request, the ICJ stated that: 
‘[The Court] has not found that a United States law, whether substantive 
or procedural in character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations 
undertaken by the United States in the Vienna Convention. In the present 
case the violation of Article 36, paragraph 2, was caused by the 
                                                             
177 Dumans, La responsabilité des Etats op. cit. At A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & 
Corr.1,para 159 [footnote 385].  
178 Moore, Digest, vol. VI. pp, 848-849 cited in A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, para 
159 [footnote 386]. 
179 LaGrand para 122. 
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circumstances in which the procedural default rule was applied, and not 
by the rule as such.’180  
As a result the Court found that, in cases where the individuals have been subjected 
to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, the United 
States has an obligation to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction 
and sentence. However it states that: 
 
‘This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice of 
means must be left to the United States.’181 
 
In Avena, Mexico requested the United States to take effective remedies, including 
the modification of domestic law that represented an obstacle to the application of 
Article 36.182 However, such a request was not maintained in the final submission, in 
which Mexico simply asked that the United States provide appropriate guarantees 
and assurances that it shall take measures sufficient to achieve increased 
compliance with Article 36’, without concretely specifying what the measures should 
be.  
 
Other remedies that, for example, contemplate the creation or modification of specific 
policies or practices in a State seem to be harder to argue. The ILC Articles do not 
include such possibility within the specific measures that the injured state can 
request as GNR. In addition to this, there is no case law that supports the inclusion 
of such remedies in PIL.  
 
                                                             
180 LaGrand para 125. 
181 LaGrand para 125. 
182 Avena para 279.  
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This analysis shows a general trend in the ICJ to provide generic remedial measures 
and to be deferential to the domestic legal order of states.183 The Human Rights 
Committee,184 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(hereinafter CEDAW Committee),185 and the Committee on the Rights of the Persons 
with Disabilities186 have increasingly, as part of their general recommendations, 
recommended states the adoption of legislative measures. The European Court of 
Human Rights has increasingly become more specific in details when awarding 
general measures that recommend the adoption of legislative reforms, in order to 
secure the effectiveness of its judgments, especially in cases of large and systemic 
violations.187 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, surely the most 
activist of the regional human rights courts, has not hesitated in ordering extensive 
legislative and policy measures as part of its reparation measures.188 In these 
circumstances, the ICJ will have to find a balance between reparation measures that 
are detailed enough to provide effective redress, but general enough to respect the 
                                                             
183 Stephen Tully, ‘By Means of its Own Choosing’: Is the Court Refashioning the Remedies 
of State Responsibility?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 459, p. 481. 
184 HRC, Fijalkowska v Poland (2005) Comm. No 1061/2002, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002, para 10.   
185 CEDAW, Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria (28 August 2012) Comm. No. 32/2011, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011, para 8.8 (2)(b); and CEDAW, Cecilia Kell v Canada (26 April 2012) 
Comm. No. 19/2008, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C.51/D/19/2008, para 11 (b) (ii). 
186 CRPD, Zsolt Bujdosó and five others v. Hungary (20 September 2013) Comm. No. 4/201, 
U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011, para 10(2) (a & b); and CRPD, Szilvia Nyusti and Péter 
Takács v. Hungary (2013) Comm. No. 1/2010, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010, para 10 (2) 
(a). 
187 See Greens and M.T. v the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 6004/08 and 60054/08 (ECtHR, 23 
November 2010) operative paragraph (6). 
188 See, Chapter III.  
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margin of appreciation that states have in the definition of its own policies.  It is 
difficult to establish how this balance should be established as this is something that 
should be decided by the ICJ case by case.  
 
2.4  Circumstances when assurances and GNR should be awarded 
 
GNR have been recognized to be of an ‘exceptional character’189 and usually 
granted only when ‘circumstances so require.’190 This characteristic appears in the 
articles adopted by the Drafting Committee in 1992, according to which:  
‘The injured State is entitled, where appropriate, to obtain from the State 
which has committed an internationally wrongful act assurances or 
guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful act.’191 [emphasis added] 
In the discussions of the drafting Committee, ‘guarantees of non-repetition’ were not 
necessarily considered a form of reparation that should be granted to every ‘injured 
state’, but rather an exceptional remedy192 that should proceed depending on the 
circumstances of the case. According to the Drafting Committee:  
‘the words ‘where appropriate’ were intended to give the article the 
necessary flexibility in that respect and, in effect, left it to the judge (or 
the third party called upon to apply the rules) to determine whether, in the 
                                                             
189 ILC, Draft Articles, commentary Article 30, para 13. 
190 idem article 30 (b). 
191 ILC, ‘Draft articles on State responsibility: Titles and texts of articles adopted by the 
Drafting Committee: Part 2’ [1992]. A/CN.4/L.472, in I ILC Yearbook 1992, p.215. 
192 ILC, ‘Summary Records of the 2288th ILC meeting’ (20 July 1992) U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1992, in I ILC Yearbook, p.222, para 64. 
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particular instance, it was justifiable to allow for assurances or 
guarantees of non-repetition.’193  
This element of ‘flexibility’ was also incorporated in the Reports on State 
Responsibility presented by the Special Rapporteur Mr. James Crawford.194 The 
formula ‘if circumstances so require’ was finally adopted by the Drafting Committee 
and introduced into the ILC Draft Articles 2001.195 The current formulation of the 
article on cessation and non-repetition establishes: 
‘The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition, if circumstances so require’. [emphasis added] 
Besides, the ILC has recognised that there is an element of ‘flexibility’ in the award of 
these measures; it would be desirable to have a standard in order to understand in 
which concrete circumstances parties can request such measures. Some insights 
can be found in the Drafting Committee’s discussion of the ILC articles. During such 
discussion of the Draft Articles in 1992, the Committee refers to ‘a real risk of 
repetition’ and to the suffering of a ‘substantial injury’, as examples of conditions for 
its granting such measures. According to the Drafting Committee:  
                                                             
193 idem para 65.  
194 According to the Special Rapporteur Mr. James Crawford ‘This element of flexibility is 
reflected in article 46 by the qualifying phrase ‘where appropriate’, at Doc. A/CN.4/507 and 
Add. 1-4., para 58; he also stated that ‘Under article 30 (b), assurances or guarantees of non-
repetition are exceptional remedies which may be called for in certain cases if there is reason 
to apprehend a further breach of the obligation’, in ILC, ‘Fourth Report on State responsibility, 
by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’ (2001) Doc. A/CN.4/517 and Add. 1, p.9, para 
32.  
195 According to the ILC Draft Articles, article 30 (b).  
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‘The conditions for granting such a remedy should, for instance, be that a 
real risk of repetition existed and that the claimant State had already 
suffered a substantial injury.’196  
In 2001, before the approval of the ILC Draft Articles, the Drafting Committee again 
discussed a similar standard:  
‘The obligation to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition was understood to arise as a function of the risk of non-
repetition, the gravity of the wrongful act and the nature of the obligation 
breached. It was also felt that assurances of non-repetition were required 
not only where there was a pattern of repetition of the wrongful act, but 
also where there was a risk of repetition or, alternatively, where the 
breach was particularly grave, even if the risk of repetition was minimal. 
The addition of the words ‘if circumstances so require’ was said to clarify 
the dependence of the concept of the particular context.’197 [emphasis 
added] 
In support of this standard the Special Rapporteur Mr. James Crawford suggested 
that, for the granting of ‘guarantees of non-repetition,’ precise circumstances should 
be taken into account including ‘the nature of the obligation and of the breach.’198 
Also, during the discussion of these articles, ‘the seriousness of the breach and the 
                                                             
196 ILC, ‘Summary Records of the 2288th ILC meeting’ op. cit. p.222, para 65.  
197 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session 
(2000), Topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly during its fifty-fifth session prepared by the Secretariat’ (15 February 2001) 
A/CN.4/513, para 57.  
198 A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4 para 58.  
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probability of repetition’ were suggested as parameters for the granting of such 
measures.199  
Despite the standard established by the ILC Draft Articles, the case law of the ICJ 
has not always been clear or consistent about the circumstances in which to award 
GNR. As already mentioned, the ICJ denied the ordering of GNR in the cases: 
Cameroon v Nigeria (2002), Bosnia v Serbia (2007), Costa Rica v Nicaragua (2009) 
and Argentina v Uruguay (2010,) considering that they should be granted only under 
‘specific circumstances’, that there was no reason to think that the acts would 
happen again, and that ‘good faith’ must be presumed. Even though in these four 
cases the Court applied the same criteria to consider the request for GNR, a more 
detailed analysis shows that the application of this criterion may not be justified in 
every case.  
 
Taking into account the factors established by the Draft Committee, the decisions of 
the ICJ in Cameroon v. Nigeria (2002) and Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (2009) may be 
defensible. In both cases the debate was related to a border dispute which was 
unlikely to happen again and, therefore, had a very low risk of repetition.200 The 
decision in the case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (2010) can also be 
legitimate, since the main claim requested by Argentina (due to the pollution it 
created, that the Onion mill built on the Uruguay River, be dismantled) was rejected 
                                                             
199 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the fifty-second session’ (1 May- 9 
June and 10 July-18 August 2000) Doc. A/55/10*, para. 91. 
200 While in the Cameroon v. Nigeria Case the Court discussed a problem related to the 
course of the maritime boundary between these two countries, in the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua 
case there was a dispute of a section of the San Juan River for navigation purposes by Costa 
Rica. 
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by the Court. As a consequence, any request for further redress would be without 
practical implication.201  
 
Probably the most controversial case, as a result of the rejection of GNR, was the 
ICJ’s case of Bosnia v Serbia (2007). In this case, the ICJ found that Serbia and 
Montenegro were not responsible for the genocide committed against the Muslims 
and Croats in Bosnia, in what was called the Srebrenica massacre. The Court, 
however, found Serbia and Montenegro responsible for the violation of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter 
CPPCG) in that they did nothing to prevent the genocide from occurring, and 
afterward did not punish the perpetrators. Bosnia requested that Serbia and 
Montenegro provide guarantees that it would not commit the wrongful act again. 
According to the Court, since this request was related to the finding that Serbia 
committed Genocide, a finding which eventually was not upheld by the Court, the 
submission failed. The Court also considered whether the claim for GNR was 
appropriate, in relation to the duty to prevent and punish genocide. However, once 
again the Court decided that the declaration, according to which Serbia would 
immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligation to 
punish acts of genocide, or any other acts proscribed by Article III of the Convention; 
to transfer individuals accused of genocide for trial by the ICTY; and to co-operate 
fully with that Tribunal, was an appropriate form of satisfaction, and therefore, GNR 
would be inappropriate.202  
                                                             
201 The ICJ justified the rejection for GNR reiterating its previous jurisprudence, according to 
which ‘As a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct has 
been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the future, since its 
good faith must be presumed’. Pulp Mills para 278. 
202 Bosnia v. Serbia paras 465-466. 
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The rejection of the Court to grant GNR may be open to criticism. On the one hand, 
as presented by Tomuschat, GNR are part of the consequences for the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act (Article 30 ICL Articles) and not a form of reparation 
(Article 34 ICL Articles). As a consequence, GNR are not only dependable on the 
breach of a primary duty, but should be awarded under a more general basis.203 In 
this case, rejecting the request because there was no violation of the duty not to 
commit genocide, and, similarly, no complicity, conspiracy and incitement, is just a 
‘misleading twist’ of the Court.204 On the other hand, as suggested by the claimants 
in the case, analysis of the circumstances showed that there were still some 
movements from Serbia calling for genocide.205 In particular, the fact that Serbia did 
not show any effective measures to transfer individuals accused of genocide to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), showed the lack of 
interest of the state in preventing the repetition of these facts.206 Moreover, the case 
found Serbia responsible for not preventing genocide; a serious breach of 
international law. The fact that the case was dealing with very serious violations of 
international law, with enormous consequences for the stability of the region, should 
be enough to request the state to display effective measures that ensure the non-
repetition of these, or similar, facts in the future.  
                                                             
203 For a full development of this argument see Tomuschat, Reparation in Cases of Genocide 
912. 
204 idem 911. 
205 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Public sitting held on Tuesday 7 March 
2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding - Oral arguments on 
behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mr. Condorelli, Mr. Pellet and Mr. Franck) [2006] CR 
2006/11, para 28, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10606.pdf (accessed on 23 
June 2015) 
206 See also, Tomuschat Reparation in Cases of Genocide 912.  
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In other cases the Court has held that the commitment of the respondent state to 
comply with its obligations, must be sufficient in order to satisfy the request of GNR. 
In the case DRC v Uganda Case (2005), the DRC requested ‘a solemn declaration 
that [Uganda] will in future refrain from pursuing a policy that violates the sovereignty 
of the DRC,’207 in addition it demanded ‘that specific instruction to that effect be given 
by the Ugandan authorities to their agents.’208 Since Uganda had signed a Tripartite 
Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes, which obliged Uganda to 
respect the sovereign and territory, the Court considered that this must be 
understood as a legally binding undertaking that Uganda will not repeat the facts in 
the future.209 The trust of the Court in the DRC may be understandable, as the 
signature of the treaty showed the active will of Uganda to not repeat these facts. 
In Avena, however, the reasoning of the Court does not seem to be justified. In this 
case, Mexico requested GNR on the basis that the measures taken by the US, to 
inform people about consular rights, is not effective and that there is a ‘regular and 
continuous’ pattern of breaches by the US in this regard. The United States 
explained that, since LaGrand, it had taken steps (i.e. the distribution of booklets 
informing about consular rights). The Court took note of the commitment undertaken 
by the United States to ensure implementation of their obligations, and found that 
this commitment must be regarded as meeting the request by Mexico for GNR.210  
The excessive trust of the Court in the US, in the Avena Case, seems to be naive. 
The case practically mirrors the judgement in LaGrand. In both cases the facts 
related to the lack of compliance with article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations; GNR were requested and later rejected under the argument 
                                                             
207 Congo v. Uganda para 255. 
208 idem para 255. 
209 idem para 257. 
210 Avena paras 59-60. 
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that, the commitment of the United States to ensure the implementation of specific 
measures in order to comply with its obligations under Article 36, was enough to 
meet the request for GNR.   
In this regard, Mexico argued that the deficiencies in the granting of information were 
not exclusive to these two cases, but were part of a ‘regular and continuous’ breach, 
identifying at least one hundred cases where Mexican nationals, during the first half 
of 2003, were not, in a timely fashion, notified of their consular rights.211 The Court, 
however, did not take into account this argument, and without actually providing a 
reason, held that ‘there is no evidence properly before [the Court] that would 
establish a general pattern.’212   
In order to justify its decision the Court relied on information provided by the United 
States, about the considerable efforts of American authorities to provide consular 
information, including the distribution of a booklet among authorities of the State 
Department. The fact that Mexico was bringing a case for the same facts presented 
in LaGrand, proves that the United States did not take seriously the commitment it 
made in this latter case. In fact, as Tranel has stated, after 11/9, U.S. authorities 
have detained a large number of foreign nationals without providing timely 
notification to the respective consulate.213 Additionally, domestic authorities have not 
always enforced the individual rights stemming from Article 36 of Vienna Convention, 
and the ones who have done so, do not necessarily refer to LaGrand.214  
                                                             
211 Avena para 146.  
212 Avena para 149. 
213 Adrienne Tranel, ‘The Ruling of the International Court of Justice in Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals: Enforcing the Right to Consular Assistance in U.S. Jurisprudence’ (2004-
2005) 20 American University International Law Review 403, p.449. 
214 Tranel The Ruling of the International Court […] 450. 
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The Court should have analysed more carefully the effectiveness of such measures 
before relying upon the good faith of the United States. In this sense, the Court could 
have ordered the United States to adopt effective measures to prevent, by means of 
its own choosing, the repetition of these facts.215 This generic statement would have 
forced the U.S. government to put in place other type of measures that effectively 
tackle the problem of lack of consular notification. More effective and detailed 
measures to secure the effective prevention of such violations were at the disposal 
of the United States, such as the judicial enforcement of the judgement in the 
domestic law,216 and the application of the American Bar Association’s adaptation of 
revised ‘Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases’ which establishes a duty of defence counsel to inform clients 
of their right to speak to the relevant consulate.217 Although more detailed measures 
would have been desirable,218 at least a general statement calling for the adoption of 
effective measures would have contributed to the implementation of measures.  
In the cases of Liechtenstein v. Germany (2005) and Djibouti v. France (2008), the 
ICJ did not discuss the request made by the complainant states to provide GNR. In 
                                                             
215 The ICJ used the formula ‘by means of its own choosing’ to order the United States to 
provide a review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of Mexican nationals. 
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) [2009] ICJ Rep 3, para 9. 
216 See Tranel The Ruling of the International Court […] 453-461. Similarly, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has increasingly awarded in its decisions, the duty of 
judges to perform a ‘control of conventionality’ when deciding cases that may rise from a 
violation of human rights. 
217 Tranel The Ruling of the International Court […] 461-463. 
218 According to Stephen Tully, the practice of the ICJ will evolve in providing more detailed 
measures of redress, as has been the practice in the European Court of Human Rights. Tully 
By Means of its Own Choosing 476.  
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the case Liechenstein v. Germany (2005), the Court did not consider it necessary to 
study the request for GNR, since the objection proposed by Liechtenstein relating to 
the lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis, was upheld by the Court. In Djibouti v. 
France (2008), the ICJ found that France had failed to comply with its international 
obligations, and that the ICJ’s findings constituted adequate satisfaction. As a 
consequence, it did not refer to the request for GNR or any other request for 
reparations. The silence of the Court may be justified in the cases Liechenstein v. 
Germany and Djibouti v. France. While the first case did not study the substance of 
the case, and therefore it is understandable that it does not provide any reparation 
measure, the second is related to a specific violation of a non-continuous character, 
one that does not require the adoption of GNR.   
In the Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory (2004), however, the Court clearly avoided the topic, despite Jordan 
requesting Israel to bring the illegal situation to an end by ceasing the construction of 
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and asking for appropriate 
assurances and GNR219. The Court did not provide any explanation for this silence, 
characterized by Barbier as part of the reluctance of the Court to recognize GNR as 
a consequence of the wrongdoing of a state.220  
The analysis of these cases shows the criteria of the Court in granting GNR. In most 
of the cases, the Court seems to have a very restrictive view about the type of 
circumstances that require the granting of GNR, therefore rejecting the request for 
guarantees, even in cases of, what can be considered, serious breaches (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Case). In other cases, the Court acknowledged the granting of 
GNR, by accepting a commitment of the responsible state to abide by obligations, as 
being enough to avoid the repetition of the facts (DRC v Uganda, Avena, LaGrand v. 
                                                             
219 Construction of a wall, para 144-145. 
220 Barbier Assurances and Guarantees of Non-repetition 555. 
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US). In others, the Court does not even explain the denial of the measures 
requested (Liechtenstein v. Germany). The Court needs to make clear in which 
circumstances GNR should be granted. The standard proposed during the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly, according to which, the risk of repetition, the 
seriousness of the breach and the character of the obligation breached, should be 
taken into account for the awarding of these remedies, may play an important role in 
the clarification of this standard. 221   
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The previous analysis shows that GNR have been clearly recognised by the ILC 
Commission in the Draft Articles of State Responsibility, and the ICJ in its case law. 
Although it is still not clear whether there is an international customary law obligation 
of states to offer GNR, the practice of both international tribunals and states, as well 
as treaty law, for example as recognised in article 24 of the ICPPED, is moving 
towards the recognition of such duty under customary law.  
Regarding the application of GNR, the ICJ has limited itself to ordering states to 
uphold its promise to fulfil its obligation, without ordering the states to take concrete 
and additional measures in order to secure this promise. Legislative reforms, 
although theoretically possible, have never been ordered in practice. In general, the 
ICJ has been very deferential to states regarding the means by which they comply 
with their obligations.  
                                                             
221 According to the Committee ‘assurances of non-repetition were required not only where 
there was a pattern of repetition of the wrongful act, but also where there was a risk of 
repetition or, alternatively, where the breach was particularly grave, even if the risk of 
repetition was minimal’; At A/CN.4/513, para 57. 
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In relation to the circumstances in which to be applied, GNR are not granted in all 
situations but only when circumstances ‘so require’. It has been proposed that GNR 
should be awarded by taking into account the risk of repetition, the seriousness of 
the breach and the character of the obligation breached.222 This constitutes a 
reasonable standard for the provision of these measures in international law. In the 
coming chapters, this standard will be examined further, when considering the order 
of GNR by other bodies. 
 
                                                             
222 idem.  
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CHAPTER II: GNR AND GENERAL MEASURES 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
As GNR have gained a place under PIL, the same has been the case in international 
human rights law. International human rights treaties, as well as, the practice of 
various UN human rights bodies and regional human rights courts, show that the 
concepts of GNR and general measures are now part of their daily work and of the 
orders/recommendations they make. This chapter will present the recent 
developments of these concepts in both, global and regional instruments, aiming at 
clarifying the nature and scope of this type of remedy. 
 
1. Differences in the redress of violations under PIL and 
International Human Rights Law, and its impact in the 
understanding of GNR in IHRL 
 
There are several differences between the redress of violations under PIL and 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL).PIL deals with violations committed by one 
state against other; whereas IHRL deals with violations usually committed by a state 
against an individual. In those cases where a state has committed a wrong against 
the national of another state, such disputes have been solved under the law of 
reparations for injuries to aliens under the general principles of reparations of PIL. 
However, even in those cases, and as Shelton has underlined, there are several 
differences in the treatment of reparations that distinguish the redress of reparations 
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for injured to aliens (under PIL) from the redress of reparations for human rights 
violations (under IHRL).223  
One of the differences is related to the source of the duty to repair. Even though the 
source of obligations in international law is a bilateral or multilateral treaty where all 
states are considered as equal with reciprocal obligations; the source of obligations 
in IHRL is either a human rights treaty or a human rights obligation imposed by 
customary law, which represent minimums of dignity and equality obligatory to 
everyone. 
There are also differences in terms of the nature of the obligation. As most of the 
international law duties are reciprocal or contractual, breaches to these obligations 
are considered an injury to the state itself. In contrast, human rights obligations 
impose particular rights on individual persons, and the corresponding duties on 
states. As a consequence, a breach to a human rights obligation is a breach against 
the rights of a human being rather than against the rights of a state. In the words of 
the Inter American Court: 
‘modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention 
in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded 
to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of 
the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the 
basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, 
both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States. 
In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common 
                                                             
223 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 97-102. 
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good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but 
towards all individuals within their jurisdiction.’224 
Contrary to the reciprocal system of obligations of international law, human rights law 
establishes an objective regime where many of its obligations are erga omnes, 
meaning that all states have the duty to vindicate them. 
Differences in the source and nature of both regimes have consequences in the type 
of redress awarded. Public international law allows the injured state to take counter-
measures based on a decentralized system that allows each state to vindicate their 
rights in pursue of reestablishing the legal relationship;225 nevertheless, breaches to 
the human rights regime would never justify a state to perform the same violation on 
any national of the breaching state. The public or erga omnes nature of the human 
rights regime requires supervisory bodies to impose remedies that not only protect 
individuals from human rights violations but, also deter the commission of future 
violations.226 As Shelton emphasized, human rights violations performed by the state 
are different from the ones performed by a private party.227 As the state is 
responsible for securing compliance with a human rights regime, the breach of its 
own duties increases the risk that similar violations are performed by other actors.  
It is precisely due to the public dimension of redress in IHRL that measures of 
satisfaction and GNR acquire a special attention function in IHRL. In her own words:  
‘Thus, society as well as the individual victim is injured when human 
rights are violated. […] If society as a whole is injured by human rights 
                                                             
224 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Arts. 74 and 75) Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No. 2 (24 
September 1982) 
225 ILA Draft Articles, article 22, p. 75 and Chapter II, Commentary 1, p.128. 
226 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 99. 
227 Idem 
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violations, so also may society as a whole benefit from public 
remedies.’228 
This public dimension of remedies in IHRL will permeate the understanding of GNR 
in IHRL at both, global and regional levels. Whereas in PIL, GNR are designed to 
secure the state that similar breaches will not happen in the future; in IHRL, GNR 
are a guarantee to the society as a whole that similar violations will not be performed 
by the state again.229   
 
2. GNR and general measures in global human rights 
instruments 
 
The term GNR has gained momentum in international human rights law, particularly 
since its insertion in soft law documents such as the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation. UN committees do not explicitly refer to 
this term but have increasingly incorporated the recommendation of general 
measures in its practice which, mutatis mutandis, could be understood as an 
equivalent term. This section analyses the origin and practice of these concepts in 
both the core international human rights instruments and UN treaty-monitoring 
bodies.  
  
                                                             
228 Idem 99 – 100. 
229 Case of Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C. No. 92 (27 February 2002) para 110. 
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2.1 Hard and soft law on the duty to provide GNR 
 
The insertion of GNR as a specific form of reparation was first proposed in the work 
of Theo van Boven in the ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation for victims of gross violation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’230 In this study several forms of satisfaction and GNR were listed in cases 
of gross violations of human rights. 
Subsequently, some reports authored by UN rapporteurs elaborated on the meaning 
of GNR in the context of impunity. In the Louis Joinet’s report on the ‘Question of the 
impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political),’231 he included 
a section on GNR. An updated and more detailed version of these principles against 
impunity was elaborated by Diane Orentlicher in the ‘Updated set of principles for the 
protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity.’232 
Together with the right to know, and the right to justice, ‘the right to 
reparation/guarantees of non-recurrence’ was included here as one of the duties of 
the states to combat impunity. The principles include a section on ‘Guarantees of 
non-recurrence’, according to which: 
                                                             
230 UNCHR, ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (2 July 1993) U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1993/8, para 137 (11).  
231 UNCHR, ‘Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and 
political), Revised final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 
1996/119’ (2 Oct 1997) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, para 45.  
232 UNCHR, ‘Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to combat 
impunity, Diane Orentlicher’; Updates Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of 
human rights through action to combat impunity’ (8 February 2005) E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 
principles 35-38. 
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‘States shall ensure that victims do not again have to endure violations of 
their rights. To this end, States must undertake institutional reforms and 
other measures necessary to ensure respect for the rule of law, foster 
and sustain a culture of respect for human rights, and restore or establish 
public trust in government institutions.’233   
As noted in chapter I, GNR were included, in 2006, in the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law which currently constitute the most recognized authority for the 
establishment of a duty to provide GNR in international human rights law.234 Article 
18 of the Guidelines includes GNR together with, restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, and satisfaction, as one of the forms of reparations that should be 
granted in cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. The Guidelines establish that this form of 
reparations should be awarded ‘as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the 
violation and the circumstances of each case.’235 Paragraph 23 of the Guidelines 
also lists some of the measures that could be considered as part of the GNR: 
‘23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any 
or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:  
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;  
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by 
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;  
                                                             
233 idem principle 35. 
234 UNGA, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147.  
235 idem article 18. 
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(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;  
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, 
the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;  
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and 
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and 
training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security 
forces;  
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in 
particular international standards, by public servants, including law 
enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service 
and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;  
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts 
and their resolution;  
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.’  
 
The Guidelines have become the most authoritative source236 on the right to a 
remedy and reparation under international human rights law.  
                                                             
236 The Guidelines ‘do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal 
obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law’ See, 
idem Preamble. They have also been cited by the International Court of Justice (hereinafter 
ICC) when defining the concept of victims. See for example, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims’ participation 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
119, para 35.   
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In 2012, the first Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, was appointed by the United Nations. 
In September 2015, he published a report elaborating upon the main elements of a 
framework for designing State policies regarding ‘guarantees of non-recurrence.’237 
In this report he clarifies the concept of ‘guarantees of non-recurrence’ in the context 
of mass violations, and as part of a transitional justice strategy. In this regard, he 
emphasises the preventive nature of the concept, as well as its increasing use 
among regional human rights courts and human rights treaty bodies.238 According to 
the report ‘the “offer” of guarantees of non-recurrence relates to a combination of 
deliberate, diverse interventions that contribute to a reduction in the likelihood of 
recurring violations.’239 This preventive understanding of ‘guarantees of non-
recurrence’ proceeds in the same direction as the one developed by the ILC and 
other UN rapporteurs. 
As the mandate of the rapporteur is mainly oriented to promote the main 
components of transitional justice, the report also distinguishes between those 
components and guarantees of non-recurrence. Unlike truth, justice and reparation, 
which are understood as transitional justice measures, guarantees of non-recurrence 
are understood as ‘a function that can be satisfied by a broad variety of 
measures.’240 Such measures can be oriented to intervene in the institutional, 
societal and cultural spheres of a State. This is also in keeping with the broad scope 
                                                             
237 UN, Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence’, Pablo de Greiff (7 September 2015) 
A/HRC/30/42. 
238 idem paras 18-19. 
239 idem para 25. 
240 Idem para 23. 
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of measures developed in international human rights law as part of guarantees of 
non-repetition which will be presented in chapters II and III of this thesis.  
The report also provides some clarification about the ‘object’ of guarantees of non-
recurrence. According to the report, ‘guarantees of non-recurrence’ are not for the 
prevention of isolated violations, ‘but of gross human rights violations and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Such violations presuppose systemic 
abuses of (State) power that have a specific pattern and rest on a degree of 
organizational set-up.’241 Here again, the report agrees with the concept of, and 
circumstances developed for, the awarding of guarantees of non-repetition in PIL. 
In addition to these soft law documents242, the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICCPED) is the only human 
rights treaty to make an explicit reference to GNR as one of the forms of reparation. 
According to Article 24 (5) of this Convention: 
´5. The right to obtain reparation referred to in paragraph 4 of this article 
covers material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms 
of reparation such as:  
( a ) Restitution;  
( b ) Rehabilitation;  
( c ) Satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and reputation;  
                                                             
241 Idem para 25. 
242 As Abbott and Snidal have stated the term hard law ‘refers to legally binding obligations 
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication of the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law’. In turn the 
term soft law ‘begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one of more of the 
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation’. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 International Organization 421 pp. 
421-422. 
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( d ) Guarantees of non-repetition´.  
 
The ICCPED was adopted in 2006, entered into force in 2010, and up to September 
2015 has been ratified by 50 states’ parties. During the discussion of the draft of the 
treaty, no state made any mention against the inclusion of GNR as a form of 
reparation, showing an increasing acceptance of a duty to provide GNR in the last 
years.  
That this treaty is the only one to explicitly refer to GNR should not be taken to mean 
that other human rights treaties do not recognise the concept. Indeed, it has been 
understood that all human rights treaties establish a right of victims to obtain 
reparation within the domestic legal system, even if they do not always expressly 
recognise such a right.243 
                                                             
243 See, International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 21 December 1965), 660 UNTS 195 
(ICERD) Article 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (adopted 16 
December 1966,entered into force 23 March 1976) 999UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Article 2(3); 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1495 UNTS 85 
(CAT) Article 14; International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (adopted 12 January 2007, entered into force 23 December 2010) (ICPPED) 
Article 24 (4).  
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2.2 General measures in the practice of the United Nations Treaty - 
monitoring Bodies 
 
All the UN human rights bodies have increasingly recommended to states the 
adoption of general remedial measures as a form of redress in the analysis of 
individual communications. This reinforces the current practice of regional human 
rights courts which, as will be developed in this and the following chapter, have also 
applied GNR as a form of reparation. 
 
2.2.1 Human Rights Committee  
 
Since its first cases, the HRC has recognized the existence of a duty of states to 
provide remedies. In one of its first cases related to the unlawful detention of several 
member of a family in Uruguay, the Committee considered that the State party is 
under an obligation to ‘provide effective remedies to the victims’.244 The HRC has 
usually referred to article 2, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, as the basis for the 
determination of remedial measures. This practice continues nowadays.  
The duty to provide remedial measures, however, has been expressed in different 
ways. Whereas in a few cases the HRC has found a violation without referring to any 
form of redress; in most of the cases the Committee has stated that the state should 
procure the redress of the victim, for example, by providing an effective remedy 
                                                             
244 HRC, Moriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay (1984) Comm. No. 5/1977, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 40, para 10. 
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including compensation.245 In other cases it has expressed that states should 
prevent any recurrence of the violation without detailing what particular measures 
should be taken.246  
When providing remedial measures the Committee has recommended both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary redress. Within the non-pecuniary measures, the 
Committee has recommended a large variety of  measures such as, restitution, 
satisfaction and GNR. As for the GNR the HRC has provided this form of redress 
since its first cases. In the Uruguayan case Moriana Hernandez Valentini de 
Bazzano v. Uruguay the Committee also established that ‘the State party is under an 
obligation to take immediate steps to ensure strict observance of the provisions of 
the Covenant.’247 In a similar case, also against Uruguay, the HRC established that 
the State should take measures to ensure ‘that similar violations do not occur in the 
future.’248 More recently the Human Rights Committee has recognized the existence 
of a duty of states to ‘avoid similar violations in the future’,249 or ‘to take steps to 
prevent similar violations in the future.’250 
                                                             
245 HRC, Edgardo Dante Santullo Valcada v. Uruguay (1984) Comm. No. 9/1977, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 at 43 (1984) para 13. 
246 HRC, Aïcha Dehimi and Noura Ayache v. Algeria (2014) Comm. No. 2018/2011, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2086/2011, para 10. 
247 HRC, Moriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay (1984) Comm. No. 5/1977, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 40, para 10. 
248 HRC, Ann Maria Garcia Lanza de Netto v. Uruguay (1984) Comm. No. 8/1977, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 at 45, para 17. 
249 HRC, Devian and Narrain et al v. Mauritius (2012) Comm. No. 1744/2007, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/105/D/1744/2007, para 17. 
250 HRC, M.I. v. Sweden (2013) Comm. No. 2149/2012; U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012, para 9; HRC, Andrei Olechkevitch v. Belarus (2013) Comm. No. 
1785/2008, U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/107/D/1785/2008, para 10; HRC, Zhanna Kovsh v. Belarus 
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Under the form of GNR, the Committee has recommended states to amend, repeal, 
and align national law with the Covenant, improve prisoners’ conditions, as well as, 
change official practices. As for legal reforms, since 1984 when the Committee 
recommended Mauritius to amend its immigration law,251 the Committee’s 
jurisprudence has had several examples where it has stated that the laws or 
regulations of a particular state do not line up with the Covenant. When 
recommending legislative changes, the position of the Committee has not always 
been consistent. Whereas in some cases it has explicitly made clear what  the law or 
regulations to be changed are,252 in cases related to capital punishment it has stated 
that the state should ‘ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future’; 
however, it has done so with no details about what laws need to be changed.253 In 
some cases, it has not even indicated that the law should be repelled.254 In many 
cases the Committee follows the general formula of establishing that there is a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(2013) Comm. No. 1787/2008, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008, para 9; HRC, Slimane 
Mechani v. Algeria (2013) Comm. No. 1807/2008, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1807/2008, para 
10.   
251 HRC, Shirin AumeeruddyCziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v Mauritius (1984) Comm. 
No. 3/1978, CCPR/C/OP/1 para 11. 
252  HRC, Valery Aleksandrov v. Belarus (2014) Comm. No. 1933/2010, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/111/D/1933/2010, para 9; HRC Petr Kuznetsov et al. v. Belarus (2014) Comm. No. 
1976/2010, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/111/D/1976/2010, para 11. 
253 HRC, George Osbourne v. Jamaica (2000) Comm. No. 759/1997, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/68/D/759/1997, para 11. 
254 HRC, Boodlal Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago (2000) Comm. No. 28/2000, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/73/D/928/2000, para 6.  
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violation of the Covenant and recommending that changes in the legislation are 
necessary, without establishing what particular changes should be applied.255  
In very few cases the HRC has recommended the adoption of a new law. For 
example, in a conscientious objection case, the Committee ordered the Republic of 
Korea to adopt legislative measures guaranteeing this right.256 
In prisons conditions cases, the Committee has been limited to ensure that the 
conditions of detention should be compatible with the Convention without explaining 
in detail which measures should be taken.257 
In cases where the Committee has recommended official practices, it has, for 
instance, recommended the state to allow its officials to respond in a different 
language to the official one, in order to avoid discrimination.258 Recently, in cases 
again Bosnia and Herzegovina, it recommended that investigation of enforced 
                                                             
255 HRC, Pedro Pablo Camargo v. Colombia (1985) Comm. No. 45/1979, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 at 112, para 15; HRC, Consuelo Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia (1982) 
Comm. No. R.15/64, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 168, para 12; HRC, Ballantyne, 
Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada (1993) Comms. Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1, para 13. 
256 HRC, Min-Kyu Jeong et al. v. The Republic of Korea (2011) Comm. No. 1642-1741/2007, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/2007, para 9. 
257 HRC, Ms. Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. The Russian Federation (2002) Comm. No. 
763/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997, paras 11 and 12; HRC, Mr. Carlos Cabal and 
Mr. Marco Pasini Bertran v. Australia (2003) Comm. No. 1020/2001, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 paras 10 and 11. 
258 HRC. J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. 
Namibia (2000) Comm. No. 760/1997, CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000) para 12. 
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disappearances should be available to relatives.259 Furthermore, it has suggested 
not to apply the domestic legal framework in a way that relatives of victims require a 
death certification in order to obtain reparations.260 Besides, the HRC has been 
generally reluctant to recommend the state to provide training to officials in order to 
guarantee compliance to international standards.261However, it has recommended 
the training of military personal in order to prevent torture and ill-treatment of 
prisoners in concluding observations to Colombia,262 Libya263 and Hungary.264  
 
2.2.2  Committee against Torture 
 
In turn, the Committee against Torture (CAT) has developed the content of GNR, 
particularly in its General Comment No. 3 on the ‘Implementation of article 14 by 
                                                             
259 HRC, Tija Hero, Ermina Hero, Armin Hero et al v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014) Comm. 
No. 1966/2010, CCPR/C/112/D/1966/2010, para 11; HRC, EminaKozljak and Sinan Kozljak 
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014) Comm. No. 1970/2010, CCPR/C/112/D/1970/2010, para 
11. 
260  HRC, Tija Hero, Ermina Hero, Armin Hero et al v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014) Comm. 
No. 1966/2010, CCPR/C/112/D/1966/2010, para 11. 
261 See for example HRC, L.M.R. v Argentina (2011) Comm. No. 1608/2007, 
CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007,para 11. In this case the Court refused to recommend training to 
health workers besides it was clear in the case they did not know how to apply the particular 
law on access to legal abortion.  
262 HRC, Concluding Observations: Colombia (3 May 1997) CCPR/C/79/Add.76, para 35. 
263 HRC, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (6 November 1998) 
CCPR/C79/Add.101, para 10. 
264 HRC, Concluding Observations: Hungary (25 September 2002) CCPR/CO/74/HUN, para 
12. 
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States parties.’265 In the General Comment it has stated that the term ‘effective 
remedy’ entails GNR among other forms of reparations.266 It has also distinguished 
between the procedural and substantive obligations of states to provide redress.267 
The General Comment lists several preventive measures that are necessary to 
prevent torture, providing a broad spectrum of measures that could be potentially 
requested by petitioners in individual communications before the Committee. 
Particularly regarding GNR it has listed several measures such as.  
‘[…] issuing effective, clear instructions to public officials on the 
provisions of the Convention, especially the absolute prohibition of 
torture. Other measures should include any or all of the following: civilian 
oversight of military and security forces; ensuring that all judicial 
proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness 
and impartiality; strengthening the independence of the judiciary; 
protecting human rights defenders and legal, health and other 
professionals who assist torture victims; establishing systems for regular 
and independent monitoring of all places of detention; providing, on a 
priority and continued basis, training for law enforcement officials as well 
as military and security forces on human rights law that includes the 
specific needs of marginalized and vulnerable populations and specific 
training on the Istanbul Protocol for health and legal professionals and 
law enforcement officials; promoting the observance of international 
standards and codes of conduct by public servants, including law 
                                                             
265 Particularly in the General Comment No. 3 on the ‘Implementation of article 14 by States 
parties’ the Committee has elaborated on the content of guarantees of non-repetition. 
266 UN, CAT, General Comment No. 3 ‘Implementation of article 14 by States parties’ (2012), 
UN. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3, paras 2 and 6. 
267 idem para 5. 
88 
 
enforcement, correctional, medical, psychological, social service and 
military personnel; reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or 
allowing torture and ill-treatment; ensuring compliance with article 3 of 
the Convention prohibiting refoulement; ensuring the availability of 
temporary services for individuals of groups of individuals, such as 
shelters for victims of gender-related or other torture or ill-treatment.’268  
 
More importantly, the General Comment 3 reinforces the link between GNR and the 
underlying causes of an specific violation, by stating that GNR ‘offer a clear potential 
for the transformation of the social relations that may be the underlying causes of 
violence and may include, but are not limited to, amending relevant laws, fighting 
impunity, and taking effective preventive and deterrent measures.’269 
However, it has not been the practice of CAT, in the analysis of individual 
communications, to recommend specific measures of general scope. Most of the 
time, the Committee against Torture restricts itself to remind the states of their duty 
to provide ‘an effective remedy’ but on very few occasions has it stated their 
obligation ‘to prevent similar violations in the future.’270 
2.2.3 CEDAW Committee 
 
The CEDAW Committee, and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities are the most prolific committees in terms of the frequency and scope of 
the GNR. Under the title ‘general measures’, the CEDAW Committee has 
                                                             
268 idem para 18. 
269 idem para 18. 
270 CAT, Oskartz Gallastegi Soduve v. Spain (2012) Comm. No. 453/2011, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/48/D/453/2011, para 9. 
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recommended states to take legislative measures;271 to provide training to judges, 
law enforcement personnel, health providers and others;272 to take measures to 
guarantee effective access to certain services;273 and to investigate promptly 
allegations of human rights violations.274 In specific cases the Committee has even 
recommended states to take measures of structural order, such as to ‘formulate 
policies and comprehensive programmes that ensure the needs of women prisoners 
are met,’275 to implement specific programs and establish committees to secure the 
protection of rights;276 and to monitor the provision of certain services.277  
                                                             
271 CEDAW, Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria (2012) Comm. No. 32/2011, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011, para 8.8 (2)(b); CEDAW, Cecilia Kell v Canada (2012) Comm. No. 
19/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C.51/D/19/2008, para 11 (b) (ii); CEDAW, T.P.F. v. Peru (2011) 
Comm. No. 22/2009, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009, para 9.2 (a) and (c; CEDAW, V.K. 
v. Bulgaria (2011) Comm. No. 20/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008, para 9.16 (b) (i). 
272 Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria para 8.8 (2) (c); T.P.F. v. Peru para 9.2 (b); V.K. v. Bulgaria para 
9.16 (b) (iv); CEDAW, Inga Abramova v. Belarus (2011) Comm. No. 23/2009, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009, para 7.9 (2) (e); CEDAW, Karen Tayag Vertido v. Philippines 
(2010) Comm. No. 18/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008, para 8.9 (iii) and (iv); 
CEDAW, Maria de Lourdes da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil (2011) Comm. No. 17/2008,  U.N. 
Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008, para 8 (II); CEDAW, Ms. Zhen Zhen Zheng v. The 
Netherlands (2008) Comm. No. 15/2007, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/42/D/15/2007, para 9.1 (II) 
(a); CEDAW, Fatima Yildirim v. Austria (2007) Comm. No. 6/2005 U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005, para 12.3 (d). 
273 Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria  para 8.8 (2) (a). 
274 Fatima Yildirim v. Austria para 12.3 (b). 
275 Inga Abramova v. Belarus para 7.9 (2) (f). 
276 The Committee  has recommended to ‘reduce preventable maternal deaths through the 
implementation of the National Pact for the Reduction of maternal Mortality at state and 
municipal levels, including by establishing maternal mortality committees where they still do 
not exist’. Maria de Lourdes da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil para (8) (2) (f). 
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2.2.4 Other committees  
 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has recommended states 
to take legislative measures,278 ensuring that certain procedures are accessible to 
people279 and to provide regular training to judges and other judicial officials.280 
Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its first case 
decided against a state, has recommended a list of ‘General Recommendations.’281 
However, other Committees like the Committee on Racial Discrimination has not 
developed the concept in individual communications, beyond requesting the state 
party to ‘give wide publicity to the Committee’s Opinion, including among prosecutors 
and judicial bodies.’282 
 
2.2.5 Conclusions 
 
Most of UN committees have included in its case law the concept of GNR or general 
measures. However, some Committees have been more proactive than others in the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
277 Fatima Yildirim v. Austria para 12.3 (a). 
278 CRPD, Zsolt Bujdosó and five others v. Hungary (2013) Comm. No. 4/201, U.N. Doc. 
CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011, para 10(2) (a and b); CRPD, Szilvia Nyusti and Péter Takács v. 
Hungary (2013) Comm. No. 1/2010, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010, para 10 (2) (a); CRPD, 
H.M. v. Sweden (2012) Comm. No. 3/2011, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/7/D/3/2011, para 9 (2). 
279 Zsolt Bujdosó and five others v. Hungary para 10(2) (c). 
280 Szilvia Nyusti and Péter Takács v. Hungary para 10 (b).  
281  CESCR, IDG v. Spain (2014) Comm. No. 2/2014, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014, para 17. 
282 CERD, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany (2013) Comm. No. 48/2010,   
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/D/48/2010; CERD, Mahali Dawas and Yousef Shava v. Denmark 
(2012) Comm. No. 46/2009, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/80/D/46/2009. 
91 
 
recommendation of general measures. Whereas the CEDAW Committee, and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities have consistently 
incorporated a section on general measures in the analysis of individual 
communications, detailing with precision the type of measures to be taken, the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) has recommended states to adopt general 
measures and to prevent future recurrence in most of its cases, but does not 
necessarily explain in detail what measures the state should take in this regard.283   
Furthermore, it is difficult to establish a general rule on how far should a UN 
Committee go in detailing the type of GNR that a state should implement in order to 
prevent the recurrence of a violation. Subsequently, a fair balance should be done in 
each case between, providing measures that are detailed enough to trigger a 
significant change in the domestic legislation and the margin of appreciation that 
each state has in defining its policies, as well as, in the perceived legitimacy of the 
Committee that recommends those changes. As it has been specified, such a 
balance has been solved in different ways by each Committee. Moreover, each case 
would require a particular analysis. In cases where clear inconsistency between a 
specific piece of legislation and the international framework is shown, it seems fair to 
say that specific measures recommending the state to amend such particular laws 
would have a greater impact than measures that generally invite the state to display 
measures in order to prevent the future commission of the acts. The fact that other 
committees are also engaging in recommending changes of legislation - without 
necessarily specifying in which way changes are to be applied- and  states are 
actively complying with these recommendations, seems to suggest that the 
                                                             
283 Viviana Krsticevic and Brian Griffey, ‘Remedial Recommendations’ in Malcom Langford & 
others (eds), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria University Law Press, 2004) Chapter 10, p.11. 
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perceived legitimacy of these Committees to engage in such recommendations has 
increased. 
None of the Committees, however, have developed a clear criteria related to the 
circumstances in which such recommendations with a general scope should be 
granted. Although many individual cases analysed by the Committees may show a 
widespread situation of human rights violations, this element is not necessarily 
required by the Committees in order to award these types of measures.  
For widespread situations, some UN Committees have established an ‘inquiry 
procedure’ whenever the Committee receives reliable information that ‘gross or 
systemic violations of human rights’ are taking place. Under this procedure, 
established under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter CAT),284 the Third Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter OP3-CRC),285 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(hereinafter OP- CRPD),286  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter OP-CEDAW),287 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
                                                             
284 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) (CAT), article 20. 
285 Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the Child on a communications 
Procedure (adopted 19 December 2011, entered into force 14 April 2014) A/RES/66/138 
(OP3-CRC) article 13. 
286 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 
December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) A/RES/61/106 (OP-CRPD) article 6. 
287 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (adopted 6 October 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) 2131 
UNTS 83, (OP-CEDAW) article 8. 
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Disappearance (hereinafter CED),288 and most recently the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter OP-
CESCR),289 the Committee is allowed to carry out visits to the country and to 
formulate general recommendations in a final report. This procedure does not require 
a specific victim or victims to be identified thus allowing the general analysis of a 
situation in a given country. Through this procedure, both CAT and CEDAW have 
analysed inquiries, recommending states to adopt ‘general recommendations’ in 
terms of, strengthening the coordination among authorities in order to carry out 
investigations, establishment of early warning mechanisms, organization of 
campaigns and setting up of programs, among other recommendations.290 There is 
not clarity, however, until what extend the general recommendations achieved as a 
result of an individual petition would be better achieved, more legitimate and with a 
wider factual base by the inquiry procedure.   
   
3. GNR and general measures in regional instruments  
 
GNR and general measures have also been used by regional bodies (commissions 
and courts). Whereas the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is by far the most 
                                                             
288 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(adopted 20 December 2006, entry into force 23 December 2010) A/RES/61/177 (ICPPED) 
article 33. 
289 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013) A/RES/63/117, article 11. 
290 See for example, UN, CEDAW, ‘Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico’ (27 January 2005) 
CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/Mexico, paras 263-294. 
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prolific in terms of the cases where it has decided to award GNR, the European, and 
African, courts have demonstrated an increasing interest in ordering general 
measures, or measures of general character, in the redress of individual cases. This 
section will present how general measures have been granted in both the European, 
and African, Courts of Human Rights. Chapter III will develop the concept of GNR in 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, given that it has crafted the most 
elaborate and far reaching jurisprudence on the subject. 
 
3.1 General measures in the European Court of Human Rights 
 
3.1.1 The award of remedies and the interpretation of ‘just satisfaction’ by the 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has jurisdiction in all cases concerning the 
interpretation and application of the European Convention.291 If the Court finds that 
there is a violation of the ECHR, the judgment will impose a legal obligation on the 
respondent state to put an end to the breach and to repair the harm. Traditionally, 
Article 41(1) has been referred as the Conventional base for the award of some type 
of reparations. According to Article 41 (1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights:  
‘If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the 
protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party 
                                                             
291 European Convention on Human Rights as amended by Protocols 11 and 14 (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), article 32 (1). 
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concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if 
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party’ [emphasis added].  
The decision of ‘just satisfaction’ included in Article 41 (1) has been generally 
interpreted in a minimalistic way by the Court as essentially ‘declaratory’. The idea of 
‘declaratory judgments’ is a reflection of the principle of subsidiarity under 
international law, according to which the primary responsibility to ensure the rights 
established in the Convention, relies on the national authorities.292 This idea is 
central for the European Court of Human Rights which is empowered to take a 
decision only in those cases where states fail in fulfilling their responsibilities. Under 
Article 41(1) of the European Convention, the Court may also include compensation 
for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, as well as legal costs and expenses. In 
these cases, the applicant must prove that there is a causal link between the 
damage claimed and the violation alleged.293  
As the decisions are, in principle, ‘declaratory,’ the Court will not normally order any 
other measure that may interfere with the ability of states to choose the means to 
comply with the Convention. As Leach presents, the Court: 
 ‘will not, however, quash decisions of domestic authorities or courts 
(including convictions), strike down domestic legislation, require a state 
to alter its legislation or otherwise require a respondent government to 
take particular measures within the national legal system (such as 
                                                             
292 Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (12 July 2000) Doc.8808, para 2, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9013&lang=en 
(consulted 27 August 2015)  
293 Philip Leach, Taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd, 2011) p. 466. 
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ordering the transfer of prisoners to the jurisdiction of another Convention 
state or order repayment of fines).’294   
Given this understanding, the Court has traditionally limited itself to establish the 
occurrence of violations and denied any power to award remedial measures 
adducing that: (i) Article 41(1) establish that its judgments are essentially declaratory; 
(ii) that is up to the respondent state to decide the means by which to redress the 
victim (Article 46 (1);295 and to the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution 
of the judgments (Article 46(2).296  
Despite this approach to reparations, the European Court’s remedial powers have 
been transformed in recent years, allowing the Court to grant measures beyond ‘just 
satisfaction’. Several authors have described how the Court has expanded its 
repertoire of remedies in particular cases, moving from a very restrictive model of 
reparations focused on the provision of ‘just satisfaction’, to the inclusion of a more 
diverse and bold set of measures through the interpretation of the concept restitution 
in integrum.297  
                                                             
294 idem 84. 
295 Marckx v Belgium App. No. 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979) para 58. 
296 Assanidze v Georgia App no 7153/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004) para 202. 
297 Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, ‘The Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific 
Non-Monetary Relief: a Critical Appraisal from a Right to Health Perspective’ (2010) 23 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 51; Valerio Colandrea, ‘On the Power of the European Court 
of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-Monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the 
Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases’ (2007) 7(2) Human Rights Law Review 396; 
Leach Taking a case to the ECHR  83-95. 
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According to this new trend, and as Philip Leach has explained,298 the European 
Court has extended its remedial powers beyond ‘just satisfaction’ by ordering 
measures of restitution in integrum, usually in cases related to the right to property. 
In Papamichalopoulos and others299 v. Greece; Brumarescu v. Romania,300 and 
Dacia S.R.L. v. Moldovaboth,301 all relating to the expropriation of private property, 
the Court ordered the return of the properties as the best way to restore the 
applicants to the situation held prior to the violation occurring.302 Also in Saghinadze 
and Others v. Georgia303 the Court proposed that, in cases where restitution in 
integrum was not possible, an alternative property should be granted.  
In other cases the Court has also ordered the states to provide the release of 
persons under unlawful arrest. In Assanidze v. Georgia, the Court found that the 
continued detention of the applicant in spite of a presidential pardon violated Article 5 
of the ECHR. The Court ordered Georgia to ‘secure the applicant’s release at the 
earliest possible date’304. Similarly, in Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, the 
                                                             
298 Leach Taking a case to the ECHR 91; Philip Leach, ‘No longer offering fine mantras to a 
parched child? The European Court’s developing approach to remedies’, in Andreas 
Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein, (eds) Constituting Europe: the European Court of 
Human Rights in a national, European and global context (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) pp. 149-161. 
299 Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece, App. no. 14556/89 (ECtHR, 31 October 1995) 
300 Brumarescu v. Romania, App. no.  28342/95 (ECtHR, 23 January 2001)  
301 Dacia SRL v. Moldova, App. no. 3052/04 (ECtHR, 24 February 2009) 
302 For an analysis of restitution in integrum in the European Court of Human Rights see 
Antoine Buyse, ‘Lost and Regained. Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights violations in 
the Context of International Law’ (2008) 68 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 
(Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht) 129. 
303 Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, App. no. 18768/05 (ECtHR, 27 May 2010). 
304 Assanidze v. Georgia, App. no. 71503/01 (ECtHR, 08 April 2004). 
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Court found that the detention of political prisoners by a non-competent Court cannot 
count as a lawful detention. As a consequence, the Court ordered the states ‘to take 
all the necessary steps to put an end to the arbitrary detention of the applicants still 
imprisoned and secure their immediate release.’305 Similar measures have also been 
awarded in other cases.306  
The Court has also awarded measures beyond ‘just satisfaction’, in some 
exceptional cases ordering the reopening of criminal proceedings. Although the 
Court has constantly emphasised that it has no jurisdiction to order the reopening of 
such proceedings,307 the Committee of Ministers has recognized that, under certain 
circumstances, the re-examination of cases by domestic authorities is the most 
efficient means to achieve restitution in integrum.308 Following this new trend, and 
since 2003, the European Court has urged states to reopen criminal proceedings 
carried out in opposition to the European Convention.309 In some exceptional cases, 
                                                             
305 Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia, App. no. 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004).  
306 See, Tehrani and others v Turkey, App. nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08 (ECtHR, 13 
April10); Yakişan v Turkey, App no. 11339/03 (ECtHR, 6  March 2007); Fatullayev v 
Azerbaijan, App. no. 40984/07 (ECtHR, 22 April10) and Aleksanyan v Russia, App no. 
46468/06 (ECtHR, 22 December 08). For a discussion of these cases, see Leach Taking a 
case to the ECHR 91-95; Leach No longer offering fine mantras to a parched child? 157-161. 
307 Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No. 2), App no. 32772/02, 
(ECtHR, 30 June09); commented in Leach Taking a case to the ECHR 94, note 100.  
308 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights  R(2000)2 (adopted on 19 January 2000 at the 694th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
309 Several Turkish cases have emphasised this point, Akkas v Turkey, App. no. 52665/99 
(ECtHR,  23 October 2003); Cakar v Turkey, App. no. 42741/98 (ECtHR, 23 October 2003), 
commented in  Leach Taking a case to the ECHR note 104, p.94. 
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such as in Scoppola (No. 2) v Italy 310 and Maksimov v Azerbaijan,311 the Court has 
stated such measures in the operative paragraphs of the decision, opening a new 
trend in the award of remedies. 
The expansion of the remedial powers of the European Court in cases related to, the 
right to property, the release of detained people and, to a lesser extent, in the 
reopening of legal proceedings, shows a broader interpretation of the concept of 
restitution of integrum that goes beyond mere compensation. This is an important, 
but still timid, step of the Court which has still not fully updated its interpretation of 
reparation measures with international standards, maintaining a very conservative 
view.  
The European Court of Human Rights has not, in general, actively engaged with 
other type of reparations measures, such as rehabilitation and GNR. In the case of 
rehabilitation, and apart from some specific cases where the Court has ordered 
compensation for past medical expenses,312 the European Court has not yet 
recognised it as a specific form of reparation.313 
Regarding GNR, they have not yet been recognized by the European Court as a 
form of redress. However, the Court has engaged in remedial measures of general 
                                                             
310 Scoppola v Italy (No. 2), App. no. 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009) Operative 
paragraphs 6 (a). 
311 Maksimov v Azerbaijan, App. no. 38228/05 (ECtHR, 8 October 2009) Operative paragraph 
(3) 
312 Aksoy v.Turkey, App. no. 21987/93 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996); Mikheyev v. Russia, 
Merits, App. no. 77617/01 (ECtHR, 26 January 2006) paras 9-27.  
313 Clara Sandoval, Rehabilitation as a form of reparation under international law, December 
2009, p. 45, available at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/The%20right%20to%20rehabilitation.pdf 
(Consulted 30 July 2015) 
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character, especially through the use of pilot and semi-pilot judgments. As will be 
explained, these measures resemble, in function, the concept of GNR in PIL and 
international human rights law. 
 
3.1.2 General measures in the Pilot Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights 
 
Among all of the regional systems, the European System of Human Rights is the 
only one that has established a specific procedure in order to deal with systemic 
violations and cases of repetitive litigation. Pilot judgements were created as an 
answer to the increasing number of complaints coming from structural or systemic 
violations of human rights, and the large backlog of pending cases resulting from 
this.314 In this regard the need for a procedure ‘that focused less on giving individual 
justice [...] and more on the systemic and structural problems which were at the root 
of repetitive cases’, was understood.315   
According to Article 61(1) of the Rules of the Court, the European Court may ‘adopt a 
pilot judgment where the facts of an application reveal in the Contracting Party 
concerned the existence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar 
dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar applications.’316 
According to this rule, pilot cases should have priority treatment. The Court should 
                                                             
314 Philip Leach, Helen Hardman, Svetlana Stephenson and Brad K. Blitz (eds.) Responding 
to Systemic Human Rights Violations – An Analysis of Pilot Judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level (Intersentia, 2010) p. 9. 
315 Interview with Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar at the European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, 25 March 2003, cited in idem 10. 
316 ECHR, Rules of Court (1 July 2014) Rule 61 (1)  
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consult the parties as to whether the case results from a structural or systemic 
problem; identify the nature of the structural or systemic problem and the type of 
remedial measures; and impose a time framework in which the measures should be 
adopted.317 The Court may also adjourn the examination of similar petitions, in which 
case the Court will retain its jurisdiction to examine the case, in the interest of the 
administration of justice.318    
The Court has applied this procedure by invoking Article 46 of the Convention, 
according to which: 
 ‘1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 
 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee 
of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.’ 
As a general principle, Article 46 does not allow the Court to determine the 
appropriate remedial measures needed to comply with the Convention, but it is up to 
the states to choose the means by which to comply with their duty. However, the 
Court has interpreted this Article flexibly, allowing the identification of precise general 
measures in cases of structural or systemic violations. This was clarified by the Court 
in the Bronioswski Case, its first pilot judgement, stating that: 
‘It is in principle not for the Court to determine what remedial measures 
may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent State’s obligations under 
Article 46 of the Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it has 
identified, the Court would observe that general measures at national 
                                                             
317 idem Rule 61 (3) and (4).  
318 idem Rule 61 (6).  
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level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the present judgment, 
measures which must take into account the many people affected.’319 
This article has opened the debate on whether the remedial measures adopted by 
the European Court are binding or not. In 2011 a new rule to the Rules of the Court 
was introduced, establishing that the Court has a binding power to grant general 
measures. The Rules of the Court establishes a regulatory framework for the 
application of the pilot procedure that clearly estates its binding power. According to 
Rule 61 (3):  
‘the Court shall in its pilot judgment identify both the nature of the 
structural or systemic problem or other dysfunction as established as well 
as the type of remedial measures which the Contracting Party concerned 
is required to take at the domestic level by virtue of the operative 
provisions of the judgment.’320  
Moreover, according to this rule, the Court can even identify a specific time within 
which the state should take the general measures (Rule 61(4). This rule codifies the 
previous practice of the Court which traditionally indicated the general measures to 
be taken by the state, in the operative paragraphs of the decision. 
Against Rule 61(3), some have argued that the competence of the Court to prescribe 
remedies should be determined in Convention provisions and not in a regulatory 
provision created by the own Court (Rules of the Court). In favour of the binding 
power of the pilot judgments, Haider has argued that the basis to empower the Court 
to determine remedial obligations can be found in Article 32 of the ECHR. Article 32 
concedes the Court jurisdiction to interpret the Convention in regard to both, the 
rights established in it and the procedural provisions established in section 2 of the 
                                                             
319 Broniowski v. Poland, App no. 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22June 2004) para 193.  
320 Rules of the Court, Rule 61 (3). 
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Convention.321 Article 32 read in conjunction with article 46 allows the Court to take 
the measures that strengthen the implementation of the Convention objects and 
purposes.322 According to Haider, by underlying a systemic problem of the 
Convention’s implementation, the Court enhances the contracting States’ 
compliance.323 Without impacting the root cause of the problem, the Court will have 
to repeatedly deal with individual cases related to a particular situation. That is why 
in this type of systemic problems, the Court has no choice in order to emphasize the 
violation and to provide some general form of redress. All in order to actually 
implement the rights established in the Convention. If the European Convention 
provides the Court the capability to interpret and decide about the rights established 
on it, it is according to its object and purpose to provide effective remedies.324  
In addition to this, and as it will be explained, the practice of the European Court in 
awarding general measures in more than 23 pilot judgements, shows that there is a 
growing practice in the Court to order these types of measures. This practice has 
also been followed via the acceptance of the states which have traditionally complied 
with the Court’s pilot decisions. Despite the Court originally denied any power to 
determine remedial obligations, the practice of the Court and the states, as well as, 
the opinion of commentators, increasingly recognises the binding power of the 
Court’s remedial decisions, particularly in pilot judgments.  
                                                             
321 Dominik Haider, The Pilot-Judgment procedure of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) p. 172. 
322 Idem p. 178. 
323 Idem pp.179-180. 
324 For a similar interpretation about the binding role of decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee see, UN. HRC, General Comment No. 33 ‘The Obligations of States Parties under 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2008) 
U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33.     
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3.1.3 Scope of the general measures granted in Pilot Judgments by the 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
By February 2015, the European Court has applied the pilot judgement in 23 
cases325 relating to: protection of property rights (Broniowski v. Poland;326 Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland;327 Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina;328 Maria Atanasiu and 
Others v. Romania;329 Manushage Puto and Others v. Albania;330 M.C. and Others v. 
Italy;331 and, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia and Slovenia;332) prolonged non-
enforcement of court decisions and lack of domestic remedies (Burdov v. Russia;333 
Olaru and others v. Moldova;334 Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine;335 and, 
                                                             
325 European Court of Human Rights, Pilot Judgments, Factsheet – Pilot judgments, June 
2015, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf 
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Gerasimov and Others v. Russia336); excessive length of proceeding and lack of 
domestic remedy (Rumpf v. Germany;337 Athanasiou and others v. Greece;338 
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria,339 and Finger v. Bulgaria;340 Ümmühan Kaplan v. 
Turkey;341 Michelioudakis v. Greece;342 Glykantzi v. Greece);343 the loss of status as 
permanent residents of a country (Kurić and others v. Slovenia);344 the right to vote 
and participate in elections (Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom);345 and, the 
overcrowded conditions in prisons (Anayev and Others v. Russia346; Torreggiani and 
Others v. Italy347; Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria).348 
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The general measures adopted in the application of ‘pilot judgements’ have 
increased both in number and reach. In its first cases, the Court usually awarded 
measures oriented to provide a mechanism that secured adequate redress to the 
victims. This was the situation in the analysis of its initial cases relating to the 
protection of property rights, and the non-enforcement of decisions. In Broniowski v. 
Poland, the first case where this procedure was applied, the Court considered the 
case of a Polish national who complained that he did not receive the compensatory 
property to which he was entitled. In this case, Poland had undertaken to 
compensate all Polish citizens who had been repatriated and who had to abandon 
property in the territories located in the south of the Bug River, after the redrawing of 
Poland’s east border at the end of the Second World War. The ECHR found that the 
case demonstrated the existence of a systemic problem in the payment of 
compensation which affected an identifiable class of citizens: the Bug River 
claimants. According to the Court, the lack of a mechanism for settling these claims 
had affected nearly 80,000 people and there were already 167 applications pending 
before the Court.349 As a result, the Court ordered the State ‘through appropriate 
legal measures and administrative practices, secure the implementation of the 
property right in question in respect of the remaining Bug River claimants or provide 
them with equivalent redress in lieu.’350  
In other pilot judgments relating to the protection of property rights, the ECHR has 
also ordered the creation of mechanisms that provide adequate redress to the 
victims. In Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (2006), the Court found serious deficiencies in 
the rent-control provision of Polish housing legislation. The law established a ceiling 
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on rent levels that did not allow landlords to recoup the maintenance cost of the 
property and, therefore, violated their rights. The Court ordered the Polish 
government to secure in the domestic legal order, a mechanism for the setting of rent 
prices, ‘maintaining a fair balance between the interests of landlords and the general 
interest of the community.’351 Also, in Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, the 
Court ordered the state to take measures ‘in order to secure in an effective manner 
the right to compensation, while striking a fair balance between the different interest 
at stake’.352 As the Court was aware of the considerable burden on the State budget 
such financial compensation represented, it urged the state ‘to start making use of 
other alternative forms of compensation’353 instead of mainly relying on financial 
compensation. In this case, the Court found that there was a general lack of 
enforcement of administrative decisions, granting compensation for property 
confiscated under the communist regime in Albania. Finally, in Maria Atanasiu and 
Others v. Romania, the Court ordered the state to put in place general measures, to 
secure effective and rapid protection of the right to restitution. These can be 
achieved, for instance, ‘by amending the current restitution mechanism, in which the 
Court has identified certain weaknesses, and establishing simplified and effective 
procedures.’354 The Court found that there were serious delays by the Romanian 
authorities, in giving a decision of the application for restitution or compensation, in 
several cases where property had been nationalised or confiscated by the state. In 
other cases relating to the right to property, such as in Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and, more recently, in M.C. and Others v. Italy, the Court requested the 
state to ensure adequate payments due to claimants in the case, whether in the form 
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of bonds355 or by securing ‘the effective and expeditious realisation of the 
entitlements in question.’356  
In other cases, relating to the lack of enforcement of domestic judgements, the Court 
focused on ordering the state to set up an effective remedy for the non-enforcement, 
or delayed enforcement, of decisions. In Burdov v. Russia, the Court analysed a 
recurrent practice of the Russian state of non-execution of judgements debts. In the 
specific case, the Court studied the case of a person who complained about the 
failure of Russian authorities in executing some domestic judgment that awarded him 
social benefits. The Court ordered the state to set up ‘an effective domestic remedy 
or combination of such remedies which secures adequate and sufficient redress for 
non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic judgments.’357 The Court also 
ordered similar measures in the cases of Olaru and others v. Moldova, relating to the 
lack of execution of final judgments awarding social housing benefits; Yurily 
Nikolayevich v. Ukraine, relating to the failure of authorities in the execution of 
judgment debts; and, more recently, in Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, relating to 
the lack of enforcement of courts’ decisions awarding housing and other type of 
benefits. In all these cases, the Court ordered the states to establish effective 
domestic remedies for the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic 
judgments. 
In some other pilot judgments relating to the excessive length of judicial procedures, 
and the lack of adequate remedial mechanism for the redress of people whose 
cases have not been heard within a reasonable time, the Court has ordered the state 
to set up effective domestic remedies, capable of affording redress for the excessive 
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delay in court proceedings. In the Rumps v. Germany case, the first of its type 
analysed by the Court, the Court observed the recurring failure of Germany to ensure 
that the cases before its administrative Courts were handled within a reasonable 
time. The Court ordered the state to establish ‘an effective domestic remedy or 
combination of such remedies capable of securing adequate and sufficient redress 
for excessively long proceedings.’358 Similar orders were also granted in: Vassilios 
Athanasious and others v. Greece;359 Michalioudakis v. Greece;360 Ummuhan Kaplan 
v.Turkey;361 Dimitrow and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, and Finger v. Bulgaria;362 and 
Glykantzi v. Greece.363  
In all of these pilot judgments, the Court has been very respectful of the margin of 
appreciation by which the state may decide to redress the violations the Court has 
found. In very few decisions has the Court gone further and ordered states to modify 
their legislation. In Green and M.T. v. UK, the Court ordered the UK to introduce 
some legislative proposal in order to modify its electoral law. In this case, UK 
legislation had imposed a blanket ban on convicted prisoners, held in detention, from 
being able to vote. In a previous judgment in 2005, Hirst v. the UK (No.2), the Court 
had established that a blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting, violated the right to 
free elections, (Article 3 Protocol 1 to the European Convention). Five years later, the 
UK had still not amended its legislation and the number of similar applications was 
more than 2,500. The Court ordered the UK to ‘bring forward, within six months […], 
                                                             
358 Rumpf v. Germany Operative paragraph (5).  
359 Vassilios Athanasiou et Autres c. Grece para 35. 
360 Michelioudakis v. Greece Operative paragraph (5). 
361 Ummuhan Kaplan c. Turquie Operative paragraph (5). 
362 Dimitrov and Hamanov c. Bulgaria, App. no. 48059/06 and 2708/09 (ECtHR, 10 May 
2011), Operative paragraph (5). 
363 Glykantzi v. Greece Operative paragraph (5). 
110 
 
legislative proposals intended to amend the 1983 Act and, if appropriate, the 2002 
Act in a manner which is Convention-compliant’ and ‘enact the required legislation 
within any such period as may be determined by the Committee of Ministers.’364  
Similarly, in Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia and Slovenia, the Court ordered Serbia 
and Slovenia to ‘make all necessary arrangements, including legislative 
amendments, within one year, in order to allow [the applicants and others in similar 
position], to recover their ‘old’ foreign-currency savings under the same conditions as 
Serbian and Slovenian citizens who had such savings in domestic branches’365 
within Serbian and Slovenian banks.  
In more recent cases, the Court has taken even more audacious steps in the 
granting of remedial measures. In Ananyev and others v. Russia, the Court analysed 
the structural problem of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention in the 
Russian prison system. The Court found that the facts of the case violated Article 3 
(right to not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment) and 13 (right to an 
effective remedy). This situation was not exclusive to a specific detention centre, but 
was generalized in the country. As a consequence, the Court ordered the state to 
‘produce, in co-operation with the Committee of Ministers, within six months […], a 
binding time frame in which to make available a combination of effective remedies 
having preventive and compensatory effects […].’366 Similarly in Torreggiani and 
others v. Italy, the Court analysed the overcrowding conditions of detention in a 
number of Italian prison, forming a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In this 
case, the Court also ordered the state to establish, within a year, ‘an action or a set 
of domestic remedies able to provide adequate and sufficient redress in cases of 
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overcrowding.’367 Similar measures were also ordered in Neshkov and Others v. 
Bulgaria. In this case the Court found a systemic problem of overcrowding in the 
Bulgarian prison system and also problems in the remedies provided by the state to 
pay compensation for violations that took place. The European Court ordered the 
state to make a combination of effective domestic remedies, in respect of conditions 
of detention, with both preventive and compensatory effects.368 Interestingly, the 
Court also ordered the state to provide compensation within three months.369      
As has been shown, the Court has taken progressive steps to award general 
measures in pilot judgments. In the application of these measures, the Court has 
developed a set of measures that range from, ordering states to set up effective 
remedies guaranteeing access to justice and redress, to a more pro-active approach, 
ordering legislative measures, and, even to take measures in order to prevent and 
compensate the effects of overcrowded prison conditions.  
 
3.1.4  Circumstances where general measures are ordered in Pilot Judgments 
 
The application of general measures in pilot and semi-pilot judgments by the 
European Court is restricted to the existence of a ‘structural or systemic problem.’370 
The European Court has defined a ‘structural or systemic problem’ as a situation 
where ‘the facts of the case disclose the existence, within the… [domestic] legal 
order, of a shortcoming as a consequence of which a whole class of individuals have 
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been or are still denied… [their Convention right or freedom]’ and where ‘the 
deficiencies in national law and practice identified in the applicant’s individual case 
may give rise to numerous subsequent well-founded applications.’371   
According to Haider, ‘systemic problems (or practices incompatible with the 
Convention) may be described as occurrences of repeated similar violations of the 
Convention, which are rooted in deficiencies in the implementation of the Convention 
or, respectively, in the execution of judgments finding a violation.’372 According to this 
author, and in the context of pilot judgments, this definition is used by the European 
Court of Human Rights to identify problems that can potentially affect a large number 
of people and, therefore, can lead to a large number of similar applications in the 
future.373 
The application of the procedure is, also, highly selective. Pilot and semi-pilot 
procedures are not applied to all structural or systemic problems identified by the 
Court. This has been criticized by several authors, who consider this to be a lack of 
transparency.374 According to Leach, there are several practical, political and legal 
factors that play a role in the selection of the cases.375 In general, the Court has 
applied the pilot procedure, after a process of informal consultation with the 
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respondent state, if it considers it is likely that the decision will be complied with by 
the state.376 This practice, applied by the Court in the first cases, was incorporated in 
the Rules of the Court in 2011, establishing that ‘the Court shall first seek the views 
of the parties on whether the application under examination results from the 
existence of such a problem or dysfunction in the Contracting Party.’377 There is no 
requirement that the Court needs the acceptance of the respondent state, but rather, 
that the Court needs to engage with the state in order to decide whether or not to 
apply the procedure. For some authors, by consulting with the states, the Court 
secures the effectiveness of the procedure, and its own credibility, in the 
application378.  
However, the high exceptionality of these measures, in the European System, can 
be quite restrictive in comparison with the application of GNR in, for example, the 
Inter-American System. As will be developed in the following chapter, GNR are 
usually provided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights including in cases 
concerning gross violations of human rights. The European Court has applied the 
pilot procedure only to cases of systemic violations, and after a process of previous 
consultation with states, but it has not made this procedure applicable in cases of 
gross violations of human rights. In general, the European Court has applied the pilot 
procedure to cases such as Broniowski, where there is a clear, dysfunctional 
problem in the domestic system, and a large number of identifiable applicants. Pilot 
judgments usually involve violations to the rights to property, and access to a 
remedy.  
Although there is nothing in theory that prevents the European Court of Human 
Rights from analysing cases of gross violations of human rights, in practice it has 
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abstained from applying individual petition mechanisms, in general, and the 
mechanism of pilot judgments, in particular, to the investigation of gross violations of 
human rights in the region. Authors, such Kamminga, have argued that the 
European Convention on Human Rights, including the European Court of Human 
Rights, is not sufficiently equipped to deal with gross violations of human rights379. 
According to Reidy, Hampson and Boyle, in order to properly deal with gross human 
rights violations, the European Court would need to reform its protocols in order to 
acquire proprio motu competence to investigate allegations, when victims cannot 
denounce human rights violations, and to create a fact-finding section within the 
Court in order to carry out the investigation of facts, and monitor the compliance with 
the Convention.380 This approach contrasts with the one taken by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights which has addressed gross violations of human rights 
through its individual petition system, and provided large reaching redress through 
the award of GNR381, even without a strong mechanism for the collection of evidence 
and the enforcement of judgments. Although the measures awarded by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights have not always been effective in dealing with 
gross violations, the boldness of the Inter-American Court contrast with the 
conservative view of the European Court.      
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One factor that may explain the limitation of pilot judgments to systemic violations, is 
the fact that the procedure originated as a process to deal with the workload of the 
Court, rather than from a genuine intention of the European Court to expand its 
remedial powers, or to deal with gross and serious violations. Pilot judgments are 
understood as a way to deal with relatively ‘easy’ but repetitive cases, rather than a 
mechanism to provide over reaching remedies to serious violations. However, taking 
into account that the pilot judgment procedure is already in place, allowing the Court 
to study large numbers of cases and to provide extensive recommendations, the 
Court could explore the possibility of applying the pilot procedure to cases of gross 
violations of human rights. Such possibility would be analysed in the following 
section. 
 
3.1.5 General measures in Pilot judgments and the concept of GNR 
 
The general measures awarded by the European Court of Human Rights in pilot 
judgments share functional similarities with the concept of GNR: First, general 
measures in pilot judgments have a preventive nature, similar to the one established 
in GNR. This has been established by the Court in several judgements. In 
Bronowski, for example, the European Court recognized that the measures adopted 
in order to remedy the systemic violation, must be ‘so as not to overburden the 
Convention system with large numbers of applications deriving from the same 
cause.’382 Similarly, the Committee of Ministers have emphasised it shall examine 
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whether states have adopted general measures, in order to either prevent new 
violations or put an end to continuing violations.383  
The preventive nature of general measures has been understood to be a key 
component in securing the credibility and efficiency of the system. As the Committee 
of Ministers have emphasised: 
‘The credibility and efficiency of the Convention system depends to a 
large extent on its capacity to ensure that States prevent new violations 
similar to those established by the European Court of Human Rights – 
that they take so called ‘general measures.’384  
Prevention is also considered as a way to reduce the work load of the Court which 
has increased considerably during the last years.385 There is no reason for granting 
only individual redress in the analysis of repetitive cases related to the same 
systemic situation. If the root cause of the violation is not tackled in the decision, the 
number of cases will keep increasing in the future. 
Second, general measures, as well as GNR, are aimed at redressing the structural 
situation that is the origin of a case, or number of cases. The idea of these measures 
is to underline the existence of a systemic problem that needs to be redressed. This 
is clearer in pilot judgements where the Court should ‘as far as possible, […] identify, 
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in its judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an 
underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is 
likely to give rise to numerous applications.’386 
Third, general measures, like GNR, have a general rather than individual character. 
They are oriented to impact upon a larger number of people, beyond those who are 
represented in the case. These can be either a specific class of individuals or a 
generic group. For example, in the Broniowski v Poland case, the Court awarded 
general measures ‘in respect of the remaining Bug River claimants’387 which, 
according to the Polish Government, could be nearly 80,000 people, and whom did 
not necessarily bring a petition before the European Court.388 In the remaining pilot 
judgements, general measures were granted to a generic or indeterminate group of 
people. For example, in the cases relating to the non-enforcement of decisions, the 
Court usually ordered the state to set up a remedy, or combination of remedies, that 
secured adequate redress for the non-enforcement of decisions.389 This remedy was 
not restricted to those persons currently with a non-enforced judicial sentence 
(regardless of whether they had filed a petition before the European Court), but also 
included those persons that, in the future, may need redress for a similar situation. In 
this sense, general measures, as GNR, are designed to impact larger groups of 
people, beyond the original petitioners of a case. 
Despite the similarities in the nature of these two concepts, there are important 
differences in the application of general measures awarded in pilot judgments, and 
the award of GNR in other jurisdictions, that cannot be ignored.  
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First, as previously stated, the scope of general measures in pilot judgments is still 
very limited and usually related to the implementation of effective domestic remedies, 
and the payment of entitlements already recognized in the domestic law. Only in two 
pilot judgments has the Court directly ordered states to modify their legislation,390 
and only in one pilot judgment has it suggested the state take preventive measures 
beyond compensation.391 With very few exceptions, the Court has generally rejected 
any request for other types of reparation measures beyond compensation, such as 
rehabilitation or GNR.392 In turn, and depending on the jurisdiction, GNR may offer a 
wider scope of measures that include the modification of legislation, the 
dissemination of judgments, the modification of manuals and protocols, the 
establishment of institutional and operative mechanisms of follow up, etc.393 In 
general, under international human rights law, GNR can take various forms, as they 
are required to tackle the root causes of violations. Although the general measures 
established in pilot judgments are more detailed than in the majority of cases before 
the European Court of Human Rights, where the choosing of appropriate means to 
comply with the decision is left to the state, they are still too restrictive in comparison 
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to the measures awarded under the concept of GNR established in other 
jurisdictions (i.e. Inter-American system of human rights).394  
Second, as explained in section 3.1.2,395 the award of general measures in pilot 
judgments is exceptional as it is restricted to systemic problems. This limits the 
application of the pilot judgment to the redress of gross violations of human rights.396 
In this aspect, and as will be presented in the following chapter, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has developed far reaching GNR in cases of gross violations 
of human rights, including legislatives measures, educational measures, setting up of 
data basis, and institutional changes. 
Following the general trend in reparations, the European Court has been timid in the 
award of remedies in cases of gross violations of human rights.397 Instead of 
applying pilot judgments or more proactive forms of redress, the European System 
has opted for a more political approach when dealing with gross violations of human 
rights. In most of the decisions, the European Court has only provided satisfaction, 
and occasionally compensation, leaving it up to the state to choose the means to 
comply with the decision, and to the Committee of Ministers to supervise the 
compliance in accordance to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.398 The Committee of Ministers has, in some cases, recommended the 
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adoption of specific general measures.399 Besides, these recommendations 
represent a unified interpretation by the member states and, in practice, have been 
generally followed by the Court and the states;400 they are not strictly binding.401  
The emphasis in the use of political mechanism as a way to deal with gross 
violations of human rights has several problems in terms of the protection of human 
rights. As Citroni has explained, in cases of gross violations, states have not shown 
any real interest in spontaneously applying any individual or general measures 
beyond mere compensation.402  
When used in a complementary way, with the political means exercised by the 
Committee of Ministers, the awarding by the European Court of more extensive 
reparation measures, in the form of general measures or GNR, could facilitate the 
effective redress of gross violations.. Also, the fact that they are awarded by the 
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Court could reinforce their obligatory character, making states accountable in case of 
non-compliance. Finally, it would open a window of opportunity for the victims to 
suggest to the Court concrete general measures, therefore, allowing their 
participation in the drafting of measures403. Participation of the victims in the 
definition of general measures is important in itself not just as a measure to create 
more meaningful measures to those recipients of the measures but also as a way to 
ensure their adequate implementation. 
Similarities in nature and function between general measures and GNR, make 
general measures an important vehicle for the potential implementation of more 
structural redress in the European system. Besides the European Court does not 
explicitly use the term guarantees of non-repetition in their case law, the application 
of general measures in pilot judgments shows that the Court is, in practice, applying 
more general forms of redress besides ‘just compensation’. However, their current 
limited scope, together with the highly exceptional circumstances in which general 
measures are granted, still make them a very restrictive way of introducing general 
redress into the European System. Despite the recent efforts of the European Court 
to move towards more progressive forms of redress beyond compensation,404 there 
is still a long way to go before the jurisprudence of the European Court can update 
the international standards established by the UN Committees, as well as the Inter-
                                                             
403 Although the participation of victims in the definition of remedies may create delays in the 
process of reparation and make more difficult the definition of reparation measures, it is 
actually the only way to create reparation measures that are truly meaningful to the victims. 
See Cristián Correa, Julie Guillerot and Lisa Magarrell, ‘Reparations and Victim Participation: 
A Look at the Truth Commission Experience’, in Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan 
Stephens (eds) Reparations for victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity (Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 
404 See section 2.1.1 in this chapter. 
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American Court of Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. However, the continuous use of the pilot procedure and the 
increasing expansion of the remedial powers of the European Court in its 
jurisprudence demonstrates that, the European Court is taking steps in the right 
direction and new windows of opportunity may open.405  
 
3.1.6  General measures in quasi-pilot judgments  
 
In addition to pilot judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has introduced 
general measures through ‘quasi-pilot judgements’. According to Leach, these are 
cases that the European Court does not describe as pilot, but where the Court has 
invoked Article 46 of the Convention to highlight a systemic or structural problem that 
is incompatible with the Convention.406 Unlike the pilot judgments, they do not allow 
the adjourning of similar cases, and, in principle, they do not include general 
measures in the operative paragraphs of the judgment.407  
In those cases where the Court has stated the existence of incompatibilities in the 
domestic legislation of a country, general measures have usually taken the form of 
legislative reforms. For example, in Manole and others v. Moldova, the Court found 
that the legislative framework did not provide sufficient safeguards against the virtual 
monopoly of a state-owned telecommunications company. The Court considered that 
                                                             
405 See David Kosar and Lucas Lixinski, ‘Domestic Judicial Design by International Human 
Rights Courts’ (2015) 109 The American Journal of International Law 4.  
406 Leach (et al) Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations 24-25.  
407 Just in very exceptional circumstances the Court has introduced ‘general measures’ in the 
operative paragraphs of semi-pilot judgements, but none of them were actually described as 
‘pilot judgements’ by the Court. 
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‘[i]n the light of the deficiencies found by the Court, these general measures should 
include legislative reform […].’408 Legislative reforms have also been indicated by the 
Court in cases relating to the compulsory letting of the land, on the basis of certain 
rental terms in Slovakia,409 the ban of the publication of statements of a terrorist 
organization in Turkey;410 and the inadequate protection for parents’ beliefs being 
recognised in the Turkish education system411.  
In other cases, the ECHR has also indicated general measures, among others, to be 
taken by a state in a semi-pilot judgement to ‘set up an ad hoc domestic 
compensation scheme;’412 and to take all possible steps to gain an assurance from a 
certain government, that condemned persons will not be subjected to the death 
penalty.413 These measures have been used as a standard to verify the compliance 
of the state to the judgment.  
 
3.1.7 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court shows that the tribunal has, 
increasingly, expanded its remedial powers from ´just satisfaction’, to the inclusion of 
                                                             
408 Manole and others v. Moldova, App. no. 13936/02 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009) para 117. 
409 Urbarska obec Trencianske Biskupice v. Slovakia, App. no. 74258/01 (ECtHR, 27 
November 2007) para 150. 
410 Gözel and Özer c. Turquie, Req. nos 43453/04 et 31098/05 (ECtHR, 06 juillet 2010) para 
76. 
411 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App. no. 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 84. 
412 Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, App. no. 26828/06 (ECtHR, 26 June 2012) para 415. 
413 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v The United Kingdom, App. no. 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 
2010) para 171. 
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other types of reparation’s measures such as restitution. Despite its reluctance to 
provide remedial measures, since 2004 the European Court has applied the pilot 
judgment procedure for the redress of ‘repetitive cases’. Through this procedure, the 
European Court has ordered states to adopt general measures, usually ordering the 
adoption of effective domestic remedies, the payment of certain entitlements, and, 
exceptionally, some legislative changes. These measures are, nevertheless, very 
similar to GNR in terms of its functional preventive nature, focus on structural 
problems, and general scope. In the last years, general remedial measures provided 
in pilot judgments have been recognised by both, the Court and commentators, as 
having a binding effect on the contracting states.414    
Besides this conceptual similarity, the European Court has been timid in respect of, 
both the scope of the measures awarded, and the type of cases in which they have 
been applied. On the one hand, general measures in pilot judgments have usually 
been restricted to ordering the setting up of adequate mechanisms of redress and 
the payment of entitlements. On the other hand, the fact that pilot judgments are 
restricted to systemic violations, and to prior negotiation with the state, limits the 
application of these measures to the redress of gross violations of human rights. 
These two characteristics contrast with the large scope of measures, and the 
application of GNR, in the redress of gross violations by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. The European Court could make more extensive use of the 
mechanism of pilot judgments and the award of general measures by expanding the 
scope of the measures and applying the mechanism of pilot judgment to cases of 
gross violations of human rights. This will certainly update the jurisprudence of the 
European Court to international standards in reparation measures. It will also provide 
the European System with an additional tool (beyond the recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers) with which to tackle gross violations of human rights. The 
                                                             
414 Haider The Pilot-Judgment Procedure […] 213-214 
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European Court has started to expand the scope of their remedial recommendations 
which is a positive step in this regard. A more decisive intention of the European 
Court would be needed if they wish to fully engage with the potential of general 
measures in pilot judgments.  
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3.2 GNR in the African Human Rights System  
 
3.2.1 GNR in the case law of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights415 has jurisdiction over all cases 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter), the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the Protocol), and any other relevant human rights instrument 
ratified by the States concerned.416 After analysing the merits of the case, the Court 
is entitled to provide appropriate remedies. According to Article 27 of the Protocol: 
‘If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ 
rights, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violations, including 
the payment of fair compensation or reparation.’417 
Even though this Article allows the African Court to provide remedies in the form of 
compensation or any other form, the reparation model has not quite been developed 
by the African Court in its case law. Up to February 2015, the African Court had 
received 32 applications and finalized 22 cases. From the finalized cases, the Court 
found it had no jurisdiction in 20 cases, and only analysed the merits of two 
applications filed against Tanzania. The two petitions were joined and analysed in 
                                                             
415 The African Court was established by Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (adopted on 10 June 1998 and entered into force on 25 January 2004). 
416 idem article 3. 
417 idem article 3. Also Rule 63 of the Rules of Court establishes that ‘the Court shall rule on 
the request for the reparation’ in either the same decision or a separate one. Rules of Court 
of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (as amended in April 2010) Rule 63.   
127 
 
one decision, namely Tanganyika Law Society and LHRC, and Reverend 
Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania. In this case, the African Court found that the law 
that prohibits any candidate from participating in presidential elections without being 
part of a political party, violates the rights of freedom of association, to participate 
freely in the government of its country, and not to be discriminated under the law. As 
a consequence, the African Court ordered Tanzania ‘to take constitutional, legislative 
and all other necessary measures within a reasonable time to remedy the violations 
found by the Court.’418 The Court also allowed the applicants to file submissions 
requesting individual reparations within 30 days after the decisions. 
Although the Court does not refer to these as GNR, the reparation measures granted 
in this case may have important consequences in terms of structural reform. In spite 
of the High Court having previously ruled that the Amendment violated existing 
provisions of the Constitution, the Parliament passed the constitutional reform 
without taking the ruling of the High Court into consideration. The African Court, 
aware of the different opinions between the Parliament and the High Court, ordered 
the removal of the constitutional provisions. This order may open the door for other 
requests for legislative reforms, in situations where a law violates some of the 
provisions established in the African Charter.  
The decision does not explain the grounds for the adoption of these measures but 
refers to them only in the conclusion of the decision. The scarce development of the 
jurisprudence of the African Court, together with the lack of analysis of the 
understanding of reparations, makes the reparation measures granted by the African 
Court a field still open to development. In this regard, the developments achieved by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
                                                             
418 Tanganyika Law Society and LHRC & Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania, 
African Court on Human & Peoples’ Rights, App. no. 009/2011 and 011/2011 (2013) para 
126 (3). 
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Rights, may bring some insights for the future development of structural remedies by 
the African Court. As the work of the African Court is still developing, it would be 
necessary to analyse the decisions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which has elaborated more detailed recommendations in the 
examination of individual and group communications. This analysis will be carried out 
in the following section.  
 
3.2.2 Other ‘general recommendations’ granted by the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Commission has the mandate to promote and ensure the protection of 
the human and peoples’ rights established in the African Charter, as well as to 
interpret the provisions of the Charter and to carry out any other task entrusted to it 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.419 The Commission can also 
consider communications submitted to it by one state claiming that another state has 
violated the Charter,420 or by individuals or organizations claiming that one state has 
violated some of the rights established in the Charter.421 After considering the 
arguments presented by the author and the state’s party observations, the 
Commission will decide upon the admissibility of the decision, and whether or not the 
facts presented constitute a violation to the African Charter. If the Commission finds 
there is a violation, it will state a final decision, also called recommendation. This will 
contain specific measures, addressed to the state, in order to remedy the violation. 
                                                             
419 OAU, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted on 27 June 1981, entered 
into force 21 October 1986) CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) Art 45. 
420 idem article 47.  
421 idem article 55.  
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These recommendations are, however, of a semi-judicial nature so they are not 
legally binding for the states. As a consequence, the compliance of these 
recommendations by states parties has been relatively low in the last years.422    
In contrast to the African Court, and despite the low levels of enforceability, the 
African Commission has developed an extensive range of recommendations in the 
last years, ones that refer to the entire range of reparation measures. By February 
2015 the Commission had published a decision on 35 communications. In these, the 
Commission recommended states to take measures in order to recognise ownership 
rights to specific communities,423 to release prisoners wrongly detained,424 to 
adequately compensate the victims,425 provide measures of rehabilitation,426 and, in 
many cases, also to engage in general measures. 
                                                             
422 Magnus Killander, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in, Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo (Ed), The African Regional Human Rights System. 30 years after the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) p. 237. 
423 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (On behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenia, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm 276/03 
(2009) Recommendation (a) and (b). 
424 Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, 
Comm. 250/02 (2003); Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Comm Hum & 
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 102/93 (1998).  
425 This is probably the most common recommendation issued by the African Commission. 
The majority of the Communications decided on merits, will end up with a recommendation 
ordering the payment of adequate compensation. Although the Commission does not 
mention which laws have to be considered in order to carry out such payment, it is expected 
they should take into account standards contained in international human rights law. Egyptian 
initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Arab Republic of Egypt, African Comm Hum & 
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 334/06 (2011); Kenneth Good v. Republic of Botswana, African 
Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 313/05 
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 In terms of general measures, the African Commission has recommended states to 
engage in a large variety of measures, such as to harmonize their domestic 
legislation in accordance with the African Charter.427 It has also recommended states 
to carry out assessments,428 establish specific institutions such a National 
Reconciliation Forum to address the long-term sources of conflict,429 or an expert 
body to review the cases of all persons detained under certain law.430 It has also 
recommended states to undertake reforms in state institutions, particularly in the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 (2010). 
426 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Cohre) v. 
Sudan, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 279/03, 296/03 (2009) para 229 (5); 
Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 241/01 (2003) 
recommendation (3). 
427 Egyptian initiative v. Arab Republic of Egypt; Marcel Wetsh’ Okonda Koso and others v. 
Congo, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 281/03 (2009); Scanlen & Holderness 
v. Zimbabwe, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 297/05 (2009); Antonie 
Bissangou v. Congo, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 253/02 (2006); Curtis 
Francis Doebbler v. Suddan, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 236/00 (2003); 
Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 
211/98 (2001); Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and 
Assistance Project v. Nigeria, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 218/98 ( 2001); 
Avocats Sans Frontièrs (on behalf of Gaëtan Bwampamye) v. Burundi, African Comm Hum & 
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 231/99 ( 2000). 
428 Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop and others v. Mauritatina, 
African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 54/91, 61/91, 96/93, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97, 
210/98  ( 2000) recommendation (5).  
429 Cohre v. Sudan para 229 (6). 
430 Purohit and Moore v. Gambia Operative Paragraphs (2). 
131 
 
judicial power431 and the police.432 It has even recommended the state to engage in 
political negotiations, such us the consolidation and finalization of peace 
agreements.433  
These general recommendations have been developed in cases claiming the 
violation of the rights of individuals,434 communities,435 and even in cases of 
generalized and massive patterns of human rights violations.436 Unlike other regional 
systems of human rights, the African Charter (Article 56.1) allows complainants to file 
a case with no need to show they are victims themselves, or that they have been 
authorized by the victims.437 Particularly, the African Commission allows the 
presentation of action popularis which are actions filed usually for human rights 
organizations or any other individual or institution, for the public interest. This 
characteristic allows the African system to receive communications for the violations 
of human rights of multiple actors, including individuals, communities and large 
populations. 
                                                             
431 Egyptian initiative v. Arab Republic of Egypt para 223 (III); Cohre v. Sudan, para 229 (2); 
Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al /Cameroon, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 
266/03, (2009) para 215 (1.7). 
432 Egyptian initiative v. Arab Republic of Egypt para 223 (IV). 
433 Cohre v. Sudan para 229 (1). 
434 Scanlen & Holderness v. Zimbabwe, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 
297/05 (2009). 
435 Purohit and Moore v. Gambia. 
436 Cohre v. Sudan. 
437 Manisuli SSenyonjo, ‘Economic Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter’, in 
Manisuli SSenyonjo (ed) The African Regional Human Rights System 30 Years after the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) p.61. 
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Regardless of the type of complainant, one element that is common to all the cases 
is that as the violation could potentially affect or is currently affecting a large number 
of people, the measures recommended by the African Commission aim to address 
the root causes of the violations and lead to its transformation. In the Malawi African 
Association (et al) v. Mauritanian Communication, the commission ordered the 
carrying out an assessment of the status of degrading practices in the country ‘with a 
view to identify[ing] with precision the deep-rooted causes for their persistence [sic] 
and to put in place a strategy aimed at their total and definitive eradication.’438   
In the cases where the Commission found that there was a political issue that 
needed to be addressed, the Commission has recommended the state to engage in 
dialogue with other political forces rather than ordering the state directly to take a 
concrete measure. For example, in the Communication Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al 
v. Cameroon, the Commission recommended the state to enter into constructive 
dialogue with the Complainants and other political movements, in order to eliminate 
the discriminatory practices against people of Northwest and Southwest Cameroon.  
As the role of the Commission is semi-judicial, it has more freedom to issue 
recommendations in different ways, even those that touch the political sphere. 
However, its semi-judicial character also undermines the possibility of compliance by 
states, making these recommendations very difficult to enforce. 
 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the case law of the African Court, and particularly the African 
Commission, shows that the African System has consistently included general 
                                                             
438 Malawi Africa Association and others v. Mauritania, operative paragraphs (5).  
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recommendations in the analysis of communications. Such recommendations 
resemble GNR in terms of the scope of the measures and their nature. General 
recommendations can range from legislative reforms, to institutional reforms, to 
political negotiations. They all share a common interest in tackling the root causes of 
the violation in order to prevent its repetition. However, the fact that the Commission 
fulfils a semi-judicial role diminishes the possibility of enforcement of such decisions. 
In the future, the African Court could make use of the experience collected by the 
African Commission in the recommendation of general measures, by following the 
scope of general measures established by the African Commission. The large scope 
of measures referred by the Commission could inspire the work of other regional 
systems, as well as UN Committees, in the drafting of more suitable general 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER III: GNR IN THE INTER-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
As has already been indicated, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights deserves special attention given the far reaching forms or reparation it 
has awarded over the years, including GNR. Indeed, as is widely accepted, the most 
ground-breaking treatment of reparations, both in compensatory and non-
compensatory forms under international human rights law, comes from this regional 
body.439  
According to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) states have the 
general obligation to both respect and ensure the rights established in the 
Convention (Article 1.1) In turn, the obligation to ensure, implies the duties to respect 
the rights and freedoms established in the Convention; guarantee or ensure the free 
and full exercise of human rights; prevent the violation of rights; investigate the facts 
effectively and, if appropriate, punish those responsible for the violation;  provide 
redress to  the victims when their rights have been infringed; and not to discriminate 
in the exercise of these obligations.440  
The duty to provide redress to victims is also incorporated in Article 63(1) of the 
Convention, according to which:  
                                                             
439 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2nd edition, 2005) p. 
299. 
440 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) para 174. 
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‘If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or 
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the 
injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that 
was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences 
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right 
or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the 
injured party.’ 
Apart from the provision established in this Article, none of the human rights treaties 
of the Organization of the American States establishes a general framework for the 
granting of remedies. Although there are some specific references to the duty to 
provide compensation in some of the treaties,441 none of them establishes a clear 
reparations framework, as this is presented in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
According to the Guidelines there are five basic forms of reparation: restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.442 
Although the Court has not always labelled its reparations measures in this way,443 in 
the jurisprudence, it is currently consistent practice to follow this approach.  
                                                             
441 See for example, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (adopted 
9 December 1985, entered into force 28 February 1985) OAS Treaty Series No 67 (1992), 
Article 9. 
442 UN General Assembly, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147, paras 18 to 23.  
443 Douglas Cassel, ‘Expanding scope and impact of reparations awarded by the Inter-
American Court of Human rights’, De Feyter et al (eds.), OUT OF THE ASHES Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia, 2006) p.193.  
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The Court has developed interesting and detailed measures regarding each form of 
reparation. Throughout its jurisprudence the Court has developed significant 
standards in regards to compensation, restitution, rehabilitation and satisfaction. 
However, GNR have not been given the same attention, although they have gained 
prominence in the jurisprudence of the Court in recent years. 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission has also requested important forms of 
reparation in the cases it has referred to the Court, or in friendly settlements. In these 
cases, the Commission has either requested or recommended measures of 
compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and GNR.  
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the GNR as they have been included in 
friendly settlements before the Inter-American Commission, or ordered by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
  
1. GNR in the Inter-American System: the work of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
 
The Inter-American Commission has played an important role in the inclusion of 
these measures in the Inter-American System. The Commission has dealt with GNR, 
not just in the process of individual cases, but also in friendly settlements. The 
friendly settlements procedure may be initiated at the request of any of the parties or 
the Commission’s own initiative, and its purpose is to solve the petition in a friendly 
manner.444 Such settlements have had a positive impact, not only on the immediate 
                                                             
444 Rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (adopted in 28 
October 2009, as amended in 2013), Article 40. 
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victims of human rights violations, but also on ‘society as a whole’, providing 
measures that foster change and address the root causes of the violation.445 
In these agreements both the states and victims have traditionally agreed that 
various measures of reparation would be given by the state, including compensation, 
restitution, rehabilitation, and satisfaction, as a condition to stop processing the 
petition. In recent years, states and petitioners have also agreed in the provision of 
several GNR.  
Under friendly settlements, states have given a commitment to: provide instruction 
and training to officials and public servants;446 take legislative measures;447 establish 
                                                             
445 IACmHR, ‘Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure’ (2013) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 
45/13, para 158. 
446 Inocencia Luca de Pegoraro et al v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 160/2010 (1 November 2010) para 25 (2.3).  
447 Gerónimo Gómez López v. Mexico (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report 68/12 (17 July 2012); Juan Carlos de la Torre v. Argentina (Friendly 
Settlement)  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report 85/11 (21 July 2011); 
Inmates of the Penitentiary of Mendoza v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 84/11 (21 July 2011); Inocencio Rodriguez v. 
Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Report 19/11; María Soledad Cisternas Reyes v. Chile 
(Friendly Settlements) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report 86/11 (21 July 
2011); Rodolfo Correa Belisle v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights Report 15/10 (16 March 2010); Valerio Oscar Castillo Báez v. Argentina 
(Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report 161/10 (1 
November 2010); Gilda Rosario Pizarro et al v. Chile (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 162/10 (1 November 2010).  
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procedures;448 establish specific positions for the protection of human rights;449 
design plans of action;450 elaborate public policies;451 and, even to provide health 
services.452   
Interestingly, the measures adopted in these friendly settlements are broader than 
the ones granted by the Inter-American Court, as they are the result of negotiations 
with the state and are consented to. Through this mechanism, states have agreed not 
just to provide training and adopt legislative measures (which are measures 
commonly granted by the Court under the individual petition system), but also to 
provide a large set of measures that the Court would not be able to easily order, 
given their far reaching nature. The agreement of measures to design public policies 
seems to be a good example of this. While the Inter-American Court, through the 
analysis of individual cases, has hesitated to order the implementation of public 
policies, through friendly settlements states have committed to undertake steps 
aimed at the establishment of public policies. For example, in the paradigmatic 
friendly settlement regarding the Inmates of the Penitentiaries of Mendoza, the 
government of the Province of Mendoza, Argentina, undertook:  
 
‘to draw up, in conjunction with the National State and the petitioners, 
within a maximum period of 90 days, a Plan of Action on Penitentiary 
                                                             
448 Amílcar Menéndez and Juan Manuel Caride v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Report 168/11 (3 November 2011); Inocencia Luca 
de Pegoraro et al v. Argentina para 25 (2.4).  
449 Raquel Natalia Lagunas & Sergio Sorbellini v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Report 17/10 (16 March 2010).  
450 Inocencia Luca de Pegoraro et al v. Argentina para 25 (2.2.c). 
451 Penitentiary of Mendoza (Friendly Settlement). 
452 Gilda Rosario Pizarro et al v. Chile (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report 162/10 (1 November 2010).   
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Policy to aid in setting short, medium and long-term public policies 
with an appropriate budget to make implementation possible. Said 
plan shall include, at a minimum, the following points:   
a) Indicate measures that shall be implemented for the 
assistance and custody of young adults deprived of their liberty […]  
Additionally, every member of that population must be ensured 
education, recreation and access to cultural and athletic activities, 
adequate medical/psychological assistance and other measures 
geared towards adequate social integration and job placement; 
b) […] request administrative and judicial authorities to review the 
disciplinary files […] 
c) Improve the health-care service of the Provincial Penitentiary 
[…]  
d) Ensure access to a job for all inmates in the Prisons of 
Mendoza who should so request one […]; 
e) Ensure access and adequate service at the Courts of Criminal 
Sentence Execution, for all persons who have a legitimate interest […] 
f) Endeavor to provide adequate training and professional 
instruction to Penitentiary Staff’.  
 
This agreement is unique not only because the state and petitioners sat together to 
draw up a plan of action or public policy, but also because it established, in detail, 
some of the objectives that such a plan should include in terms of the protection of 
the human rights’ of persons deprived of liberty. The agreement is flexible enough, 
providing the parties with the opportunity to discuss the elements of the policy, 
without excessively intervening in the design of said policy. This idea is secured by 
establishing that the draft should be elaborated ‘in conjunction with the National 
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State and the petitioners’453 and by establishing a time framework of 90 days to carry 
out such discussion. 
At the same time, the agreement is strict enough in terms of the protection of human 
rights. The agreement establishes specific elements that should be incorporated in 
order to guarantee that prisoners enjoy, education, recreation, adequate medical and 
psychological assistance, as well as access to health care, job opportunities and 
justice.  
The acceptance by the states of these measures, agreed after a long process of 
debate and under the supervision of the Commission, may show a progressively 
more open attitude of states to the implementation of broader reparations measures.  
In these friendly settlements, states have also committed to take legislative 
measures and to provide regulatory reforms in several topics,454 such as: women’s 
rights,455 indigenous peoples,456 migrants,457 freedom of expression,458 torture,459 
                                                             
453 Penitentiary of Mendoza (Friendly Settlement) para 31 (c) (1). 
 
454 For a full presentation of the case law of the Inter-American Commission on Friendly 
Settlements, see IACmHR Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure. 
455 María Merciadri de Morini v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights Report 103/01 (11 October 2001).   
456 Mercedes Julia Huentao Beroiza et al v. Chile (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 30/04 Petition 4617-02 (11 March 2004). 
457 Juan Carlos de la Torre v. Argentina (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report No. 85/11 (21 July 2011). 
458 Carlos Dogliani v. Uruguay (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Report 18/10 (16 March 2010). 
459 Alejandro Ortiz Ramírez v. Mexico (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report 101/05 (27 October 2005). 
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forced disappearance,460 military justice,461 rights of persons with disabilities,462 
access to justice and social security.463   
States have also agreed to offer training to state officials and civil servants in a 
variety of topics, such as, sexual and reproductive rights,464 gender-based 
violence,465 labour rights,466 respect for human rights by police officers,467 and, 
training of judges in topics related to forced disappearance.468  
GNR, in friendly settlements, may also have an important impact on the protection of 
socio-economic rights. On the one hand, they may give victims the opportunity to get 
involved in the discussion of public policies, as relevant actors in the political 
discussion, and also, in the drafting of such policies, to guarantee the establishment 
of a minimum contents of rights. For example, in the case Inmates of the 
Penitentiaries of Mendoza, where the state compromised to include, in the Plan of 
Action on Penitentiary Policy, measures to ensure that every member of the 
penitentiary would receive medical and psychological assistance, and also 
improvements of the health service in the penitentiary, were agreed.   
                                                             
460 Inocencia Luca de Pegoraro v. Argentina.  
461 Roison Mora Rubiano v. Colombia (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report 45/99 (9 March 1999.)  
462 María Soledad Cisternas Reyes v. Chile.  
463 Amilcar Menéndez, Juan Manuel Caride et al. v. Argentina.  
464 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report No. 71/03 (10 October 2003). 
465 Marcela Andrea Valdés Díaz v. Chile (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Report 80/09 (6 August 2009). 
466 Jose Pereira v. Brazil (Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Report 95/03 (24 October 2003).  
467 Alejandro Ortiz Ramírez v. Mexico.  
468 Inocencia Luca de Pegoraro v. Argentina.  
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Another case that may have a very important impact in the protection of the right to 
health, is María Mamérita Mestanza. This represents one case among many, of 
women affected by a massive and systemic government policy of sterilization, 
among poor, Indian women in rural Peru. María Mamerita, a rural woman of 
approximately 33 years old, and a mother of seven children, was pressured by the 
local Health Centre into accepting sterilization. After having tubal ligation surgery, her 
condition worsened and she died at home. In the friendly settlement, the Peruvian 
State promised to investigate the facts, carry out administrative and criminal 
investigations against those responsible for pressuring the consent, and the health 
personnel that ignored the need for urgent care. It also reached a compromise to pay 
monetary compensation, and to agree indemnification from those criminally 
responsible for the acts. For the victim’s beneficiaries, it also ordered the state to 
make a one-time payment to the beneficiaries for psychological rehabilitation, as well 
as to provide the victim’s children with free primary and secondary education in 
public schools, and tuition-free university education for a single degree at state 
schools. In terms of GNR the state made a compromise agreement to carry out 
changes in laws and public policies in terms of: 
‘a. Penalties for human rights violators and reparation for victims 
1) Conduct a judicial review of all criminal cases on violations of human 
rights committed in the execution of the National Program of 
Reproductive Health and Family Planning, to break out and duly punish 
the perpetrators, requiring them to pay the appropriate civil damages, 
including the State if it is determined to have some responsibility for the 
acts that gave rise to the criminal cases. 
2) Review the administrative proceedings initiated by the victims and/or 
their family members, linked to the cases in the previous paragraph, 
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which are pending or have concluded concerning denunciations of 
human rights violations. 
b. Methods for monitoring and guaranteeing respect for human rights of 
health service clients 
1) Adopt drastic measures against those responsible for the deficient pre-
surgery evaluation of women who undergo sterilization, including health 
professionals in some of the country’s health centers. Although the rules 
of the Family Planning Program require this evaluation, it is not being 
done. 
2) Continuously conduct training courses for health personnel in 
reproductive rights, violence against women, domestic violence, human 
rights, and gender equity, in coordination with civil society organizations 
that specialize in these topics. 
3) Adopt the necessary administrative measures so that that rules 
established for ensuring respect for the right of informed consent are 
scrupulously followed by health personnel. 
4) Guarantee that the centres that offer sterilization surgery have proper 
conditions required by standards of the Family Planning Program. 
5) Take strict measures to ensure that the compulsory reflection period of 
72 hours is faithfully and universally honoured. 
6) Take drastic action against those responsible for forced sterilization 
without consent. 
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7) Implement a mechanism or channels for efficient and expeditious 
receipt and processing of denunciations of violation of human rights in 
the health establishments, in order to prevent or redress injury 
caused.’469 
This case represents an important step forward in the protection of sexual and 
reproductive rights of women in the region. It opened up the opportunity for the 
request and implementation of far reaching GNR, aimed at modifying public policies, 
the carrying out of human rights training, and, the adoption of administrative and 
other positive measures in order to protect the rights of women. This model of 
friendly settlements can be used for the protection of the right to health in other types 
of cases. 
 
2. GNR in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: the progressive expansion of the remedial powers of the 
Court  
 
2.1 The jurisprudence on reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 
 
This section will explain some of the main features of the jurisprudence on remedies 
of the IACtHR, highlighting the progressive expansion of remedial powers of the 
Court in recent years. It will refer to the time framework introduced by Thomas 
                                                             
469 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru para 14. 
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Antkowiak, related to the distinctive eras of IACtHR’s jurisprudence on reparations.470 
According to the classification suggested by Antkowiak, it is possible to distinguish 
three periods of the jurisprudence on reparations in the IACtHR: early reparations 
jurisprudence (from 1987 to 1998), a following period following 1998 (from 1998 to 
2001), and a contemporary era (starting in 2001). In this chapter it will also be argued 
that, in addition to the eras mentioned, there is a new era of consolidation of the 
reparations jurisprudence in the Inter-American system, starting in 2008.  
 
 
 2.1.1 Early reparations jurisprudence (1987-1998) 
 
In its early reparations jurisprudence (1987-1998), the Court focused on monetary 
remedies as the main form of reparations, placing special emphasis on restitution 
and, when appropriate, compensation. During this period, the Court did not expressly 
refer to the concept of GNR in its case law. In Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras,471 
Godínez Cruz v Honduras,472 Gangaram Panday v Suriname,473 and Genie Lacayo v 
                                                             
470 Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 351. 
471 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No. 7 (21 July 1989). 
472 Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No. 8 (21 July 1989). 
473 Case of Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 16 (21 January 1994). 
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Nicaragua,474 the Court granted just compensation, in order to repair the material and 
moral damage caused by the disappearance and killing of victims, by military and 
state authorities. In addition to monetary compensation, in some cases, the Court 
ordered the locating and identification of the remains of the victims and the delivery of 
them to their next of kin;475 whilst in some others, it ordered the state ‘to continue 
investigations into the events referred to in the instant case, and to punish those 
responsible.’476  
In this period the focus of reparation was on monetary orders, with an aim to 
compensate the material and moral harm. The only exception to this principle was 
probably in the case Aloeboetoe et al, related to the ill treatment and subsequent 
execution, by military forces in Surinam, of seven young men (Maroons) from the 
Saramaka tribe. In this case, the Court granted extensive amounts of compensation, 
taking into account the particular family structure of the polygamy-based 
community.477 It also ordered non-monetary reparations, such as the reopening of a 
school and the establishment of a medical clinic, so that the children of the victims 
could receive adequate education and basic medical attention;478 as well as the 
creation of a trust fund so that the relatives of the victims could get the most benefit 
                                                             
474 Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No. 30 (29 January 1997). 
475 Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No. 28 (14 September 1996); Case of Caballero-Delgado and Santana v. 
Colombia (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 
31(29 January 1997).   
476 idem para 64 (4). 
477 Case of Aloeboetoe et al v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No.15 (10 September 1993) paras 63-66. 
478 idem para 96. 
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from the monetary compensation.479 The measures taken in this case seem to be 
exceptional for this period, as, in other cases, the Court had been reluctant to order 
other types of reparation, beyond compensation.480 The general approach granted in 
this decision has been criticized for going beyond the harm proved.481 The Court 
ordered measures that benefited the whole community, but refused to recognize 
them as ‘collective reparations’, or to acknowledge the existence of a moral damage 
to the community.482 The decision was also criticized for endorsing and legitimizing 
polygamy which is arguably a practice against women’s rights.483  
 
2.1.2 From 1998 to 2001  
 
A second moment in the IACHR’s jurisprudence went from 1998 to 2001. In this 
period the Court started to grant legislative and other measures which reflected a 
more expansive approach in the award of remedies. They were not, however, 
explicitly granted under the concept of GNR. Instead, the Court preferred to analyse 
                                                             
479 idem paras 100-101. 
480 Theo Van Boven, ‘Reparations; A requirement of Justice’, in Memoria del Seminario: El 
Sistema interamericano de proteccion de los derechos humanos en el umbral del siglo 
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481 Antkowiak Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations 367. 
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483 Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, ‘The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of 
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the topic as part of the general duties of States, established in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
CADH, to both respect the rights recognized in the Convention and to adopt 
legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms. 
Very often, the Court referred to Article 2 of the American Convention in order to 
justify the granting of legislative measures.484 
 
In the case Loayza Tamayo  v Peru, the Court took the first steps in establishing 
legislative measures. In this case, a female university teacher was arrested, tortured 
and tried in military and civil courts, for the crime of terrorism, and sentenced to 
twenty years in prison via the application of anti-terrorist laws that allowed such 
procedure.485 Although, by the time the Court decided on reparations, major reforms 
had been introduced to these laws, including elimination of the practice of trial before 
‘faceless’ judges,486 there were still some problems in defining the crimes of ‘treason’ 
and ‘terrorism’. According to the Court, the lack of adequate definition of such crimes 
could imply a risk against the judicial guarantee that prohibits double jeopardy.487 In 
consequence, the Court stated Peru ‘shall adopt the international legal measures 
necessary to adapt [its legislation] to conform to the American Convention.’488 The 
Inter-American Court was still timid in the drafting of the order, not specifying which 
aspects of the law should be amended.   
 
                                                             
484 Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (Reparation and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No.42 (27 November 1998). 
485 Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 
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486 Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (Reparation) para 161. 
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488 Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (Reparation) para 192 (5). 
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Following this case, the Court enacted a similar order in the case Castillo Petruzzi v. 
Peru, which also related to the application of the Anti-terrorist legislation in Peru. In 
this case, four people were judged and convicted under a military tribunal, to life 
imprisonment for the crime of treason established in this legislation. The Court 
ordered the State to ‘adopt the appropriate measures to amend those laws that [the] 
judgment has declared to be in violation of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.’489   
 
However, legislative measures were not always awarded in this period. For example, 
in the case Garrido v. Argentina, relating to the detention and forced disappearance 
of two Argentinian men, the victims’ representatives had requested the Court, as part 
of ‘other forms of reparations’, to order the state that, forced disappearance be 
typified under criminal law. The Court recognized that, in addition to monetary 
compensation, ‘the reparation may also be in the form of measures intended to 
prevent a recurrence of the offending acts.’490 However, the Court did not order to 
change the legislation, considering that the State had already taken serious steps in 
this regard491 through the introduction of a bill in the Congress to criminalize forced 
disappearances.  
Also in the case Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador the Court found that Article 114 of the 
Ecuadorian Criminal Court established an exception to the right to be released 
which, in the opinion of the Court, violated Article 2 of the American Convention. 
Despite this finding and the request of the Commission to ‘adopt effective measures 
                                                             
489 Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 52 (30 May 1999) para 226 (14). 
490 Case of Garrido and Bagorria v. Argentina (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No. 39 (27 August 1998) para 41. 
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to ensure that this type of violation does not recur in future,’492 the Court did not grant 
such measure, considering that the Article had already been declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Ecuador.  
 
During this period there were already developments to the idea of GNR. For 
example, in the case Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, when referring to the duty of states to 
investigate the facts, identify and punish those responsible, the Court stated that 
‘impunity fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations.’493 In the case 
Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala, when referring to the right of the victims to know 
the truth, the Court expressly recognized that, according to the general obligation 
established in Article 1 (1) of the Convention, the State has an obligation ‘to ensure 
that these grave violations do not occur again. Therefore, the State must take all 
steps necessary to attain this goal. Preventive measures and those against 
recidivism begin by revealing and recognizing the atrocities of the past.’494  
 
2.1.3 The revisited ‘contemporary’ era (2001-2008) 
 
According to Antkowiak, the third moment in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
system on reparations starts in 2001, with a fast increase in the number of judgments 
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of reparations decided by the Court.495 In this period, the jurisprudence included 
remedies directed, not just to repair individual harm, such us restitution, cessation 
and rehabilitation measures, recognition of responsibility, apologies and memorials, 
but it also ordered measures addressed to specific communities, in the form of 
development projects, and even measures oriented to benefit the society as a 
whole.496   
Regarding the measures directed to discrete communities, the Court established 
important measures. For example, the Court ordered the implementation of 
development funds and programs in particular communities, with the purpose of 
developing social services that may contribute to the wellbeing of affected 
communities. In the case Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala, the Court ordered the 
implementation of a development fund for health, education, production and 
infrastructure. It stated that the program should include a sewage system and potable 
water supply, as well as the maintenance and improvement of the road system within 
the affected communities, the supply of teaching staff trained in intercultural and 
bilingual teaching, and the establishment of a health centre in the village. It also ruled 
that these programs should be carried out independently of the existing public works 
financed by the national budget in these communities.497   
In other cases of violations of indigenous communities’ rights, the Court granted 
similar measures. In the case Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, the Court ordered the State to 
set up a development fund and program for the implementation of education, 
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Antkowiak Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations 371; and Cassel Expanding 
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housing, agricultural and health programs, with a value of US $905,000.498 Similarly, 
in the case Moiwana v. Suriname, the Court ordered the composition of a 
development fund consisting of US $1,200,000 which would be directed to health, 
housing and educational programs.499 In the Paraguayan cases, Sawhoyamaxa, 
Saramaka and Xakmok Kasek, the Court also ordered the establishment of 
community development funds with a value of US$1,000,000,500 US$ 600,000501 and 
US$700,000,502 respectively, in order to finance educational, housing, agricultural, 
nutritional and health, projects, as well as to provide electricity and drinking water 
and to build sanitation infrastructure.503 These measures also reflect an interest of 
the Court in expanding its remedial powers in order to address the harm, not just of 
the individuals directly affected by the violations, but to the whole community.  
In addition to this, the Court also ordered a series of measures directed to a larger 
section of the society, especially by ordering legislative reforms and training in 
human rights to public servants.504 Although previous developments were presented 
in other decision, it is in this period that the Court starts applying these measures 
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more consistently.505 Through these measures the Court explicitly developed a more 
structural approach to remedies, by ordering measures oriented to redress, not just 
the violation of a specific individual, but also oriented to prevent future harm.  
In 2002, in Caracazo v Venezuela, for the first time, the Court referred explicitly to 
‘guarantees of non-recidivism.’506 In this case, relating to the disproportionate use of 
force of the Venezuelan military forces in controlling protesters, the Court 
considered ‘[i]t is necessary to avoid by all means any repetition of the 
circumstances described.’507 As a consequence, the Court ordered the State ‘to take 
all necessary steps to avoid recurrence of the circumstances and facts of the instant 
case’508 by ordering it to take all necessary steps to educate and train all members 
of its armed forces in human rights and the standards to use weapons; adjust its 
operational plans regarding public disturbances to the requirements of respect for 
human rights; and to ensure that members of the armed forces and security 
agencies will use only those measures that are strictly required to control the 
situation. It is important to highlight here that the Court not only explicitly referred, in 
these measures, to take ‘necessary steps to avoid recurrence’509 but it also develops 
in detail, the type of measures that should be taken, ordering for example, among 
others, training courses, and the adjustment of operation plans.   
Interestingly during this period, the Court refers to the concept of ‘society as a 
whole’, as a way to denote all the measures which have a broader aspect, beyond 
the individual. In the Case Caballero Delgado y Santana v. Colombia, the Inter-
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American Commission requested the Court to publicly acknowledge its responsibility 
to the relatives of the victims and ‘to Colombian Society as a whole.’510 This 
interpretation was recognised by the Inter-American Court in the Trujillo-Oroza v. 
Bolivia case, by stating that ‘the State has the obligation to take all necessary steps 
to ensure that these grave violations are not repeated, an obligation whose fulfilment 
benefits society as a whole.’511 According to Schonsteiner, this term has been used 
extensively by the Court in connection with the right to the truth, in the context of 
impunity, and in connection with the obligation to investigate, try and punish the 
perpetrators.512 The explicit use of this term by the court is also a signal of the 
increasing interest of the Court in a broader understanding of reparations, one which 
focuses not just on the individual relief, but also spreads its effects to wider society. 
According to Schonsteiner, ‘after reviewing the contexts in which the Court has used 
the term ‘society as a whole’, it can be inferred that the Court intends for these 
awards to repair more than the harm to an individual victim.’513  
During this era the Court started to make explicit reference to the concept of 
‘guarantees of non-recidivism’ or GNR, in both the analytical part and the operative 
paragraphs of the decisions.514 For example, in the case Caracazo v. Venezuela, 
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the Court stated that the finding, exhumation, identification and delivery of the mortal 
remains to the next of kin will ‘give impetus to the criminal proceedings in connection 
with the facts [and] provide guarantees of non-recidivism of the latter.’515 It also 
mentioned that the training of all members of armed forces was necessary to avoid 
‘any repetition of the circumstances described.’516 In harmony with this, in the 
operative paragraphs of the decision, the Court declared that ‘the State must take all 
necessary steps to avoid recurrence of the circumstances and facts of the instant 
case,’517 by ordering the training of all members of armed forces, the adjustment of 
operational plans regarding public disturbances to human rights standards, and to 
ensure that members of the armed forces will use only those physical means strictly 
required to control situations.   
The Court’s understanding of this concept is, however, not very clear. During this 
era, there were several decisions in which measures, currently understood by the 
Court as measures of rehabilitation518 or satisfaction,519 were labelled as GNR. For 
example, the provision of medical psychological treatment, actually a form of 
rehabilitation, and the order to carry out a public act of acknowledgment, which 
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should be considered a form of satisfaction, are usually discussed under the general 
title of ‘other forms of reparation measures of satisfaction and GNR’. In fact, during 
this period, the Court analysed all of the non-monetary remedies under the general 
title ‘other forms of reparations’ and, later on, under the title ‘other forms of 
reparation, measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition’, without 
necessarily distinguishing among the different forms of reparations.   
In other cases, the Court seems to exceed their powers by ordering extensive GNR, 
without adequately explaining their reasoning for this. For example, in the case 
López Álvares v. Honduras, relating to the illegal privation of liberty of one person, 
and several irregularities in the judgment of this case, the Court ordered extensive 
reparation measures that covered the whole prison system. In concrete, the Court 
ordered the state to ‘adopt, within a reasonable time, measures tending to create 
conditions that ensure the inmates an adequate diet, medical attention, and physical 
and sanitary conditions pursuant with the international standards on this subject.’520 
Although the Court received some evidence that the victim was held in a Criminal 
Centre under unhealthy and overcrowded conditions,521 there was no discussion of 
whether this was a systemic situation in the country’s prison system, or if it was a 
particular policy of the centre where the victim was held.  
 
2.1.4 The era of consolidation of remedial measures (2008- onwards) 
 
After 2008 the Court decided more than one hundred cases, representing almost half 
of its case law. Although in most of the judgments the Court took a restrictive 
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approach in the award of GNR, it is in this era that the Court consolidated its 
understanding of reparations. In contrast with the jurisprudential trend, the Court also 
decided some specific cases, with very ambitious orders, in cases related to women’s 
rights and people with disabilities.  
The first judgment where the Court developed ambitious guarantees was in the case 
Cotton Field v. Mexico. The case related to the disappearance, mistreatment and 
death of three women, two of them minors, who were subsequently found in a cotton 
field in Chihuahua, (Mexico). The cases were not isolated, but part of a systemic 
pattern of disappearances and murders of girls and women in the city.522 In addition 
to measures of compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction, the Court ordered 
extensive GNR.  
In this decision, the Court starts to make clearer use of the concept of GNR, 
especially by distinguishing these measures as separate from rehabilitation and 
compensation, by introducing subtitles in the decision for each of them.523  
The Court also became more precise in the drafting of measures. Instead of just 
providing a general measure ordering the state to ‘amend its domestic law’,524 as in 
previous cases where specific provisions of the domestic law contravened the 
Convention, the Court was very detailed in determining the specific norms that must 
be modified, and the normative standards that should be taken into account in the 
reform. In situations where the legislation was in line with international standards, 
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GNR were oriented to guarantee full access to justice by forcing concrete reforms in 
the manner that operators of justice carry out their duties. This was translated into 
orders to: adopt protocols, manuals, prosecutorial investigation criteria, expert 
services, and services, to provide justice in the investigation of disappearances and 
sexual abuse, that should be modified in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol.525  
Regarding training programs, the Court increased the spectrum of human rights 
courses by addressing them, not just to public officials, but also to the population in 
general. In particular, in this case the Court ordered the State to conduct educational 
programs on human rights and gender, for both the public officials and the general 
population of the State of Chihuahua, as a way to overcome the stereotyping of 
women.526  
In this case the Court also ordered new measures and GNR. Specifically, among 
other measures, the Court ordered the creation of a web page concerning the women 
and girls who had disappeared, and a database containing the available, personal 
information on the missing women, their DNA and genetic information.527 
Interestingly, in this case the Court also engaged in the development of the concept 
of ‘transformative reparations’. This concept refers to the idea that reparations must 
be designed to change structural patterns of violations, when they happen in 
situations that are, per se, discriminatory, and not just in the re-establishment of the 
situation of the status quo ante, as it was before the violation. According to the Court: 
‘[...] bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination in 
which the facts of this case occurred, which was acknowledged by the 
State, the reparations must be designed to change this situation, so that 
                                                             
525 Cotton Field Orders, numeral (18). 
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their effect is not only of restitution, but also of rectification. In this regard, 
re-establishment of the same structural context of violence and 
discrimination is not acceptable.’528  
Other international ‘bodies’, such as the Committee against Torture,529 and the 
Rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida Manjoo, have also made reference 
to this concept.530 Despite the theoretical achievements, there are certainly difficulties 
in the application of this concept in practice. Apart from the order to provide general 
human rights and general training to the population of Chihuahua, the Inter-American 
Court did not award any transformative measure in the Cotton Field case, but also 
did not make any new references to the concept of transformative reparations in its 
jurisprudence.531 In general, the Court has rejected any request to order states to 
adopt public policies, programs, institutional reforms, and any other measure with a 
transformative component, in cases where such measures were clearly requested. 
                                                             
528 idem para. 450. 
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For example, in the case Atala Riffo v. Chile532 the Court considered that, since the 
violations did not result from a problem with the laws, per se, it was not appropriate, 
in the circumstances of the present case, to order the adoption, modification or 
adjustment of specific domestic laws.533  
The combination of very progressive statements in theory, with more modest results 
in practice, shows a clear dichotomy in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
system. While the introduction of the concept of ‘transformative reparations’ was an 
important step forward in the development of the jurisprudence of the Court, it seems 
there is not a real will from the Inter-American Court to engage in truly transformative 
reparations. As a result, some commentators have expressed that this jurisprudence 
on ‘transformative reparations’ may be an obstacle rather than progress in the 
protection of human rights, in as much as the concept is not well developed in 
international law and the Court did not award any actual measures.534 In order to see 
further development of this concept, it will be up to the petitioners and the Inter-
American Commission to adequately argue the request of these measures, to 
academics to clarify the links between GNR and ‘transformative reparations’, and to 
the Court to develop a consistent theory for the awarding of such measures.  
The boldness of the Court in the Cotton Field decision is maintained in other specific 
cases during this period. For example, in the cases Radilla Pacheco, Fernández-
Ortega and Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, the Inter-American Court ordered very specific 
measures in terms of legislative reform, ordering the state to adopt ‘the relevant 
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legislative reforms to conform Article 57 of the Military Code of Justice to international 
standards.’535  
In the case Fornerón and daughter v. Argentina, the Court was not shy to grant 
orders that compromised the budget capacity, or the internal organization of an 
institution, in some way. It ordered the government ‘to implement, […] with the 
respective budgetary provision, a compulsory program or course for judicial agents 
[…] who intervene in the administration of juvenile justice’536 in an Argentinean 
province. This measure was necessary, taking into account the difficulty of securing 
the resources to fund the program in a federal system, as the Argentinian system 
required that local authorities (not just the general government) approve the budget.  
The Court also granted measures that required the establishment of new institutional 
mechanisms of control, with corresponding budget and organizational implications. In 
the case Furlán and Family v. Argentina, the Court ordered the state to establish an 
interdisciplinary group in order to assist the victim in his educational, vocational, and 
labour insertion.537 When carrying out this duty, the State has a duty to enforce the 
obligation of ‘active transparency’ in relation to health and social security benefits. 
This duty implies the obligation ‘to provide the public with the maximum amount of 
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information, in a proactive manner, regarding the information needed to obtain said 
benefits. This information should be comprehensive, easily understood, available in 
simple language and up to date.’538 
The boldness of the Court expressed in these high-profile cases is, however, not 
present in the rest of the jurisprudence of the Court during this period, where the 
Court was more reluctant to the award of GNR. This shows the lack of consistency of 
the Court in the criterion to award GNR, one that is not fair for those victims of less 
high profile cases.  
 
2.2 The scope of the measures: different forms of GNR 
 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is characterized by 
the variety of GNR the tribunal has awarded. Such measures vary in the way they 
interfere with state sovereignty, ranging from human rights courses and campaigns, 
to the standardization of protocols of actions and manuals, legislative reforms, 
strengthening and reform of state institutions, and even, in some cases, the 
consideration of the adoption of public policies and programs. The next section will 
discuss in detail the characteristics and circumstances in which these measures 
have been awarded.  
 
2.2.1 Human rights courses and campaigns 
As already noted, the Court ordered GNR for first time in 2002, in the Caracazo v. 
Venezuela Case. After 2002 the Court granted these measures with some regularity, 
but it was after 2008 that the measure became more common in the jurisprudence of 
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the Court. Since 2012, the Court has been much more detailed in the wording of 
these measures, specifying the type of topics that should be covered in the curricula. 
For example, while in the Caracazo v. Venezuela Case the Court ordered the state 
to ‘take all necessary steps to avoid recurrence of the circumstances and facts of the 
instant case including training of members of armed  forces […]’, in Radilla Pacheco 
v. Mexico the Court ordered the implementation of permanent courses in the 
‘analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system in reference to military 
criminal jurisdiction’, and the ‘due investigation and prosecution of facts that 
constitute forced disappearance of persons’. In the last case, the Court also 
mentioned that public servants should be trained in the use of circumstantial 
evidence, indicia, presumptions and the assessment of systematic patterns, among 
other aspects.539 Also, in the case Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, the 
Court ordered the state to carry out training sessions to ‘members of the armed and 
police forces, agents responsible for border control, and agents responsible for the 
administration of justice.’540  
Such courses have been directed at various public servants. Although in the 
beginning the Court primarily addressed this measure to the armed forces and 
security agencies, it has also directed these courses to, among others: police 
officials,541 agents responsible for responding to requests for access to state-held 
information,542 judicial agents,543 military criminal court staff,544 border control agents 
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and agents in charge of migratory procedures.545 The Court has gone even further, 
by ordering educational programs for the general public of a state, in order to 
overcome the general situation of discrimination against women.546 In the Cotton 
Field case the Court also ordered an annual report elaborated by the state, indicating 
the actions taken.  
The Court has also ordered courses on a large variety of human rights topics, such 
as: the prevention of torture,547 limits of military criminal jurisdiction and investigation 
and prosecution of forced disappearance,548 diligent investigation in cases of sexual 
violence,549 and, the human rights of indigenous peoples.550  
Regarding ESC rights the Court has ordered training programs directed to health 
care professionals and judicial officials, in relation to patient’s rights,551 reproductive 
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rights, and non-discrimination.552 The Court has also ordered national campaigns in 
order to inform and sensitize people about the importance of the work of 
environmental defenders;553 in detection and attention to problems of violence 
against women;554 and, more widely, the dissemination of patient’s rights.555 When 
ordering the latter, the Court has also ordered the state to act with ‘active 
transparency’, which implies the obligation to provide information in a proactive, 
comprehensive and simple manner.556 
 
2.2.2 Standardization of protocols of action and manuals  
 
Legislative reforms do not necessarily guarantee that real changes take place in 
practice. In fact, without appropriate operationalization, it is almost illusory to expect 
adherence to the duties of states to respect, protect and ensure human rights. For 
public servants that carry out their work every day, the establishment of clear 
protocols of action and manuals is indispensable to clarify their human rights 
obligations.  
Taking into account this idea, since 2008, the Court has ordered states to carry out 
the standardization of protocols of action and manuals used in the attention and 
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investigation of human rights violations in accordance with international standards. 
These measures have been applied by the court particularly in cases of sexual 
violence against women. In the case Gonzalez et al (Cotton Field) v. Mexicothe 
Court ordered the state to ’continue standardizing all its protocols, manuals, 
prosecutorial investigation criteria, expert services and services to provide justice 
that are used to investigate disappearance and sexual abuse in accordance with the 
Istanbul Protocol and other international norms.’557 Similarly, in the cases 
Fernández-Ortega v. Mexico and Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, both about the rape of 
indigenous women, by soldiers, when the women were carrying out daily life 
activities, the Court found serious faults, such as: the lack of female doctors, and 
chemical reagents, to perform the medical examination;558 indifference of the officials 
in charge of receiving the complaint,559 and, a lack of translators to receive the 
complaint.560 In both cases the Mexican state was found responsible for the lack of 
due diligence in the investigation and punishment of the rape of the women.561 As a 
consequence, the Court ordered the Mexican government to standardize the action 
protocol used in the attention and investigation of rape, taking into account the 
Istanbul Protocol and the Guidelines of the World Health Organization.562  
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As in the granting of legislative measures, the Court has been very detailed in stating 
not only the type of measures that should be the object of standardization, but also 
the type of standards that should be taken into account in order to carry out such 
updating. While these standards are soft law, they do establish the most clear and 
updated criteria for the regulation of specific topics. Without the use of such 
standards, the regulation and updating of protocols and manuals would be even 
more difficult, lacking an adequate model of reference. 
As will be discussed in Chapters IV and V, these measures may have an important 
impact in the realisation of ESC rights, where, often, the lack of operational methods 
for the provisions contained in the legislation, make the rights illusory.  
 
2.2.3 Capacity building and institutional reform   
 
The Inter-American Court has also ordered measures that have a specific impact in 
the creation, strengthening, and reform of state institutions. Particularly in cases 
related to disappearances, the Inter-American Court has shown an active 
involvement with the strengthening of state institutions, in order to prevent the 
commission of these facts. Among other measures, the Court has ordered states to 
create search web pages for missing people,563 to establish databases with personal 
and genetic information,564 to implement a system of genetic information in order to 
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determine the blood relationship of victims,565 to set up or improve national registries 
of detainees, in order to reduce the risk of torture and disappearance.566 It has also 
awarded measures to establish the truth of the facts, by welcoming the 
establishment of a Truth National Commission to clarify facts of disappearances,567 
and by recommending the state to allow the participation of civil society in the 
establishment of a national commission to trace young people who have 
disappeared.568 In other cases related to disappearances, the Inter-American Court 
has also ordered states to strengthen certain institutions, in order to advance the 
investigation and prosecution of this crime; ordering states to provide an Inter-
Institutional Council for the clarification of Forced Disappearance,569 and to equip the 
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Prosecutor’s office,570 with the necessary human and material resources to 
effectively carry out their functions. 
In other cases relating to the inadequate conditions of detention, the Inter-American 
Court has ordered the general improvement of prisons and detention centres571 and, 
in some cases, it has also ordered the creation of facilities to accommodate persons 
detained for suspected immigration violations.572   
In cases related to the prevention of sexual violence against women, the Inter-
American Court has ordered the state to improve and strengthen specific services 
and institutions. In the cases Rosendo-Cantú v. Mexico, and Fernández Ortega v. 
Mexico, the Court ordered Mexico to strengthen services for treating female victims 
of sexual violence in health centres573 and to follow the recommendations of other 
institutions that recommended the decentralization of services which are mainly 
located in the cities, in order to prevent violence against women, and to improve the 
access of indigenous women to telephones.574 
These measures require a higher level of effort from states as they have to carry out 
the design, budget appropriation, and both legal and administrative procedures, in 
order to implement them. As a consequence, the challenge of the Inter-American 
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Court is to duly justify these measures in order not to reduce the margin of 
appreciation, which states have in the design of their own institutions.  
 
2.2.4 Legislative reforms  
 
Although legislative measures were first granted in 1997, in the cases Loayza 
Tamayo v. Peru, and then again in 1999 in Castillo-Petruzzi v. Peru,575 they have 
been more consistently granted since 2001, with the Olmedo Bustos et al v. Chile 
Case. In this case the Chilean State had banned the exhibition of the film ‘The last 
temptation of Christ’, relying on article 19(12) of the Chilean Constitution which 
establishes a ‘system of censorship for the exhibition and publicity of 
cinematographic productions.’576 The Inter-American Court found that previous 
censorship, as was established in the Chilean Constitution, represented a violation of 
the freedom of expression, set up in Article 13 of the Convention. As a consequence, 
the Court ordered the State to ‘amend its domestic law, within a reasonable period, 
in order to eliminate prior censorship to allow exhibition of the film.’577 The case is 
relevant since it ordered the modification of a constitutional provision in order to 
make it compatible with the American Convention.  
 
From 2001 onwards, legislative measures have been applied in a wide range of 
topics related to:  
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‘children’s rights, conditions of detention, corporal punishment, death 
penalty, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, freedom of 
expression, judicial independence, juvenile detention, indigenous land 
and property titles, kidnapping or abduction, military jurisdiction, 
obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish, political rights, principle 
of legality, procedures for acquiring nationality, registers of detainees, 
regulation of the recourse of habeas corpus, right of judicial appeal, 
states of exception and suspension of guarantees, terrorism, use of force 
by State agents and use of information.’578  
Regarding the level of specificity, they have varied over the course of time. In early 
decisions the Court was prone to order general reforms, ordering the states to ‘adopt 
the legislative, administrative and any other measures that are necessary in order to 
adapt [a state’s] legislation.’579 In other cases, such as in the case Olmedo Bustos v. 
Chile, the Court ordered specific measures oriented to eliminate, include, or modify, 
specific pieces of legislation. For example, the Court has ordered the elimination of 
prior censorship from the Chilean Constitution,580 the Corporal Punishment Act from 
the domestic legislation in Trinidad and Tobago,581 and, most recently, it has ordered 
the annulment of the prohibition to practice In vitro Fertilization (IVF) in Costa 
Rica.582 In other cases, the Court has also ordered the inclusion of specific 
                                                             
578 Sofía Galván, ‘Legislative measures as guarantees of non-repetition: a reality in the Inter-
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provisions, usually in criminal legislation, for example, the order to define both the 
forced disappearance of persons,583 and the sale of children,584 as an offence in 
criminal codes, and to approve an Ethics Code.585   
 
The Court has also ordered the modification of specific pieces of legislation that were 
found to be incompatible with the Convention. It has largely ‘ordered to conform to 
international standards’ specific provisions of domestic legislation, in cases regarding 
the definition of the crimes of kidnapping and abduction,586 forced disappearance,587 
and, military jurisdiction,588 among others.  
 
Only in one decision, Raxcaco-Reyes v. Guatemala, was the Court detailed in its 
identification of the concrete elements different forms of the crime of kidnapping or 
abduction should take into account, in order to be compatible with the Convention.589 
In this case a person was sentenced to death via the application of a law that 
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punished, with the death penalty, the perpetrators of the crime of kidnapping or 
abduction. The Court found that such legislation which ‘punishes any form of 
kidnapping or abduction with the mandatory death penalty and expands the number 
of crimes punishable with this sanction’,590 violated the rights to life (Article 4), and 
that the state must adopt legislative or other measures necessary to give effects to 
the rights in the Convention (Article 2). The Court ordered the modification of this 
article in the Criminal Code, in very precise terms:  
 
 ‘It orders that the State should adopt the legislative, administrative and 
any other measures necessary to adapt its domestic legislation to the 
American Convention; in particular: (i) Modification, within a reasonable 
period, of Article 201 of the Penal Code in force, in order to define 
various specific crime categories that distinguish the different forms of 
kidnapping or abduction, based on their characteristics, the gravity of the 
facts, and the circumstances of the crime, with the corresponding 
provision of different punishments, proportionate to each category, and 
the empowerment of the courts to individualize punishment in keeping 
with the specifics of the crime and the perpetrator, within the maximum 
and minimum limits that each crime category should include, This 
modification should, under no circumstances, expand the list of crimes 
punishable with the death penalty established prior to ratification of the 
American Convention.’591  
 
The specificity of this order seems to be justified due to the gravity of the rights 
involved. In fact, the provision deals with the application of the death penalty which is 
                                                             
590 idem para 88. 
591 idem para 132 (i). 
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considered a clear violation of the right to life under the American Convention. As a 
consequence, even though the order establishes a clear directive to the legislative 
power in the modification of these norms, this seems to be justified for the relevance 
of the rights involved.  
 
The granting of these measures imposes several challenges for the Court. As 
Antkowiak has pointed out, three elements are crucial for the development of 
legislative measures: ‘they must be clear enough to be understood and followed by 
frequently unenthusiastic bureaucrats, [...] concrete enough to be verifiable by the 
Court in the supervisory process, [and] they should be sufficiently flexible to allow the 
sovereign state some discretion.’592 In the granting of legislative measures, the Court 
seems to have taken a proactive role by establishing, not only those cases where 
domestic provisions were against international standards, but also by establishing 
the elements that should be taken into account by congresses and parliamentary 
institutions, in order to adapt its legislations.  
 
2.2.5 Adoption of public policies and plans of action 
 
While the Court has not hesitated in granting measures ordering the training of public 
officials, the updating of manuals, legislative measures, and, in some circumstances, 
the strengthening and reform of state institutions, it has been very cautious in 
granting measures that order the state to adopt public policies, programs and plans. 
So far, the Court has not accepted any of the requests made by the Commission to 
order the adoption of public policies oriented to guarantee specific rights.  
                                                             
592 Antkowiak Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations 384. 
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The reasons for these rejections have always been linked to procedural issues. In 
the case Gonzales et al (Cotton Field) v. Mexico case, the Commission requested 
the Court to design a coordinated public policy in order to prevent facts of sexual 
violence, and to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible.593 Similarly, in 
the case Rosendo-Cantu v. Mexico, the Commission requested, as part of the GNR, 
the design of a participatory program to contribute to the reinsertion, into the 
community, of indigenous women who had been the victims of rape.594 In both 
cases, the Inter-American Court rejected the request, arguing that the Commission 
did not adequately demonstrate that the current policies in place did not 
appropriately protect the rights violated.595 The argument of the Court is interesting 
as it did not question the legitimacy of this type of measures in the repertoire of 
reparation measures established by the Court. This is an important step forward, as 
it implicitly recognizes the possibility of requesting the creation, or modification, of 
public policies and programs when it is proved they are part of the root causes of a 
violation.  
However, the fact that the Court did not grant these measures raises several 
concerns regarding the burden and standard of proof required by the Inter-American 
Court. In respect of the burden of proof to demonstrate the non-existence or non-
effectiveness of policies to prevent the repetition of the facts, the jurisprudence is not 
                                                             
593 Cotton Field paras 474-475. 
594 Rosendo-Cantú and other v. Mexico para 236. 
595 In the Rosendo Cantú Case the Court argued that, since the state provided information 
about some public policies in place and that the Commission did not object to the validity of 
the measures, the Court found that there was not enough evidence or argumentation to grant 
the measures (Rosendo-Cantú and other v. Mexico paras 237-238). In the Cotton Field Case 
the Court argued that, without information about any structural defects and problems of 
implementation and impact, it was unable to order such measures. Cotton Field para 495. 
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clear. On the one hand, it is generally established that the party making the 
allegation has the burden to prove the facts on which the claim is based.596 As 
changes in the definition of public policies may be considered an illegitimate 
interference in the definition of state’s own policies, it makes sense that the Inter-
American Court requires from petitioners extensive evidence, in order to justify the 
award of such measures. On the other hand, at least in cases of systemic violations 
of human rights, it seems disproportionate to expect the victim to prove that the 
policies and programs settled by the state do not actually protect the right violated, 
especially when information about the content and effectiveness of some policies, 
relies on the state. In this sense, Sandoval and Rubio have argued that, in these 
circumstances, the Court should reverse the burden of proof597 as has been its 
consistent practice in those cases where evidence cannot be produced without the 
State’s cooperation, such as in cases of enforced disappearances.598  
In relation to the problems of evidence that the victims may encounter, it should be 
noted that the Inter-American Commission could take an active step to assume part 
of the burden to prove the lack of policies, or the ineffectiveness of the existent ones. 
In particular, the Inter-American Commission could make use of the extensive 
information collected in its country and thematic reports, as well as the 
documentation of other cases, in order to prove the lack of effective policies to 
prevent the facts, and, how this is intrinsically linked with the eventual repetition of 
the violation. The Inter-American Commission could also refer to the reports of other 
                                                             
596 Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Merits) para 121. 
597 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 1088. 
598 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala paras 152-153; Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and 
Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2013) p. 
171. 
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domestic and international bodies, received in the preparation of the case. After all, 
one of the main pillars of the work of the Commission is to monitor the human rights 
situation of the Member States.599 In doing so, it has a privileged view of the general 
situation of remedies and policies in the states, which facilitate the Commission’s role 
in the proving and requesting of programs and policies of prevention.  
Regarding the type of proof required, the Court would have to clarify the type of 
standard applied to these situations. In the case Gonzales et al (Cotton Field) v. 
Mexico the Court mentioned that it was unable to rule on the existence of an integral 
policy, without information on: ‘any structural defects that crosscut these policies, any 
problems in their implementation, and their impact on the effective enjoyment of their 
rights by the victims of this violence.’600 Impact and effectiveness evaluations, in the 
analysis of legal cases, impose new challenges for both the petitioners and the Court 
who are not used to the assessment of such variables. Taking into account the 
difficulty of carrying out these studies and the cost associated with them, the Court 
could be flexible in the type of standard accepted to prove this. In this aspect, the 
Court has also specified that result indicators can also be used as a tool to measure 
such variables.601 However, there is not yet clarity as to how result indicators can be 
adequately used in measuring the impact and effectiveness of public policies. 
Further research is it necessary in this regard.  
In other cases the Court has rejected the request for GNR, arguing that the request 
was not presented in a timely manner. In the case Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, the 
                                                             
599 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (adopted October 1979) Res 
447, Article 18 (a), (b) and (c). 
600 Cotton Field para 495. 
601 The Court also mentioned that it “does not have result indicators in relation to how the 
policies implemented by the State could constitute reparations with a gender perspective” 
(Cotton Field para 495. 
178 
 
Commission requested similar measures to those requested in the cases Gonzales 
et al (Cotton Field) v. Mexico  and Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico. The Court, however, 
considered that the request ‘was not presented at the opportune procedural moment’ 
which should be in the respective application and brief of pleadings and motions.602 
In other cases, the Court has rejected the request for new programs and public 
policies, arguing that the laws in which these programs are based did not violate the 
Convention. For example, in the case Atala v. Chile, the Commission requested the 
Court to adopt ‘legislation, public policies, programs and initiatives to prohibit and 
eradicate discrimination based on sexual orientation in all areas of the exercise of 
public power, including the administration of justice.’603 At the same time, the victim’s 
representative requested the Court to send a ‘message of utmost urgency’ regarding 
a draft law, that was intended to establish anti-discriminatory measures, in order to 
ensure that said draft expressly prohibited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, and that it provided a legal remedy by which to claim for a violation. Most 
of the argumentation of the Court was related to the request of ‘message of utmost 
urgency’ laws, but the argumentation did not address the broader request of both the 
Commission and the victims’ representative, to provide positive measures in the form 
of programs, polices and legal remedies to protect people against discrimination. In 
this case, the Court concluded that the petitioners did not provide sufficient facts to 
suggest that the violations resulted from a problem with the law, per se, but that the 
application of the law.604 By doing this, the Court focused on the legal dimension of 
the measure, particularly in the ‘message of utmost urgency’, but did not address the 
request oriented to provide, for example, legal remedies to claim protection. At the 
end of the case, instead of granting the ‘message of utmost urgency’, the Court took 
                                                             
602 Fernández Ortega et al v. Mexico para 280. 
603 Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile para 273. 
604 Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile paras 279-284. 
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a halfway position by, motu propio, ordering Chilean judges to carry out a 
‘convention control’, ex officio, between domestic law and the American Convention, 
in the analysis of discrimination cases. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
 
This section has shown the variety of measures that the Court has awarded as GNR. 
In all cases, a higher or lower level of intrusion in the sovereignty of the state takes 
place. As is to be expected, the higher the level of intrusiveness of the measure, the 
higher the standard of proof. Whereas human rights courses, standardization of 
protocols of action and manuals, and some form of institutional strengthening imply 
low levels of intrusion in the sovereignty of states, they are more or less common 
forms of GNR. However, as legislative measures and public policies require a 
stronger intrusion in the sovereignty of states, they require a higher level of 
argumentation and of evidence to be ordered by the Court. For example, in respect 
of legislative measures, the Inter-American Court has indicated that it is necessary to 
prove there is a violation of Article 2 of the American Convention. This raises the 
standard for the application of this type of measures. Also, in the request of public 
policies and programs, the Court has been extra cautious in raising the standard of 
proof for the award of such measures, by indicating that the parties should prove the 
lack of, either existence or effectiveness, of the policies in place. Despite the 
attempts of the Court to create a narrower criterion for the award of remedies, still 
GNR are commonly requested in almost every case, and some form of GNR is 
generally awarded by the Court in most of its judgments. This necessarily raises 
concerns about the respect to the sovereignty of states, and the difficulties for the 
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compliance of these measures.605 Even though the Court has made efforts in order 
to narrow down the criteria to award GNR, it has not necessarily agreed on a 
coherent criterion. The next section will discuss some of the circumstances in which 
GNR have been granted, and some of the criteria that the Court could use in order to 
provide such measures. 
 
2.3 Under which circumstances does the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights grant GNR?  
 
As a general rule, every violation of the American Convention entitles the victims to 
request reparations from the Commission or the Court, for the harm suffered. As 
already stated, reparations may take the form of restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and GNR. These are not exclusive options but may be 
requested alternatively, or all together, depending on the circumstances of the case.  
The Court, however, has not established precisely under which circumstances GNR 
can be granted. As a consequence, it has become a general practice for petitioners 
to request some form of GNR in almost every case. Even though the Court has tried 
to narrow down the criteria for the granting of GNR, by requiring the demonstration of 
a ‘generalized pattern’ of violations, such criteria is still not consistent. The next 
sections will present both the procedural and substantive standards that the Court 
has used in order to award these measures.  
 
2.3.1  Procedural standards in the awarding of GNR  
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In recent years, the Court has narrowed down the criteria it applies in ordering 
reparation measures, by setting several procedural standards. First, GNR should be 
generally requested by either the Inter-American Commission or the petitioners. The 
Inter-American Court could also award measures in application of the iura novit curia 
principle,606 even when they have not been requested. This has happened only in 
exceptional circumstances, such as in the case Gonzales et al (Cotton Field) v. 
Mexico), where the Court ordered the state to offer a program of education for the 
general public of the State of Chihuahua, one that was not requested by any of the 
parties.607  
The Inter-American Court has also established that measures should be requested 
at the right procedural opportunity: either when the Inter-American Commission 
brings a case to the Court and/or when the petitioners (the victims or their 
representatives) bring the brief containing pleadings, motions and evidence.608 The 
Court has rejected the request for GNR in several cases, arguing that the request 
was made out of time.609 
The Inter-American Court has also established the need to demonstrate a causal link 
between the facts of the case, the alleged violation and the damage alleged. The 
Court has stated that: 
                                                             
606 Iura novit curia is a Latin, legal maxim expressing the principle that ‘the Court knows the 
law’ and therefore it is not necessary to prove particular pieces of law in the litigation of a 
case. 
607 Cotton Field para 543. 
608 Rules of procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, articles 35 and 40. 
609 Case of Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No. 190 (26 November 2008) para 121; Vélez Loor v. Panama para 
298. 
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‘[…] reparations must have a causal link to the facts of the case, the 
violations declared and the damage attributed to those violations, as well 
as to the measures requested in reparation of the corresponding 
damages. Therefore, the Court must examine that concurrence in order 
to duly rule in keeping with the law.’610 
In respect of the link between the facts and the measures, the Court has rejected 
measures that go beyond the facts discussed in the case. For example, in the case 
Escué-Zapata v Colombia, the Court rejected the request of the representatives to 
order the state to adopt measures to grant the indigenous community rights over 
their ancestral territory, and to create a plan that facilitated the restructuring of the 
community’s plan of life.611 The case related to the extra-judicial killing of Mr Zapata, 
who worked in the defence of the indigenous community’s land. Since the GNR 
requested were related to the indigenous community and not to the facts discussed 
in the case (i.e. the killing of the victim) the Court decided that the petitions should 
not proceed.612 
In respect of the link between the violation occurred and the measures requested, 
the Court rejected the petition to modify specific legislation, arguing that a violation of 
Article 2 of the Convention was not demonstrated. In the cases Garibaldi v. Brasil, 
relating to the failure of the state to investigate and punish the murder of a person 
                                                             
610 Case of Abrill Alosilla et al v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No. 223 (4 March 2011) para 87; Ticona Estrada et al v. Bolivia 
para 110; Case of Gomes Lund et al (Guerrilha do Araguaia) para 246 and; Case of Cabrera 
Garcia and Montiel Flores (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 220 (26 November 2010) para 209.  
611 Case of Escué-Zapata v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No.165 (4 July 2007) paras 181 and 182. 
612 idem para 185. 
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during an extrajudicial operation to evict families of landless workers, and, Escher et 
al v. Brasil, relating to the unlawful telephone interception by the military police, of 
conversations of members of several organization; the representatives requested the 
state to derogate laws that granted the title of ‘honorary citizen’ to one of the judges 
in charge of the investigation. In both cases, the Court denied the request, arguing 
that the representatives did not prove how such laws were contrary to Article 2 of the 
Convention.613 In other cases, such as in Mejía-Idrovo v. Ecuador, the Court rejected 
the request to apply administrative, and other, measures to remove all legal and 
factual obstacles and mechanisms that prevented the investigation, identification and 
prosecution of those responsible, arguing that obstacles in the investigation and 
prosecution of the ones responsible, were not demonstrated.614  
The Court also established that there should be a link between those persons 
recognised as victims by the Court, and the reparations granted. For example, in the 
case of Manuel Cepeda v. Colombia, the Court recognized that the murder of the 
congressman Manuel Cepeda happened in a context of violence against the 
opposition party, ‘Union Patriótica’ (UP in Spanish); here, members, representative 
and sympathizers of this party were harassed, attacked and murdered, in an attempt 
to eliminate the opposition.615 As a consequence, the Commission requested the 
state to adopt a policy to eradicate violence based on political ideology. The Court 
                                                             
613 Case of Garibaldi v. Brasil (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No.203 (23 September 2009) para 173; Case of 
Escher et al. V. Brazil Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No.200 (6 July 2009) paras 252-254.  
614 Case of Mejía-Idrovo v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.228 (5 July 2011) paras 145-146. 
Case of Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 213 (26 May 2010) paras 81 
and 87.616 idem para 238. 
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rejected the measures arguing that, ‘since the members of the UP were not declared 
to be victims in this judgment, the Court will abstain from ordering reparation on this 
aspect.’616 The argument in this case is, however, quite problematic. GNR have, by 
nature, a clear collective component, requiring the state to grant measures oriented 
to impact wider audiences. When the Court has ordered human rights training, 
legislative measures, and institutional changes, the recipients of such measures are 
the public servants, the population in general, and the institutions which are not 
necessarily recognized as victims of the case. Expecting that the beneficiaries of the 
GNR should coincide with the identified victims of the case nullifies the 
transformative potential of GNR. If the Court disagreed with the awarding of public 
policies as a form of guarantee of non-repetition, or if it decided not to grant these 
measures in order to see the outcome of a second petition about the UP, pending a 
resolution in the Inter-American system,617 it could have explicitly mentioned this, 
instead of arguing the lack of compatibility between the measures and the victims of 
the case.  
The Court has also established that the request for GNR should be sufficiently 
argued by the parties to the case. As discussed in section 2.2.5618 of this chapter, in 
the cases Gonzales et al (Cotton Field) v. Mexico, Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, and 
Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, the Commission and the representatives requested the 
implementation of public policies oriented to prevent the facts of violence against 
women. In each case, the request was denied by the Court, arguing that the parties 
                                                             
616 idem para 238. 
617 See, José Bernardo Diaz and other v. Colombia ‘Union Patriótica’ (Admissibility) Inter 
American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.227, Report 5/97(12 March 1997). 
618 See, pp. 174-179.  
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did not adequately argue why current policies were insufficient in order to prevent the 
facts.619   
In addition to this criterion, the Court has also taken into account other procedural 
elements in order not to grant certain GNR. The Inter-American Court has rejected 
the request to award additional GNR arguing that the state has already put in place 
other measures which have the same purpose. In the case Chitay Nech et al v. 
Guatemala the representatives requested certain legislation, related to the 
procedures of absence and death, be modified in order to adapt them to international 
standards. The Court stated that it had ordered the modification of such legislation in 
a previous decision and was still in the process of monitoring of compliance.620 
Similarly in the case Tristán Donoso v. Panama, the Inter-American Commission 
requested the Court to adapt the criminal legislation that established ‘crimes against 
honour’, in order to conform to the American Convention. Since the State had 
introduced some amendments precluding the possibility of criminal punishment for 
offences against certain public officials, the Court did not accept the request for the 
measures.621   
In other cases, however, the Court has not provided an in-depth argument for the 
denial of the measures but has simply argued that other measures awarded in the 
case were sufficient to redress the violation and that, therefore, in the context of the 
case, the request for GNR was not necessary. For example, in the case of Valle 
Jaramillo et al v. Colombia, the Commission and the representatives requested 
                                                             
619 Cotton Field para 495-496; Fernández Ortega et al v. Mexico para 274; Rosendo Cantú et 
al v. Mexico para 232. 
620 Case of Chitay Nech et al v. Guatemala (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs)  Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 2012 (25 Mar 2010) para 260. 
621 Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 193 (27 January 2009) para 209. 
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additional measures with the purpose of raising awareness of the risks faced by 
human rights defenders, in order to prevent the repetition of the facts. Without 
providing further argumentation, the Court found that the measures granted were 
enough to achieve such purpose and, as a consequence, it was not necessary to 
order additional measures.622 Similar arguments can be seen in the case Heliodoro 
Portugal v. Panama,623 and Tristán Donoso v. Panama.624  
Although the Inter-American Court has not always being consistent with the 
application of these standards, they show a growing interest of the Court to narrow 
down the procedural criteria to award GNR. The next section will explore some of the 
substantive criteria that the Inter-American Court is developing in the awarding of 
these measures. 
 
2.3.2 Substantive standards: GNR in cases of ‘general patterns’ of violations 
 
In its first cases the Court did not take into account the systemic character of a 
violation, or the pattern of recurrence in which the violation took place, in order to 
award or reject any request of GNR. As a consequence, the Court did not grant any 
strong GNR in cases that had a clear structural component. For example, in the 
Cases Castillo Paez v Peru, and Blake v. Guatemala, both cases relating to a proven 
pattern of disappearance of political opponents, the Court ordered the states, in very 
                                                             
622 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 192 (27 November 2008) 
para 239; Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia para 238. 
623 Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 186 (12 August 2008) para 262. 
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general terms, to ‘adopt the necessary domestic legal measures to ensure that this 
obligation is fulfilled.’625 Although this measure has some structural dimension, the 
Court did not grant any specific measures aimed at addressing the pattern of 
violence in which the violations took place.626  
In contrast, the Court has ordered important GNR in cases of individual violations 
that were not necessarily part of a pattern of violations by the state. For example, in 
the case Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, the Court analyzed the case of Mr. Wilson 
Gutiérrez who was detained and tortured by members of the National Police. The 
case was not presented before the Court as part of a systemic violation, or as part of 
a context of torture against a particular population. The Court, however, ordered the 
state to grant wider GNR in the form of human rights training for officials,627 
measures of dissemination and implementation of the Istanbul Protocol,628 and 
measures to strengthen existing control mechanisms in state detention centers.629 
The lack of connection between the granting of GNR and the demonstration of a 
‘pattern of violations’ may be problematic. As more of the cases presented before the 
Inter-American System are related to individual violations of human rights, this 
standard may raise the expectation of the victim’s representatives who, as a result of 
                                                             
625 Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru (Reparation and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No.43 (27 November 1998) para 118 (2).  
626 According to Antkowiak, other measures would have included ’orders to build 
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Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations 371 [footnote 99.] 
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of Human Rights Series C No. 132 (12 September 2005) paras 106-107. 
628 idem para 110. 
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the litigation, may request the granting of GNR in cases that affect exclusively the 
individual victim in the case, and do not necessarily reflect a generalized problem, or 
have a public impact. Unless the case clearly shows a risk of repetition or it is related 
to a gross or serious violation, the demonstration of a pattern of violations should be 
a relevant criterion in the award of GNR.  
In more recent cases, the Court has applied a more restrictive criterion, stating that it 
is necessary to prove that there is a ‘generalized problem’ or ‘general pattern’, in 
order to grant certain GNR. For example, in Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, the 
Court found that the expropriation of certain property for environmental reasons, but 
without the respect of the legal procedure to restrict rights, violated the Convention. 
As a consequence, the Commission requested, as a GNR, the training of 
administrative and judicial officials involved in expropriation processes on human 
rights. The Court, however, considered that ‘it was not proven that the violations and 
circumstances proven in the case sub judice constitute a generalized problem in the 
substantiation of these type of trials in Ecuador’ [emphasis added].630   
Similarly, in the case Mejía Idrovo v. Ecuador, the Court found a lack of compliance 
of a judicial decision that ordered the payment of compensation for the suspension of 
Mejía Idrovo’s job as a Colonel of the Army. The representative requested, as GNR, 
the state to be ordered to carry out specific training courses on human rights for the 
military high command, and to take all necessary measures to adapt its legislation to 
accord with the Convention. The Court found that ‘since no violation of Article 2 of 
the Convention was declared, nor the existence of general patterns of 
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Human Rights Series C No. 222 (3 March 2011) para 131. 
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noncompliance with the rulings’, [emphasis added]631 these measures were not 
appropriate.   
Recognizing the need to prove a pattern of violations as one of the conditions for the 
granting of GNR implies accepting that they cannot be granted in all cases but only 
‘if circumstances so require’632 as stated in the ILC Articles, or ‘where applicable’ as 
stated in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy.633  
The request for a ‘generalized pattern’ or ‘generalized problem’ has been implicitly 
applied by the Inter-American Court in order to grant GNR in cases with a clear 
public dimension. For example, in the case Gonzales et al (Cotton Field) v Mexico it 
was proved by the Commission and the petitioners, and accepted by the State, that 
there was a context of systematic discrimination against women, in Ciudad Juarez 
(Mexico).634 This pattern was not directly caused by the state. However, the 
existence of a climate of impunity reveals such a pattern was tolerated and, in some 
cases, even promoted by Mexican authorities.635 The Court ordered various GNR in 
order to prevent the repetition of the facts, including, among others: the 
standardization of protocols to combat the disappearances and murders of women, 
implementation of a program to look for and find disappeared women, creating legal 
mechanisms against impunity, and, human rights training for officials and the general 
public.636   
Also, in the ccase Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, both the Inter-American 
Commission and the victims proved that the case happened in a context of structural 
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discrimination towards Haitians in the Dominican Republic.637 The Court, however, 
was very careful in not expressing its opinion regarding the structural situation of 
discrimination against such persons, only making reference to the specific situation 
of discrimination faced by the victims in the case.638 However, when granting the 
measures, the Court clearly linked the patterns of discrimination within the case, with 
the remedies ordered.  According to the Court: 
‘since it has been proved that the State was responsible for a pattern of 
discrimination against migrants in Dominican Republic, the Court finds it 
relevant that the State organize a media campaign on the rights of 
regular and irregular migrants on Dominican territory in the terms of this 
judgment.’639  
Later on, in the case Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic , the 
Court studied the context of poverty and discrimination suffered by Haitians and 
people born in Dominican territory with Haitian ascendency. The case dealt with the 
arbitrary arrest and summary expulsion of 26 Haitian individuals and Dominicans of 
Haitian descent, along with the implementation of discriminatory policies that did not 
allow the right to a nationality for individuals born in the Dominican Republic but 
whose parents were not citizens. The Court documented extensively the existence of 
a systematic pattern of collective expulsions of Haitians and people of Haitian origin 
which happened to have a discriminatory effect against this population.640 Although 
the Court did not link the pattern of collective expulsion with the granting of GNR, the 
                                                             
637 Nadege Dorzema et al v. Dominican Republic paras 219-22. 
638 idem para 40. 
639 idem para 272. 
640 Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic (Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 282 (28 
August 2014) para 171. 
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Inter-American Court awarded extensive reparation measures. The Court ordered 
human rights training for state operators, in particular, for members of the Armed 
Forces, border agents and agents in charge of migratory and judicial procedures;641 
the adoption of measures of domestic law and, particularly, the adoption of the 
necessary measures to ensure that the judicial decision that approved discriminatory 
measures, had legal effects.642 The Court also ordered the authorities to exercise a 
‘conventionality control’ of the decisions that the authorities were in charge of 
implementing.643  
Adding the criterion of ‘generalized pattern’ or ‘generalized problem’ may be an 
interesting way to narrow down the criteria for the granting of GNR. This standard 
could help the Court to gain legitimacy in order not to award GNR, in individual cases 
without a ‘public relevance’, but, at the same time, allows them the freedom to award 
truly comprehensive GNR, in cases that do clearly reveal a systemic problem. For 
example, in the Karen Atala v. Chile, and Nadege Dorzema et al v. Dominican 
Republic, Cases, arguably there were patterns of discrimination against women and 
Haitian migrants, based on sexual orientation and origin, respectively. Although 
these patterns were not explicitly proven in the mentioned cases, a different standard 
for the application of GNR, one that takes into account the generalized patterns of 
violations, would have helped the Court to develop comprehensive measures directly 
linked to redressing the structural situation of discrimination. For example, policies 
directed at public officials in the judicial branch, in order to eradicate discrimination 
based on gender, or directed to public officials in the registry offices, in order to 
eradicate discrimination based on ethnic origin in Dominican Republic.  
                                                             
641 idem para 465. 
642 idem para 469. 
643 idem para 471. 
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There is, however, much discussion regarding the standard required to recognise the 
existence of a context or pattern of violations. For example, in the case Barrios 
Family v. Venezuela (2011) the Court received extensive evidence from the 
Ombudsman’s Office regarding the existence of a ‘modus operandi’ in Venezuela, of 
extrajudicial executions, and threats and harassment against people; the Court 
considered that the evidence provided was insufficient to recognize the existence of 
a context of extrajudicial executions in this country.644 However, based on similar 
evidence, the Court recognized the existence of such a pattern later in the cases 
Uzcategui et al v. Venezuela (2012), and Brothers Landaeta Mejias and others v. 
Venezuela (2014).645 This opens a new debate regarding the standard of evidence 
required by the Court in order to prove the existence of a pattern. In this regard, the 
Court should clarify the standard required so that it may provide better guidance to 
petitioners. In general, the Court should be able to receive any means of evidence in 
order to prove the existence of such patterns, and to recognise the existence of such 
patterns in a larger number of cases.  
Since the establishment of patterns and contexts in a case requires a higher 
standard of proof, other criterion should be also taken into account in order to award 
GNR. In this sense, the standard provided in PIL according to which GNR can be 
adopted when there is i) a pattern of repetition of the wrongful act; ii) a risk of 
                                                             
644 Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 237 (24 November 2011) paras 43 and 44.  
645 In Uzcategui et al v. Venezuela and Brothers Landaeta Mejias and other v. Venezuela, in 
addition to the Ombudsman’s reports cited in Barrios Family, the Inter-American Court also 
took into account the report prepared by the Venezuelan National Commission for Police 
Reform (CONAREPOL) as well as the reports of UN Rapporteurs. These reports, however, 
were previous to 2011 and were available to the public so the Court could have access to 
them. 
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repetition, and iii) the breach was particularly grave, could provide an interesting and 
wider standard for the Inter-American Court to take into account when awarding such 
measures.646   
 
2.3.3 Conclusion  
 
The lack of consistency in the application of the criteria to award GNR by the Court is 
the result of various tensions. On the one hand, both the Commission and the victims 
have demanded from the Court the expansion of its remedial powers and orders. In 
recent years, requests for GNR have increased, not only in number but also in detail 
and scope, in almost every case. On the other hand, the granting of such measures 
may face resistance from states who see the expansion of the remedial powers of 
the Court as ‘ultra vires’.647 It also implies additional effort required by the Court’s to 
follow-up the compliance of these decisions, and to secure their enforcement.648 
Beyond the political implications that this debate may have, part of the problem is 
that the Inter-American Court has not established a clear conceptual framework 
                                                             
646 According to the Committee ‘assurances of non-repetition were required not only where 
there was a pattern of repetition of the wrongful act, but also where there was a risk of 
repetition or, alternatively, where the breach was particularly grave, even if the risk of 
repetition was minimal’; UNGA, Sixth Committee (53th Session) ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session’ (15 February 2001) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/513, para 57. 
647 Tara Melish, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Beyond Progressivity’, in Malcom 
Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (Cambridge, 2009) p. 404. 
648 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 290. 
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regarding the conditions that should be taken into account to grant such remedies. 
There are no clear standards regarding the circumstances in which GNR should be 
granted and which form of GNR should be ordered. This situation is not an exclusive 
problem of the Inter-American system. In fact, both PIL and international human 
rights law lack a comprehensive conceptual framework to explain the nature and 
adequate application of GNR.  
In order to establish some of the elements that an appropriate understanding of GNR 
should have, it would be relevant to take into account some of the standards 
discussed in PIL according to which GNR are granted. The recent jurisprudence of 
the Court, linking the granting of GNR with a ‘generalized pattern’, may open the 
door for the establishment of a clearer standard in the granting of GNR in the Inter-
American system. However, more consistency from the Court would be needed in 
order to apply this criterion in all cases where a ‘generalized pattern’ is proved. 
Additionally, it would be important for the Inter-American Court to reflect on the 
possibility of awarding GNR, in those cases where a risk of repetition is proved, or in 
cases of serious violations of human rights. A strict application of these criteria could 
help the Court to narrow down the awarding of these measures without depriving the 
measures of all content.  
3. Conclusion  
 
GNR have been extensively developed in the Inter-American System. Although the 
American Convention does not explicitly refer to GNR they have been clearly 
recognized as a legitimate form of reparation in the Court’s jurisprudence, in 
application of Articles 1(1) and 63 of the ACHR. As presented in this chapter, such a 
process has been developed progressively, appearing for the first time in 2002 and 
showing a moment of consolidation from 2008 onwards. Besides the boldness of 
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some of the measures adopted in some cases, after 2008 the Court has taken a 
more conservative view in the award of GNR, showing a very deferential attitude 
towards the margin of appreciation that states have in the definition of their own 
policies and laws. This can be a reaction to the continuous criticisms that the Court 
has faced in the award of these measures. This is reflected in the low level of 
compliance of these measures by states. According to David Baluarte, among 
different forms of reparation in the Inter-American system, GNR are the ones with the 
lowest levels of compliance.649 
In this context, clearer criteria for the award of GNR could help to justify the award of 
GNR in the specific situations where it is necessary. This chapter proposed the 
limiting of the award of these measures to those situations when i) there is a pattern 
of repetition of the wrongful act; ii) there was a risk of repetition and, iii) the breach 
was particularly grave, even if the risk of repetition is minimal. Such criterion is 
compatible with the practice of the Court in most of its jurisprudence and would help 
to clarify the situations in which such measures should be awarded. Still more needs 
to be done by the states. Rather than simply insisting on the legitimacy of the 
measures, states need to show the same level of compliance with these measures 
as they do with other forms of obligatory remedies.  
                                                             
649 David Baluarte, ‘The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of Inter-American Court litigation 
and the Strategic imperative for victims Representatives’ (2011-2012) 27 American University 
International Law Review 263, p. 303. 
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PART II: THE AWARDING OF GNR IN RIGHT TO 
HEALTH CASES 
  
 
The previous chapters provided a general understanding of the concept of GNR in 
international law. Whereas chapter I focused on the development of this concept in 
PIL, chapters II and III focused upon the development of this concept in international 
human rights law by referring to the individual communications of several UN 
Committees and also to the case law of regional courts of human rights. In the 
analysis of this concept the scope of the measures, as well as the difficulties in 
finding a clear criterion for the awarding of the measures, were presented.  
The second section of this thesis will analyse how GNR have been, and should be, 
applied in the redress of a particular economic, social and cultural right: the right to 
health. The main question that this section analyses is whether the awarding of GNR 
in right to health cases is similar or different to the awarding of the same measures in 
civil and political rights. This is a very important question taking into account that, as 
presented in section one, GNR have been mainly awarded in cases of civil and 
political rights. As a consequence, there is no clarity on how these measures could 
be applicable in the redress of violations to the right to health. 
The reasons to choose the right to health are twofold: on the one hand, it is a right 
that has been increasingly litigated in regional courts in the last years650. On the 
                                                             
650 Leonardo Cubillos, Maria-Luisa Escobar, Sebastian Pavlovic, Roberto Lunes, ‘Universal 
health coverage and litigation in Latin America’ (2012) 26 Journal of the Health Organization 
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other hand, there is a large amount of literature about the understanding and 
conceptualization of the right which allows for a more detailed analysis of, and 
engagement with, the application of GNR in the protection of specific elements of the 
right to health. 
In order to develop these ideas, chapter IV provides a brief outline of the 
international right to health. It also refers to the difficulties that regional human rights 
tribunals have experienced in the awarding of remedies, in particular GNR, when 
redressing violations to the right to health. The chapter will analyse in particular how 
the lack of justiciability of right to health cases makes the awarding of such remedies 
difficult.  
Finally, based on the insights gained in chapters I to IV, chapter V offers some 
analysis of how an adequate model for the awarding of GNR in violations of the right 
to health should work. In this chapter, specific analysis will be given to the nature, 
scope, characteristics, and the circumstances for, the awarding of GNR in right to 
health cases. Special attention will be paid to the specific nature of the right to health 
as a right subject to the clause of progressive realisation, and whether such a 
characteristic will require special circumstances in the awarding of GNR.  
The chapter will end with the provision of some recommendations to the CESCR 
concerning the award of general measures for the redress of violations to the right to 
health. With the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee will have the 
opportunity to receive individual and group communications related to alleged 
violations of the right to health, opening a window of opportunity for the awarding of 
general measures in the protection of right to health cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and Management 390; Siri Gloppen, ‘Litigation as a strategy to hold governments 
accountable for implementing the right to health’ (2008) 10 Health and Human Rights 21.  
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CHAPTER IV: GNR FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
RIGHT TO HEALTH AND HEALTH RELATED 
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
 
 
1. The international right to health: a brief outline 
 
The right to health cannot be understood as a right to be healthy. Instead, it should 
be understood as a right to the enjoyment of the facilities, goods and other 
conditions, that the state is responsible for providing and that are necessary for the 
attainment and maintenance of the ‘highest attainable standard of health.’651 Several 
international instruments have tried to give meaning to the right to health. The 
Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) has recognized that: 
                                                             
651 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 14 ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health’ (2000) U.N. Doc E/C.12/2000/4, para 9.  
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‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic, or social conditions.’652  
Later, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provided a legal foundation 
for the international framework of the right to health but did not establish a ‘right to 
health’ as such. According to the instrument: 
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and wellbeing of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security 
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.’653 
In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter ICESCR)654 provided the cornerstone provision, in international law, to 
the establishment of a right to health. According to it: 
‘1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
                                                             
652 WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, Basic Documents, Forty-fifth edition, 
Supplement (October 2006). 
653  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 25 (1). 
654 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted on 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
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(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.’ 
The right to health, as defined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereinafter CESCR or ‘the Committee’), takes into account a holistic 
approach to health, influenced by public health principles, according to which ‘health’ 
includes not just a right to health care, but also a right to healthy conditions. In this 
respect, the General Comment on the right to health has recognised several 
determinants that influence the enjoyment of the right to health. According to the 
CESCR, ‘the right to health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a 
variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of 
the highest attainable standard of health.’655 As a consequence, the right to health 
must be seen as:  
‘an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care 
but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe 
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe 
food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental 
conditions, and access to health related education and information, 
including on sexual and reproductive health. A further important aspect is 
                                                             
655 CESCR GC 14 para 9. 
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the participation of the population in all health related decision making at 
the community, national and international levels.’656 
The CESCR has also emphasised that the right to health includes several essential 
and interrelated elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. 
Availability refers to the fact that, within the State party, public health and health-care 
facilities, goods, services and programs, have to be available in sufficient quantity657. 
Accessibility means that health facilities, goods and services have to be accessible 
to everyone. This aspect includes four dimensions: non-discrimination, meaning that 
health services must be available to all, including the most vulnerable, and without 
discrimination on any ground; physical accessibility, meaning that health facilities 
should be within safe, physical reach for all sections of the population; economic 
accessibility (affordability), meaning that health facilities must be affordable for all, 
including socially disadvantaged groups; and, information accessibility, meaning that 
people should have the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
concerning health issues.658 Acceptability refers to the fact that health facilities, 
goods and services, must be respectful of medical ethics and be culturally 
appropriate.659 Quality means goods and services must be scientifically and 
medically appropriate, and of good quality.660  
 
 
 
                                                             
656 idem para 11. 
657 idem para 12 (a). 
658 idem para 12 (b). 
659 idem para 12 (c). 
660 idem para 12 (d). 
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  1.1 General legal obligations of states on the right to health 
 
Article 2.1 of the ICESCR obliges states to take steps, up to the maximum of their 
available resources, in order to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights 
established in the Covenant. When resource constraints make the fulfilment of this 
obligation impossible, states should be able to demonstrate that every effort has 
been made to use all available resources in order to fulfil the obligations established 
under the Covenant.661 According to the CESCR, this clause simply acknowledges 
that the complete realization of all economic, social and cultural rights needs effort, 
and cannot be achieved immediately.662 In order not to deprive the Covenant’s 
obligations of all content, the CESCR has recognized that Article 2.1 imposes an 
obligation to advance towards the full realization of this right ‘as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible.’663 The clause also provides a strong presumption that 
retrogressive measures are not permissible.664 Any retrogressive measure should be 
carefully justified by taking into account all the rights included in the Covenant and by 
making use of the maximum available resources.665  
 
In addition to the obligation to progressively realise the right to health, states also 
have immediate obligations to fulfil certain core obligations, such as to guarantee 
                                                             
661 idem para 47. 
662 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 3 ‘The Nature of States Parties Obligations’ (1990) 
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, para 9. 
663 CESCR GC 14 para 31. 
664 idem para 32. 
665 idem para 32.  
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that rights will be exercised without discrimination of any kind, and to take deliberate, 
concrete and targeted steps666 towards the full realization of the right to health.667   
 
1.2 Legal obligations of states on the right to health: the respect, protect 
and fulfil framework  
 
As is the case with all human rights, the right to health imposes three types or levels 
of obligations on states: the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil. 
 
In relation to the right to health, the duty to respect ‘requires states to refrain from 
interfering directly, or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to health.’668 
Examples of this obligation are, the obligations of states, inter alia, to refrain from: 
limiting equal access to health services to everyone, imposing discriminatory 
practices, prohibiting forms of traditional preventive care, marketing unsafe drugs, 
prohibiting specific medical treatments, limiting access to women to contraceptives or 
any other way to maintain sexual and reproductive health, and to prevent people 
from participating in health related matters.669 
 
The duty to protect the right to health requires the state to prevent third parties from 
interfering in the enjoyment of the right to health.670 Examples of this duty include: 
                                                             
666 idem para 30. 
667 A presentation on the minimum core obligation of states regarding the right to health 
occurs in section 1.3. 
668 CESCR GC 14 para 33. 
669 idem para 34. 
670 idem para 33. 
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ensuring that, when some sectors of the health service are privatized, these are not 
a threat to the adequate provision of services, establishing appropriate regulations 
for the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties, making sure 
that health practitioners, and health professionals in general, are adequately trained, 
taking measures in order to prevent traditional practices within the family or the 
community from interfering with the access to pre and post-natal care, as well to 
family planning, preventing third parties from obliging women to undertake traditional 
practices, and to make sure that third parties do not interfere in the adequate access 
to health information and services.671 
 
Lastly, the obligation to fulfil requires states to ‘adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures, towards the full 
realization of the right to health.’672 The CESCR has distinguished between three 
levels of this obligation: to facilitate, provide and promote.673 ‘Facilitate’ involves 
positive measures that assists individuals in enjoying the right to health.674 ‘Provide’ 
requires the state to deliver a specific right when individuals or a group are unable to 
realise that right themselves.675 Finally, ‘promote’ requires the state to take measures 
in order to ‘create, maintain and restore the health of the population.’676 For example, 
it requires states to promote factors that support positive health results, such as 
research and provision of information ensure that health services take into account 
the cultural differences of the population and that health care staff are adequately 
                                                             
671 idem para 35. 
672 idem para 33. 
673 idem para 33. 
674 idem para 37. 
675 idem para 37. 
676 idem para 37. 
205 
 
trained in this respect, provide appropriate information in order to promote healthy 
lifestyles and help people in the provision of information so they can make informed 
choices about their health.677   
 
1.3 Minimum core obligations v. ‘reasonableness’ 
 
The CESCR has also recognized that states have a minimum core obligation to 
ensure minimum essential levels of each of the rights established within the 
Covenant.678 Although some scholars have been sceptical about the idea of 
minimum core obligations,679 the CESCR has understood this as a logical 
interpretation, in order not to deprive the Covenant of its raison d’etre.680 The 
CESCR has confirmed its interpretation of the minimum core in its general comments 
about rights to food;681 education;682 health;683 water;684 work;685 social security;686 
and the right to take part in cultural life.687  
                                                             
677 idem para 37. 
678 idem para 10. 
679 According to John Tobin, states did not envision the idea of minimum core when drafting 
the ICESCR. He also argues that this concept is not realistic as ‘it simply does not offer a 
principled, practical, or coherent rationale which is sufficiently sensitive to the context in 
which the right to health must be operationalized’. John Tobin, The Right to Health in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 2012) pp. 239-240. 
680 CESCR GC 3 para 10. 
681 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 12 ‘The right to adequate food (Art.11)’ (1999) U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, paras 14 and 17. 
682 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 13 ‘The Right to Education’ (1999) U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10, para 57. 
683 CESCR GC 14 para 43. 
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In relation to the right to health, the CESCR has confirmed that states have a duty to 
provide minimum essential levels of this right. In General Comment No. 3, the 
CESCR established that states have a minimum core obligation to ensure the 
satisfaction of, at very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights, for 
example, through the provision of essential primary health care. This General 
Comment also establishes that, if the state fails to meet at least its minimum core 
obligations, it must demonstrate that ‘every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.’688 In terms of the right to health, such core obligations include, 
at a minimum the following: 
 
‘(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and 
services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or 
marginalized groups;  
 
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is 
nutritionally adequate and safe, [and] to ensure freedom from hunger to 
everyone; 
                                                                                                                                                                              
684 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 15 ‘The right to water’ (Art.’s 11 and 12) (2003) U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para 37. 
685 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 18 ‘The right to work’ (2006) U.N.Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, 
para 31. 
686 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 19 ‘The right to social security’ (2008) U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/19, para 59. 
687 UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 21 ‘Right of everyone to take part in cultural life’ 
(2009) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 para 55. 
688 CESCR GC 3 para 10. 
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(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and 
an adequate supply of safe and potable water; 
 
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under 
the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; 
 
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and 
services; 
 
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and 
plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the 
health concerns of the whole population.’689 
 
However, the idea of minimum core obligations should be placed in the context of 
the obligation established in Article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which establishes that: 
’When examining communications under the present Protocol, the 
Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the 
State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the 
Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of 
possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant’. (italics added) 
This was one of the most discussed provisions during the negotiation of the Optional 
Protocol.690 The United Kingdom, Canada and Norway proposed that both a 
                                                             
689 CESCR GC 14 para 43. 
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‘reasonableness’ test and a ‘margin of appreciation’ would be necessary in order to 
prevent the unnecessary intervention of the CESCR in domestic policymaking.691 
The final version of Article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol excludes any reference to 
‘margin of appreciation’, but sets out that states ‘may adopt a range of possible 
policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.’692  
 
Notwithstanding its incorporation in the Optional Protocol, it is not yet clear what the 
‘reasonableness’ test means. Although it was certainly informed by South African 
jurisprudence, particularly in Government of the Republic of South Africa & Ors v 
Grootboom & Ors,693 the CESCR has adopted its own standards of review. Based on 
its experience in the periodic reporting process, the CESCR established some 
standards outlining the obligation of states to take steps in respect of use of 
maximum of available resources. The CESCR stated that ‘in assessing whether they 
are ‘adequate’ or ‘reasonable’, the CESCR may take into account, inter alia, the 
following considerations: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
690 Brian Griffey, ´The Reasonableness Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights’ 
(2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 275, p. 276-277. 
691 UNCHR ‘Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the 
elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights on its third session’ (14 March 2006) E/CN.4/2006/47 at para 92. 
692 UNGA, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (adopted on 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013) A/RES/63/117, article 
8(4).  
693 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Government of the Republic of South Africa & Ors v 
Grootboom & Ors 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
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‘(a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete 
and targeted towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural 
rights;  
(b) whether the State party exercised its discretion in a non-
discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner;  
(c) whether the State party’s decision (not) to allocate available 
resources is in accordance with international human rights standards;  
(d) where several policy options are available, whether the State party 
adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights;  
(e) the time frame in which the steps were taken;  
(f) whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they 
were non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritized grave situations or 
situations of risk.’694 
 
 
The CESCR also established that, in those cases where the state has taken no 
steps, or any retrogressive measures have been taken, the burden of proof 
passes to the state to prove that such measures were taken after careful 
consideration, can be justified by reference to the totality of rights provided in 
the Covenant, and that the state made full use of available resources.695 In 
those cases where the state seems to justify its action on the grounds of 
‘resource constraints’, the CESCR should consider the information, taking into 
account: 
                                                             
694 UN, CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to take steps to the “Maximum of available 
resources” under an optional protocol to the Covenant’ (21 September 2007) E/C.12/2007/1, 
para 8. 
695 E/C.12/2007/1 para 9. 
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(a) ‘The country’s level of development; 
(b) The severity of the alleged breach, in particular whether the situation 
concerned the enjoyment of the minimum core content of the Covenant; 
(c) The country’s current economic situation, in particular whether the 
country was undergoing a period of economic recession; 
(d) The existence of other serious claims on the State party’s limited 
resources; for example, resulting from a recent natural disaster or from 
recent internal or international armed conflict;  
(e) Whether the State party had sought to identify low-cost options; and  
(f) Whether the State party had sought cooperation and assistance or 
rejected offers of resources from the international community for the 
purposes of implementing the provision for the Covenant without 
sufficient reason.’696 
 
The CESCR will have to clarify, on a case-by-case basis, exactly how this 
understanding of reasonableness is compatible with the idea of minimum core 
obligations. This aspect will be considered more in depth in chapter V Section 
4.3.1.697 
 
1.4 The challenge of remedies 
 
Once a violation of the right to health has been identified, domestic and international 
bodies have the challenge of granting appropriate redress. Whereas the 
determination of remedies in international law has been extensively developed in 
                                                             
696 E/C.12/2007/1 para 10. 
697 See, pp. 320-327. 
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cases of violations of civil and political rights, there are no clear standards about the 
redress for violations of ESCR. According to Courtis, the imbalance in the 
development of remedies is not related to the distinction between civil and political 
and ESCR, but rather to the ‘degree of leeway’ that is granted to the political 
branches of the State.698 When the violation is related to defined acts or omissions, it 
can be redressed by simple orders provided by the judiciary (i.e., to provide a 
benefit, or to prohibit the carrying out of a specific action) However, there are 
situations where the order of the Court is clear (i.e., to reach a certain goal or 
standard) but the means of reaching that standard are numerous. In those cases, the 
redress of the violation may require the cooperation of the judiciary alongside other 
branches of power.699  
 
The communications procedure established in the Optional Protocol brings new 
challenges in the awarding of remedies for violations of ESCR. The CESCR has 
consistently emphasized, in its general comments, that all victims of ESCR’ 
violations are entitled to adequate reparation, which may take the form of restitution, 
compensation, satisfaction, or guarantees of non-repetition. This has been inserted 
into general comments relating to the rights to food,700 health,701 water,702 work703, 
                                                             
698 Christian Courtis, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights – Comparative experiences of justiciability, (International Commission of Jurist, 2008) 
pp. 84-85. 
699 idem. 
700 CESCR GC 12 para 37. 
701 CESCR GC 14 para 59. 
702 CESCR GC 15 para 55. 
703 CESCR GC 18 para 48. 
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and social security,704 and is similar to a provision established in the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997)705. 
 
Following the example of the CEDAW Committee, and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), it is likely that, when defining the content of 
remedies, the CESCR will order both ‘individual’ and ‘general measures.’706 In a 
previous statement, the CESCR seems to confirm this two-track approach to 
remedies by indicating that recommendations should include remedial measures 
oriented to the victim(s), such as compensation, and more general measures aimed 
at redressing the ‘circumstances leading to a violation.’707 This corresponds to a 
general trend in international human rights law of providing both individual relief, 
intended to redress the particular victims of a violation (usually in the form of 
compensation, restitution or rehabilitation), and general relief in the form of GNR 
aimed at preventing future violations, and with a wide-reaching character.708 This 
                                                             
704 CESCR GC 19 para 77. 
705 International Commission of Jurists, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (adopted on 26 Jan 1997), para 23. 
706 This has been also suggested by Viviana Krsticevic and Brian Griffey, ‘Remedial 
Recommendations’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria University Law 
Press, 2004) Chapter 10.   
707 E/C.12/2007/1 para 13. 
708 The ILC distinguish between the duty of states to offer appropriate assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition (article 30), and to make full reparation for the injury caused by 
the wrongful act ( 31) which can take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction 
(article 34). See ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts’ (November 2001) Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. Also, whilst the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
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suggests that reparation measures for violations of ESCR are not inherently different 
from those awarded in cases of violations to civil and political rights.  
As the Optional Protocol remains silent about the scope and content of remedies, it 
is not yet clear what the interpretation of the CESCR will be when drafting individual 
and general measures. In particular, with respect to its recommendations in the 
analysis of individual cases, the CESCR will face a central challenge in trying to draft 
adequate and effective measures that actually contribute to the non-repetition of 
future violations. Although the CESCR already has experience in providing 
recommendations in its concluding observations to states, the awarding of general 
measures through individual communications represents an additional challenge. 
While the reporting cycle allows the CESCR to receive general information relating to 
the implementation of the Covenant,709 and on that basis carry out a general analysis 
and provide recommendations, individual communications are based on an 
individual’s or group’s complaint and are likely to be highly specific. Nonetheless, 
following the practice of other Committees which have traditionally engaged in both 
individual and general redress, the CESCR should be able to make both individual 
and general recommendations in order to provide adequate redress to the victims in 
the relevant case.     
                                                                                                                                                                              
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, establish that full and effective reparation can take the form of restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; it is clear that 
while restitution, compensation and rehabilitation are oriented to provide individual relief to 
the victim, guarantees of non-repetition have a general scope.  
709 UN, CESCR, ‘Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by states parties 
under articles 16 and 17 of the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (24 March 2009) E/C.12/2008/2, para 2. 
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In order to provide a clear understanding of how general measures have been 
awarded for the redress of violations concerning health related issues, the next 
section will analyse the jurisprudence of regional bodies of human rights. In 
particular, it will analyse general measures on the right to health, in the jurisprudence 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It will also look at the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights when awarding GNR in 
the redress of cases related to health issues, and to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the redress of pilot judgments in which health 
issues were discussed. 
 
2. How regional human-rights bodies have addressed health 
related issues: some illustrative case law  
 
This section will describe the awarding of GNR in the redress of right to health and 
health related cases, in three regional systems: African, Inter-American, and 
European. The distinction between ‘right to health’ and ‘health related’ cases is 
important since the right to health is not directly justiciable in all regional systems. As 
will be explained, only the African system of human rights allows the direct 
justiciability of the right to health.710 In both the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, the right to health is not directly 
justiciable, so these Courts have addressed it in an indirect way, usually through the 
protection of other rights, such as the rights to life, personal integrity, and a fair 
                                                             
710 See OAU, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 16 and OAU, African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted on 11 July 1990, entered into force 
29 November 1999) CAB/LEG/24.9/49 8 (1990) article 14.  
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trial.711 In these cases, courts refer to health related issues in their jurisprudence 
offering an indirect protection to dimensions of the right to health.    
 
2.1 GNR in the redress of right to health cases: an analysis from the 
jurisprudence of the African Human Rights System 
2.1.1  The direct protection of the right to health in the African Human Rights 
System  
 
The African human rights system establishes the direct justiciability of the right to 
health by incorporating it in both the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Article 16 of the 
African Charter states that:  
 
1. ‘Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state 
of physical and mental health. 
2. State Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they 
receive medical attention when they are sick’. 
 
                                                             
711 For a presentation of the indirect approach of the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights, see Oscar Parra-Vera,  ‘La protección del derecho a la salud a través de casos 
contenciosos ante el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos’ in, Laura Clerico, 
Liliana Ronconi, Martin Aldao, Tratado de Derecho a la Salud (Ed. Abeledo Perrot, Buenos 
Aires, 2013); and in the pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights see Ingrid 
Nifosi-Sutton, ‘The Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-
Monetary Relief: a Critical Appraisal from a Right to Health Perspective’ (2010) 23 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 51. 
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In turn, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child establishes a right 
to health in similar terms,712 including more extensive and detailed obligations for the 
states in the protection of such a right. It establishes, for example, the obligation of 
states to reduce infant and child mortality rates, to ensure the provision of necessary 
medical assistance and health care, to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition 
and safe drinking water, to combat disease and malnutrition, to ensure adequate 
health care for pregnant mothers, to develop preventive health care and family life 
education, to integrate basic health service programs in national plans, to inform 
different sectors of the society in the use of basic knowledge of child health and 
nutrition, to ensure the participation of civil society in the planning and management 
of service programs for children, and, to support, through technical and financial 
means, the mobilization of local community resources in the development of primary 
health care.713 As a consequence, the right to health can be directly protected by the 
African Commission and the African Court throughout the individual communication 
system. 
 
While the African Court has not yet actively engaged in the protection of ESCR in its 
jurisprudence, the African Commission has had an active role in the development of 
recommendations in ESCR cases.714 At the outset, the African Commission was not 
very detailed in either the analysis of the rights violated or the granting of 
remedies.715 However, since 1999-2000 the Commission has been more detailed in 
                                                             
712 Article 14 establishes the right of children to enjoy ‘the best attainable state of physical, 
mental and spiritual health’. (Underlining added). 
713 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, article 14 (2). 
714 Instead, the African Court has still nor ordered specific reparation measures in ESCR 
cases.  
715 In the Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ 
Rights, Comm. No. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1995), the Commission found that there 
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both its analysis of the violations and its outline of remedies.716 In the following 
cases, related to the right to health, the Commission has developed extensive 
recommendations.  
  
In Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESCR) v. Nigeria,717 the African Commission found the Nigerian 
government responsible for gross violations of rights in the oil exploitation of the 
Niger Delta. The responsibility of the state stems both from the action of authorities 
who were responsible for several violations of the rights of the Ogoni people, and, in 
the state’s negligent management in the Niger Delta, in not taking care of the rights 
of victims and appropriate protection of the environment, when such violations were 
denounced. The Commission found the government violated the rights to: equal 
treatment (article 2), life and integrity (article 4), property (article 14), the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health (article 16), protection of the family in 
its physical health and morals (article 18.1), peoples ability to freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources (article 21), and to the enjoyment of a general, 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development (article 24).  
In regard to the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, 
the Commission found a violation of this right, alongside the right to a general 
                                                                                                                                                                              
were ‘serious and massive violations’ of the right to education among other rights, but did not 
afford any specific recommendation for the redress of such violations. Also see, Morne van 
der Line & Lorette Louw, ‘Considering the interpretation and implementation of article 24 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in light of the SERAC communication’ 
(2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 167, p. 173, footnote 23. 
716 Van der Line & Louw Considering the interpretation […] 172-173. 
717 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (SERAC) v. Nigeria, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 
(2001).  
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satisfactory environment.718 According to the Commission, the state violated its 
duties to both respect and protect these rights in favour of the Ogoni community.719 
The duty to respect the rights of the Ogoni was violated by ‘attacking, burning and 
destroying several Ogoni villages and homes.’720 The state also violated its duty to 
protect the rights to health and to enjoy a general satisfactory environment, by failing 
to undertake an impact analysis, or to provide independent scientific monitoring of 
threatened environments. Also, the state did not undertake appropriate monitoring, 
or provide information about the dangers of oil projects to those affected, and/or 
provide opportunities to ensure participation in the decision-making process for 
development projects affecting their communities.721 
 
As the Commission found specific violations of the duties to respect and protect, in 
relation to the rights to health, and, to enjoy a general satisfactory environment, the 
recommendations were also oriented to redress such levels of protection. The 
Commission recommended different forms of remedies, which can be classified in 
accordance with the type of obligation in the right to health that it aimed to redress.  
 
As table No. 1 shows, regarding the duty to respect, most of the recommendations 
are in the area of investigation, restitution and compensation, but there is nothing in 
terms of rehabilitation, and GNR. In this regard, the African Commission could have 
                                                             
718 idem paras 54 and 55. 
719 In the analysis of rights, the Commission clearly endorsed the four levels of duties that 
correspond to the states, in regard to human rights obligations, namely the duty to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill these rights. The Commission expressed that this obligation 
applies to all type of rights and ‘entails a combination of negative and positive duties’. idem 
para 44. 
720 idem para 54. 
721 idem para 53. 
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recommended the state provide, for example, physical and psychological 
rehabilitation to the next of kin of the people killed by security forces (rehabilitation), 
and human rights training to security forces, in order to prevent the future 
commission of such cases (GNR). 
 
In contrast, regarding the duty to protect, most of the recommendations are in terms 
of rehabilitation, and GNR. The Commission ordered the state to provide appropriate 
environmental assessments for future oil development projects, the provision of 
information on health, and, environmental risks, as well as providing access to an 
effective decision-making process. It also ordered the Ministry of Environment to 
provide information on their work on environment-related issues in Nigeria, and the 
work of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), in order to address the 
environmental and social problems in the area. The wide-ranging, general 
recommendations awarded by the African Commission, not just in this decision but in 
others, contrasts with the very restrictive measures adopted by the European Court 
of Human Rights when granting general measures.722 Particularly in this case, the 
recommendations may be related to the fact that the Nigerian government did not 
answer the allegations of the claimants, and the recommendations adopted by the 
Commission replicate the wording of the complaint.723 These measures are a good 
example of the type of general measures that Courts can award in the protection of 
the right to health. 
 
 
 
                                                             
722 See the discussion on the awarding of general measures in pilot judgments by the 
European Court of Human Rights in section 2.3.2 of this Chapter.  
723 Fons Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 749, p.10. 
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Table No. 1. Reparation measures in relation to the duties violated – SERAC and CESCR v. Nigeria (African 
Comm. Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96) 
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Investigate the 
human rights 
violations 
perpetrated by 
officials of the 
security forces, the 
National Nigerian 
Petroleum 
Company (NNPC) 
and relevant 
agencies involved 
in human rights 
violations.724 
 
Stopping all 
attacks on 
Ogoni 
communities 
and permitting 
citizens and 
independent 
investigators 
free access to 
the territory.725 
 
Ensuring 
adequate 
compensation 
to the 
victims.726 
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Clean
ing up 
land 
and 
rivers 
dama
ged 
by oil 
opera
tions.
727 
  
Ensuring that appropriate 
environmental and social 
impact assessments are 
prepared for any future oil 
development, and that the 
safe operation of any further 
oil development is 
guaranteed through effective 
and independent oversight 
bodies for the petroleum 
industry.728 
Provide communities likely 
to be affected by oil 
operations with information 
on health and environmental 
risks, as well as meaningful 
access to regulatory and 
decision-making bodies.729 
Keep the Commission 
informed about the work of 
the Federal Ministry of 
Environment in addressing 
environmental and 
environment-related issues 
prevalent in Nigeria, and the 
work of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission 
(NDDC), which was 
established to address the 
environmental and social 
problems of the affected 
area.730 
 
 
                                                             
724 idem para 69 (2) 
725 idem para 69 (1) 
726 idem para 69 (3) 
727 idem para 69 (3) 
728 idem para 69 (4) 
729 idem para 69 (5) 
730 idem para 69 (6) and (7) 
221 
 
 
Another case where the Commission recommended measures for the protection of 
the right to health is Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (Cohre) v. Sudan.731 In this case, the Commission studied the massive 
and systemic violation of rights in the Darfur region, which was the product of a 
confrontation between two armed groups and a State sponsored, Arab militia force. 
As a result of this confrontation, many civilians were affected; thousands were killed, 
homes and other structures were burned or destroyed, and more than a million 
people were forcibly displaced. Many villages, markets and water wells were raided 
and/or bombed.732 The Commission found that these facts represented ‘serious and 
massive violations of human and peoples’ rights,’733 finding that they represented a 
violation of the rights to life, dignity, liberty, freedom of movement, property, family, 
and health.  
 
Regarding the right to health, the Commission considered that ´the destruction of 
homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells 
exposed the victims to serious health risks and amounts to a violation of Article 16 of 
the Charter.´734 The Commission seems to accept the claims of the complaint, 
according to which the state was complicit in destroying foodstuffs, crops and 
livestock, as well as poisoning wells, and denying access to water sources.735 The 
Commission referred to CESCR General Comment No. 14 on the right to health, to 
emphasise that violations to the right to health can occur through the direct action of 
                                                             
731 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Cohre) v. 
Sudan, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 279/03, 296/03 (2009) . 
732 idem paras 13 – 14. 
733 idem para 102 and 225. 
734 idem para 212. 
735 idem para 207. 
222 
 
the state, or by other entities insufficiently regulated by States.736 By considering the 
state responsible, either for its own action, in destroying homes and polluting water 
sources, or complicity, with armed forces who carried out these actions, the 
Commission is protecting the right to health in the ‘respect’ and ‘protect’ dimensions.  
 
As table No. 2 shows, in terms of the protection of the right to health, the 
Commission recommended the rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure, 
such as education, health, water, and agricultural services, in order to provide 
conditions for the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons. It also recommended 
the establishment of the National Reconciliation Forum, in charge of addressing the 
long-term sources of conflict, the allocation of national resources to different 
provinces, as well as issues of land, water rights and distribution of livestock.737 The 
Commission also recommended the state conduct effective official investigations, 
undertake major legislative reforms, prosecute those responsible for human rights 
violations, and take measures to ensure that the victims of human rights abuses are 
given effective remedies.738  
 
When recommending the rehabilitation of the general economic and social 
infrastructure that contributes to the better guarantee of the rights to health and 
water, the Commission seems to imply that such improvements should be made to 
re-establish the conditions before the conflict, for example, purifying water sources 
and replacing water wells. The Commission does not go further into the 
transformation of other dimensions of social rights. For example, it is well known that 
the Darfur region is characterized by a lack of development and high levels of 
                                                             
736 idem para 210. 
737 idem para 229 (6). 
738 idem para 229 (1 -4). 
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poverty.739 The Commission, however, does not go further in the redress of the 
poverty conditions that are also at the base of the displacement. In this regard, the 
rehabilitation measures awarded by the African Commission replicate the general 
trend of awarding measures that merely provide restitution for harms done, but do 
not go beyond, such as the transformation of the root causes of injustice linked to, 
for example, poverty.740  
 
In terms of GNR, the Commission recommended establishing a National 
Reconciliation Forum that would address ´the long-term sources of conflict, […] 
including […] resolv[ing] issues of land, grazing and water rights, including 
destocking of livestock.’741 As the measure is intended to remedy the ‘long-term 
sources of conflict,’ it has a preventive nature and is future-oriented, making it a clear 
GNR. The measure is far reaching, showing confidence in the Commission in terms 
of the provision or general measures. In this measure, the Commission follows the 
dialogical approach followed by some domestic courts.742 Instead of directly 
indicating the specific measures to be adopted, it refers to the establishment of a 
‘National Reconciliation Forum,’ which will decide on the measures to be taken. The 
Commission does not establish what the exact composition of the National 
                                                             
739 According to the Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, the rate of poverty 
incidence in Sudan is 46.5% and 62.7% in the Darfur region. Sudan Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, North Sudan – Tabulation 
Report, p.12, available at 
http://ecastats.uneca.org/aicmd/Portals/1/Publications/Others/POVERTY%202009.pdf    
740 For the links between violence and Poverty in Sudan see: David Keen, The Benefits of 
Famine. A political economy of famine and relief in Southwestern Sudan 1938-1989 
(Princeton University Press, 1st edition, 1994). 
741 COHRE v Sudan para 229 (6). 
742 See Chapter V section 5. 
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Reconciliation Forum should be, leaving it open to being defined by the competent 
authorities. This approach seems to be more open to public deliberation of the 
measures among different actors. However, compliance with the measures has been 
largely neglected by Sudan, which refuses to take measures to secure 
implementation of the decision.  
 
Table No. 2. Reparation measures in relation to the duties violated – Sudan Human Rights 
Organization & Centre on housing Rights and Evictions (Cohre) v. Sudan (African Comm Hum 
& Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 279/03, 296/03) 
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Conduct effective 
official investigations 
regarding the abuses 
committed by 
members of military 
forces; and to 
prosecute those 
responsible of human 
rights violations in 
particular murder, 
rape, arson and 
destruction of 
property.743 The state 
should also abstain 
from adopting 
amnesty laws in 
favour of perpetrators 
of human rights 
violations744. 
  
‘Rehabilitate economic and 
social infrastructure, such 
as education, health, 
water, and  
agricultural services, in the 
Darfur provinces in order to 
provide conditions for 
return in safety and dignity 
for the IDPs and 
Refugees.’745  
 
   
Undertake major reforms 
within the legislative and 
judicial framework in 
order to deal with cases 
of serious and massive 
human rights 
violations746. 
‘Establish a National 
Reconciliation Forum to 
address the long-term 
sources of conflict, 
equitable allocation of 
national resources to the 
various provinces, 
including affirmative 
action for Darfur, [and] 
resolve issues of land, 
grazing and water rights, 
including destocking of 
livestock.’747 
 
In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia,748 a petition was presented on behalf of the 
patients detained at the Campama Psychiatric Unit, and all the patients detained 
                                                             
743 idem para 229 (1 and 3) 
744 idem para 229 (7) 
745 idem para 229 (5). 
746 idem para 229 (2) 
747 idem para 229 (6). 
748 Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 
241/2001(2003). 
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under the Mental Health Acts in The Gambia. The complainants alleged that 
legislation related to mental health, the Lunatic Detention Act (LDA), in The Gambia 
is outdated and includes stereotypes. They also alleged that the Campama 
Psychiatric Unit is overcrowded and that there is no requirement of consent to 
treatment, or a process by which one can request the review of continued treatment. 
In terms of the right to health, the Commission established that the LDA does not 
have sufficient resources and programmes for the treatment of persons with 
disabilities749 which implies a violation of Article 16 of the African Charter. This can 
be considered a part of the dimension of protecting right to health against the acts of 
third parties.750  
 
As table No. 3 shows, the Commission’s restitution measures included ordering the 
state to provide adequate medical and material care for persons suffering from 
mental health problems. It also ordered some general measures, such as legislative 
changes to make the Lunatics Detention Act compatible with the legislative regime 
for mental health. Additionally, it ordered the state to create an expert body to review 
cases of all persons detained under the Lunatics Detention Act. Since the violation is 
related to the general conditions of patients under mental health care in The Gambia, 
and the inadequacy of the Lunatic Detention Act, the general measures awarded are 
justified.  
 
In terms of the protection to the right to health of persons with disabilities, the 
recommendations by the Commission could have included broader measures, such 
as to take effective measures to deal with overcrowded conditions of detention, 
manuals of protocols for health workers in the Campama Psychiatric Unit, in 
                                                             
749 idem para 83. 
750 ESCR GC 14  paras 33 and 51. 
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accordance with international standards, and the dissemination of a list of patient 
rights. The limited GNR granted in this case contrasts with the approach taken by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in a similar case, related to the treatment of 
patients with mental disability in Brazil.751 The case against Brazil is discussed in 
section 2.2.1.4 of chapter IV, below.752 
 
 
Table No. 3. Reparation measures in relation to the duties violated - Purohit and Moore v. The 
Gambia (African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 241/2001) 
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‘Provide adequate 
medical and 
material care for 
persons suffering 
from mental 
health 
problems.’753 
  
Repeal the Lunatics 
Detention Act and 
replace it with a new 
legislative regime for 
mental health 
compatible with 
human rights 
standards754. 
 
Create an expert 
body in charge of 
reviewing the cases 
of all persons 
detained under the 
Lunatics Detention 
Act and make 
appropriate 
recommendations 
for their 
treatment.755 
 
 
                                                             
751 Case of Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C. No. 149 (4 July 2006).  
752 See, pp. 252. 
753 Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia para 85 (c). 
754 idem para 85 (a). 
755 idem para 85 (b). 
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In the decision on the Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya,756 the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,757 considered the 
situation of Kenyan Nubians, who are treated like ‘aliens’ and who hold tenuous 
citizenship status. This treatment is particularly serious for Nubian children, who are 
not usually registered as Kenyan citizens at birth. Because of this, they lack the 
same entitlements that are granted to other children in Kenya. Most of the 
unregistered children live in poverty, with limited access to education and healthcare. 
At the age of 18, when most Kenyan children apply for identification cards, 
unregistered Nubians have to face a long and complex procedure in order to obtain 
them. As a result of the denial of status, the Kenyan government systematically 
refuses to provide basic services in Nubian neighbourhoods. The Committee found 
these facts were a violation of the African Children’s Charter’s guarantee of the rights 
to a nationality (articles 6.2, 6.3, 6.4), non-discrimination (article 3), health and health 
services (article 14.2), and education (article 11.3).  
 
Related to the right to health, the Committee recognized that the lack of basic access 
to health facilities, as well as to primary and therapeutic health resources, is 
inconsistent with the respect for a child’s right to the highest attainable standard of 
health.758 The Committee found that the underlying conditions for achieving a healthy 
                                                             
756 IHRDA & OSJI, (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v. Kenya, African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Comm. No 002/2009 (22 March 
2011). 
757 The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is the body in 
charge of promoting and protecting the rights enshrined in the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child. Among other functions they have the role to monitor the 
implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in this Charter. See African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, articles 32-46. 
758 idem para 59. 
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life are protected by the right to health.759 In this context, the provision of plans and 
programs to provide health services in informal settlements and slum areas inhabited 
by Nubian people, is a duty of states under Article 14 of the African Children’s 
Charter. In this regard, the Commission protected the right to health of Nubian 
children in the ‘fulfil’ dimension. Additionally, the Commission stated that Nubian 
children enjoyed less access to health services than comparable communities, due 
to the lack of confirmed status as Kenyan nationals.760 In doing so, the Committee 
protected the right to health in its dimension of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment.  
 
As table No. 4 outlines the Committee recommended that the Government general 
measures consisting in the adoption of ‘a short term, medium term and long term 
plan, including legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure the fulfilment 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health and of the right to education, 
preferably in consultation with the affected beneficiary communities.’761 This measure 
is oriented to the redress of violations of the duty to fulfil the right to health. It is also 
clearly oriented to redressing the root causes of the problem, which, as determined 
by the Committee, are linked to the ‘underlying conditions’ for achieving a healthy 
life. Since such measures depend on the provisions of plans and programs to 
provide health services in the Nubian informal settlements, it is pertinent that the 
Commission decided to intervene in the creation and modification of such plans and 
programs. However, as the plan will have direct impact in the life of the community, 
the Committee was careful in recommending that such measures be taken in 
                                                             
759 idem para 59. 
760 idem para 62. 
761 idem para 69 (4). 
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consultation with affected beneficiary communities. How such consultation should be 
done is something that the Committee did not explain.  
 
Table No. 4. Reparation measures in relation to the duties violated - IHRDA & OSJI, on behalf 
of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v. Kenya (African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, Comm. No 002/2009) 
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‘[A]dopt a short term, 
medium term and 
long term plan, 
including legislative, 
administrative, and 
other measures to 
ensure the fulfilment 
of the right to the 
highest attainable 
standard of health [..], 
in consultation with 
the affected 
beneficiaries and 
communities.’762 
 
2.1.2 Advantages in the granting of recommendations in the case law of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Since the right to health is directly justiciable in the African system, the 
recommendations made by the Commission, in terms of reparations, are more 
consistent with the adequate protection of this right. In general, the Commission has 
distinguished, although not explicitly, between the duties to respect, protect and fulfil 
in relation to the right to health, which has led to measures that correspond with each 
of these duties. In each case, the corresponding violations to the duties to respect, 
protect and fulfil are matched with recommendations in the form of compensation, 
                                                             
762 idem para 69 (4). 
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restitution, satisfaction, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition. This 
analytical framework (respect, protect and fulfil) for the awarding of general 
measures, allows the implementation of general measures in a clear and structured 
way. Although the particular measures awarded could have been more ambitious in 
some cases, the analytical framework used is beneficial in terms of the clarity it 
brings to the awarding of general measures. An adequate doctrine for the redress of 
human rights should take this analytical framework into account in order to grant 
adequate reparation measures. A proposal for an analytical model in the 
understanding and awarding of GNR will be presented in chapter V.  
 
2.2 GNR in the redress of health related issues: an analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
2.2.1 The indirect protection of the right to health in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights and the granting of GNR 
 
The right to health is explicitly recognized in three instruments of the Inter-American 
system. The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also known as the ‘Protocol of San 
Salvador’, establishes that ‘everyone shall have the right to health, understood to 
mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being.’763 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also establishes that 
‘every person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and 
                                                             
763 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Protocol of San Salvador’ (adopted on 17 November 
1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988) article 10.  
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social measures […].’764 In turn, the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection 
of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, establishes that ‘persons deprived of 
liberty shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the 
highest possible level of physical, mental and social well-being.’765 References to 
health organizations and health facilities are also included in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States;766 the Inter-American Convention against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance;767 and the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women.768  
                                                             
764 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) article XI.  
765 Resolution 1/08 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of 
Liberty in the Americas (adopted on 13 March 2008) Principle X. 
766 Article 45 (b) establishes that ‘work is a right and a social duty, it gives dignity to the one 
who performs it, and it should be performed under conditions, including a system of fair 
wages, that ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living for the worker and his family 
[…]’. Article 34 establishes that member states ‘agree to devote their utmost efforts to 
accomplishing the following basic goals:  (l) Protection of man's potential through the 
extension and application of modern medical science.’  
767 Both the Inter-American Convention against all forms of discrimination and intolerance and 
the Inter-American Convention against racism, racial discrimination and related forms of 
intolerance, establish in article 7 that ‘States Parties undertake to adopt legislation that clearly 
defines and prohibits racism, racial discrimination, and related forms of intolerance, […], 
particularly in the areas of employment; participation in professional organizations; education; 
training; housing; health […]’. Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination and related forms of intolerance (adopted on 5 June 2013). 
768 Article 2 states that ‘violence against women shall be understood to include physical, 
sexual and psychological violence: […] that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by 
any person, including, among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, 
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In spite of the recognition of a right to health in several instruments, none of them 
explicitly establishes a mechanism for the enforceability of this right. The American 
Convention on Human Rights, (ACHR), allows for a system of individual petition.769 
However, the Protocol of San Salvador does not recognize the right to health as one 
of the rights that can be used to initiate the application of the individual petition 
system. In turn, both the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the 
Americas, are non-binding instruments so that the inclusion of the right to health has 
merely interpretative effects.   
 
The lack of an express clause providing the direct justiciability of the right to health, 
in the main instruments of the system, has led the incorrect assumption that the right 
to health is non-justiciable in the Inter-American system of human rights. This 
understanding rests on the fact that the ACHR, the main instrument of the Inter-
American System, does not explicitly include a right to health. The Convention 
distinguished between rights included in its chapter II on ´Civil and Political Rights´ 
(Articles 3 to 25) and the rights established in its chapter III on ´Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights´. Chapter III includes just one article, (Article 26,) on ´Progressive 
Development´ which refers to the obligation of states to: 
 
‘undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international 
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a 
view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                              
forced prostitution, kidnapping and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in 
educational institutions, health facilities or any other place.’ 
769 Protocol of San Salvador article 19.6. 
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means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, 
educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of 
the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires.’770  
 
Several authors have argued that article 26 of the ACHR could be interpreted in a 
way to provide direct and autonomous protection to the justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights, including the right to health.771 In support of this position, 
the Inter-American Court has stated that ‘the Court has full jurisdiction over all 
matters pertaining to [the ACHR’s] Articles and provisions.’772 Similarly, Judge 
Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, in a concurring opinion, argued that a systemic, 
evolutionary and pro-homine interpretation of Article 26 should lead to the direct 
                                                             
770 American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose’ (adopted on 22 November 
1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), article 26. 
771 Tara Melish, ‘Rethinking the ‘less as more’ thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the Americas’ (2006-2007) 39 N.Y.U. Journal of International 
Law and Politics 204; Julieta Rossi & Victor Abramovich, ‘La Tutela de los Derechos 
Económicos, Sociales y Culturales en el Artículo 26 de la Convención  Americana sobre 
Derechos Humanos’ (2007) 9 Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 34; Oscar Parra-Vera, 
Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales and el Sistema 
Interamericano (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, México, 2011), pp. 11-34; 
Christian Courtis,  ‘La Protección de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales a 
través del Artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos’, in Christian 
Courtis et al (eds), Protección Internacional de Derechos Humanos, Nuevos Desafíos 
(México, Porrúa-ITAM, 2005). 
772 Case of Acevedo Buendia et al (Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller) v. 
Peru (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C. No. 198 (1 July 2009) para 16. 
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enforcement of the right to health.773 This, however, is still a minority opinion in the 
Court.774 
 
Nonetheless, both the Inter-American Commission, and the Inter-American Court 
have protected some health issues in an indirect way, by referring to civil and 
political rights provisions. For example, the Inter-American Court has referred to the 
right to life (Article 4 of the ACHR) and the right to personal integrity (Article 5 of the 
ACHR), in order to address particular health issues. The Court has also elaborated 
on the obligation of states to guarantee the inspection, vigilance, and control of 
health providers, and the obligation to protect persons in conditions of vulnerability, 
and found some obligations of states in relation to health issues.775 The next section 
of this chapter presents an analysis of the reparation measures addressing health 
related issues granted in the case law of the Inter-American Court.  
 
2.2.1.1 Protection of health related issues through the application 
of the right to life (article 4 ACHR) and the concept of ‘Dignified life’ 
 
                                                             
773 Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 261 (21 May 2013) Concurring opinion 
of Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot.  
774 In the majoritarian opinion of this decision, the Court found Ecuador had violated the rights 
to fair trial, judicial protection and human treatment. It however, did not find a direct violation 
to the right to health. Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Merits) para 229. 
775 For a full presentation of these arguments, see, Parra-Vera La protección del derecho a la 
salud […]; and Steven Keener & Javier Vasquez; ‘A life worth living: enforcement of the right 
to health through the right to life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008-2009) 
40 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 595.   
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Health related issues have traditionally been protected in the Inter-American system, 
by referring to the right to life. By using Article 4 of the ACHR, the Inter-American 
Court has recognized states have some positive duties in the protection of the health 
of people. Such positive duties are comparable to the duty to fulfil the right to health, 
in as much as they are oriented to ensuring the provision of health care in different 
ways.776 
 
The first case where the Court referred to some health related issues was Villagrán 
Morales and others v Guatemala.777 In this case, the Court considered the 
kidnapping, torture and death of four minors, and the murder of another minor by 
security forces. The minors were homeless (they were called ‘street children’) and 
lived in extreme poverty. The Court referred to the concept of ‘dignified life’ (‘vida 
digna’), stating that the right to life includes, not only the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life, but also ‘the right that he will not be prevented from having access to 
the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.’778 Although the Court did not 
specifically refer to the right to health, it did point out that the State has an ‘obligation 
to adopt special measures of protection and assistance for the children within its 
jurisdiction.’779  
 
As the case focused on justiciable elements of children’s rights, the reparation 
measures were similarly focussed, without providing any measure that specifically 
redressed the health related issues in the case. The Court ordered the payment of 
compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, as well as the 
                                                             
776 ESCR GC 14 para 36. 
777 Case of the ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán Morales et al) v. Guatemala (Merits) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 63 (19 November 1999). 
778 idem para 144. 
779 idem para 146.  
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transfer of the mortal remains of one of the children, the designation of an 
educational centre named after the victims, and an investigation into the facts of the 
case. As part of the GNR, the Court ordered the state to ‘implement, in its internal 
legislation, the legislative, administrative or other measures that are necessary to 
adapt Guatemalan legislation to article 19 of the Convention on the rights of the 
child, in order to ensure that events such as those under consideration are never 
repeated.’780  
 
These measures could have included more detailed aspects bearing upon the right 
to health. As the expert on the rights of the child, Emilio Garcia Mendez, suggested, 
in order to redress the systemic violence against children, it is necessary to take 
legislative measures, such as the inclusion of international standards on children’s 
rights in the domestic law, the enforcement of a Children and Youth Code (1996) that 
includes international standards, reforms in institutions, and provisions to combat the 
impunity. These measures should be taken together with efforts aimed at increasing 
basic social policies of health and education.781 In the measures awarded by the 
Court, it could have specifically mentioned the need to implement measures that are 
necessary to adapt Guatemalan legislation to the Convention in order to secure an 
adequate standard of living for the ‘street children’, including, particularly, an 
adequate standard of health.  
 
                                                             
780 Case of the ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala (Reparation and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.77 (26 May 2001) para 98. The 
excessive focus of the Court on ‘children rights’ will be developed in section 2.2.2.2. 
781 idem para 56.   
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More extensive GNR were granted in Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay782 
which related to the overcrowded conditions of a detention centre for young people, 
and the death of nine detainees who were killed in three fires. In this case, the Court 
found that the inmates of the Institute, many of them minors, were not given prompt 
and proper medical, dental and psychological care783 and that the State failed to take 
all the ‘necessary positive measures to ensure to all inmates decent living 
conditions.’784 The Court established that the rights to life and to an adequate 
standard of living of children include an obligation to ‘provid[e] them with health care 
and education, so as to ensure to them that their detention will not destroy their life 
plans.’785 As part of the reparation measures, the Court ordered the state to carry out 
a public act of acknowledgment,786 psychological and medical treatment for the 
inmates injured in the fires,787 vocational guidance to all persons who were 
inmates,788 and the payment of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.789 
 
In what can be called a GNR, the Inter-American Court also ordered the state to 
prepare and map out, in partnership with civil society, a state policy for the short, 
medium and long term on the subject of juveniles in conflict with the law. The state’s 
policy ‘must include, inter alia, strategies, appropriate measures and the earmarking 
                                                             
782 Case of the Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ v. Paraguay (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C. No.122 (2 
September 2004). 
783 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay (Merits) para 166. 
784 idem para 176. 
785 idem para 161. 
786 idem para 316. 
787 idem para 319. 
788 idem para 321. 
789 idem para 330. 
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of the resources needed […] for the establishment of education programs and full 
medical and psychological services for all children deprived of their liberty.’790 This 
measure directly tackles the health aspects of the case and is wider in scope than 
the measures adopted in Villagrán Morales. They are also very exceptional as they 
have a far reaching scope, with a clear preventive nature.  
 
In other cases related to the protection of health in indigenous communities the 
Court has stated that the right to a decent existence includes the provision of health 
care. In the cases of the indigenous communities Yakie Axa v. Paraguay (2005) and 
Xakmok Kasek v. Paraguay (2010), the lack of access, and entitlement, to ancestral 
territories forced the communities to live in temporary settlements where access to 
water, appropriate sanitary conditions, food, health and education were restricted791. 
In these cases, the Court found that the right to a dignified life includes ´minimum 
living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human persons and of not 
creating conditions that hinder or impede it.´792 The Court found that the measures 
taken by the state were insufficient to correct the situation of vulnerability for 
indigenous communities793 and that the state had not guaranteed adequate access 
to health for members of the community.794  
 
                                                             
790 idem para 317. 
791 idem paras 74, 164-213. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 125 (17 
June 2005) paras 50.15, 50.92-50.105. 
792 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 162. 
793 idem para 169. 
794 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 214 (24 August 2010) para 208.  
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Although the facts of Yakie Axa and Xakmok Kasek are broadly similar, the 
reparation measures, and particularly GNR, are similar in some ways but different in 
others, showing the evolution of the Court in dealing with reparations for health 
related issues. First, as a result of the lack of adequate access to health care, in both 
cases the Court ordered the immediate and regular provision of medical care, 
including appropriate medicines and adequate treatment, to all members of the 
community and especially the elderly, children and pregnant women.795 In addition to 
this, the Court in Xakmok Kasek also ordered ‘periodic vaccination and 
deparasitation campaigns that respect their ways and customs.’796 It also 
emphasized that medical care for women should include both pre and post-natal 
care, as well as care during the first months of the baby’s life.797 These are very 
important measures that, following the framework of duties of the CESCR, effectively 
address the duty to fulfil the right to health for these communities.  
 
However, it is important to notice how these measures are titled in different ways 
depending on the case. Whereas in Yakie Axa such measures appear under 
‘guarantees of non-recidivism,’798 in Xakmok Kasek they appear as ‘rehabilitation’.799 
In fact, if the right to health were justiciable in the Inter-American system, these 
measures would be better understood as measures of restitution. They are not 
aimed at preventing the inactivity of the state in guaranteeing adequate access to 
health services for the communities or at changing the root causes of the violation. 
Instead, the measures are oriented at forcing the state to fulfil an obligation (the duty 
to fulfil the right to health of these communities) that was not complied with before.  
                                                             
795 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 221; and Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 301. 
796 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 301 (b). 
797  idem para 301. 
798 Yakye Axa (Merits) paras 210-227. 
799 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 300 to 306. 
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Second, the cases differ in the type of ‘other measures’ granted by the Court to 
redress the violations. In Yakie Axa, apart from ordering the immediate and regular 
provision of medical care, no general measures or GNR were awarded in relation to 
health issues. This situation was amended five years later in Xakmok Kasek, where 
more advanced measures were granted in relation to health related issues. In this 
case, the Court also ordered the state to prepare a comprehensive study, within six 
months, regarding the provision of potable water, medical and psycho-social care, 
delivery of medicines, supply of food for the community, and the supply of materials 
and human resources for the community’s school. Related to the provision of health 
care, the Court indicated that the study should include: 
 
‘(1) the frequency required for the medical personnel to visit to the 
Community; (2) the main illnesses and diseases suffered by the 
members of the Community; (3) the medicines and treatment required for 
those illnesses; (4) the required pre- and post-natal care, and (5) the 
manner and frequency with which the vaccination and deparasitation 
should be carried out.’800  
 
The scope of this measure is more extensive that the ones granted in Yakie Axa, 
and clearly incorporates the preparation of studies that will lead to the design of 
public policies that have a bearing upon the right to health of this community. It is 
also more detailed, allowing GNR not just for the provision of adequate medicines 
and medical care, but also emphasizing other elements of the right to health of 
vulnerable populations, in particular the inclusion of maternal care, and vaccination 
and deparasitation programs which were not mentioned in Yakie Axa. Even though 
                                                             
800 idem para 303. 
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this measure is under the title ‘rehabilitation,’ it can be considered a GNR as it is 
intended to change ‘the delivery of basic supplies and services to the members of 
the Community’801 and, therefore, to prevent the repetition of the violations.  
 
In addition to this measure, the Court indicated that the state should establish a 
health clinic, which has necessary medicines and supplies, in the place where the 
Xakmok Kasek community is temporarily located, as well as a system of 
communication for emergency cases, and transportation when required.802 These 
are measures which address the obligation to fulfil the right to health of the 
community. In the section on ‘Guarantees of non-repetition’ in Xakmok Kasek, the 
Court also ordered the implementation of a program for the registration of births and 
the issuance of identity cards, as well as the establishment of an effective system for 
indigenous people to claim their right to property.803 These ‘guarantees of non-
repetition’ are directly oriented to prevent further violations of the right to property of 
ancestral lands, but do not directly address health related issues, which were 
considered under the section on ‘rehabilitation’.  
 
Another allegation that implicated the responsibility of the state, and links the right to 
life with some elements of health care, relates to the presumed responsibility of the 
state in the death of people from preventable causes. In both cases, the Commission 
alleged that the state was responsible for the deaths of several members of the 
community, which could have been avoided with adequate food and medical care. 
This allegation was, however, in each case, treated in a different way. In Yakie Axa, 
the Court did not find any evidence to establish state responsibility, claiming ‘it did 
                                                             
801 idem para 305. 
802 idem para 306. 
803 idem para 308. 
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not have sufficient evidence to establish the causes of said deaths.’804 The Court’s 
lack of sensitivity to this allegation was criticized in the concurring opinion of the 
case.805 Later, in Xakmok Kasek, the Inter-American Court seemed to correct the 
understanding of this type of violation, embracing a more extensive understanding of 
the right to life, by finding the state responsible for the death of thirteen members of 
the Xakmok Kasek community, due to illnesses that were easily preventable806 if the 
individuals had received prompt and adequate medical care807. Unlike other cases 
where the right to life was found to be violated, the Inter-American Court did not 
award compensation measures for material and moral damages as a result of these 
deaths.  
 
The GNR awarded in Xakmok Kasek contrasts with the lack of express GNR for the 
prevention of health related violations in Yakie Axa. This demonstrates the evolution 
of the Court’s jurisprudence on GNR for the redress of health related cases, even 
                                                             
804 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 177. 
805 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 125 (17 June 2005) Separate 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and M.E. Ventura Robles, para 6; for 
commentary on this, see Keener & Vasquez A life worth living 610.  
806 Such illnesses include tetanus, pneumonia, tuberculosis, anaemia, whooping cough, 
dehydration, and serious complications during labour. Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 231. 
807 In the Xakmok Kasek Case, the Court ‘underscores that extreme poverty and lack of 
adequate medical care for pregnant women or women who have recently given birth resulting 
in high maternal mortality and morbidity. Because of this, States must design appropriate 
health-care policies that permit assistance to be provided by personnel who are adequately 
trained to attend to births, policies to prevent maternal mortality with adequate pre-natal and 
post-partum care, and legal and administrative instruments for health care policies’. Xákmok 
Kásek (Merits) para 233.  
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though the right to health is not directly justiciable in the Inter-American system. 
However, the direct justiciability of the right to health would be a step forward, in as 
much as it would increase the likelihood of granting GNR that are directly linked to 
health related issues.808 It also increases the likelihood of more detailed measures 
that redress specific components of the right to health, instead of generic 
formulations that merely call for an improvement in ‘health conditions.’  
 
2.2.1.2 Protection of health related issues through the application 
of the right to personal integrity (Article 5 ACHR) 
 
Health related issues have also been protected in the Inter-American system through 
the right to personal integrity. In Sebastián Furlán v. Argentina809, the Court analysed 
the case of Sebastián Furlán who, at the age of 14, suffered an accident in a military 
field, hitting his head on a heavy beam. As a result, Sebastian developed difficulties 
in his speech and the use of his upper and lower limbs810. His father filed a civil suit 
against the state, claiming compensation for injuries resulting from the accident811. 
The Court found that a twelve year delay in hearing the civil claim was attributable to 
the state authorities. They also found that the delay had a significant impact on the 
personal integrity of the victim, who was unable to receive adequate psychiatric 
treatment and rehabilitation, necessary to improve his quality of life812. The Court did 
not refer expressly to the right to health but instead stated that there was a violation 
                                                             
808 This argument is developed in more depth in section 2.2.2 GNR and rehabilitation 
measures.  
809 Case of Furlán and Family V. Argentina (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 246 (31 August 2012).  
810 idem para 74. 
811 idem para 78. 
812 idem paras 203-204. 
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of the right to personal integrity, because of the impact the denial of access to justice 
had on him obtaining adequate rehabilitation and health care.  
 
The Court ordered several reparation measures. In terms of rehabilitation, the Court 
ordered that the state provide adequate and effective medical, psychological and 
psychiatric treatment to the victim and the next of kin, free of charge, through its 
specialized health care services813. The Court ordered the creation of a 
multidisciplinary team to assist Sebastian in his social, educational, vocational and 
labour integration,814 and also ordered the publication of the decision in an official 
newspaper. 
 
In terms of GNR, the petitioners requested the state the issue regulations to the 
National Mental Health Act (Law 26,657) arguing that this law was not effective in the 
protection of the rights of persons with disabilities.815 When analysing the request, 
the Court acknowledged that, in addition to the National Mental Health Act, the state 
had ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and had 
enacted other laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.816 As a 
consequence, the Court considered that issuing additional regulations was not 
necessary. As in other cases, the refusal of the Court to order legislative reforms in 
                                                             
813 idem para 284. 
814 idem para 288. 
815 idem para 291. 
816 The State had ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and has 
enacted Laws 22,431 ‘which introduce the use of a single disability certificate and establish 
the system of basic integrated rehabilitation and training services for people with disabilities’; 
Law 24,901 which establishes rehabilitation services, therapeutic educational services, 
education and assistance services; and Law 22,431 which ensure that people with disabilities 
would have obtained medical care, education, and social security, and tax exemptions.  
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order to prevent the repetition of the facts was not related to lack of competence, or 
the inadequacy of the measure, but to the previous existence of legislative reforms. 
This is a relevant argument for those who deny the capability of the Court to order 
legislative reforms as part of the GNR.  
 
So instead of ordering the enactment of regulations, the Court ordered the state to 
‘enforce the obligation of active transparency in relation to the health and social 
security benefits to which people with disabilities are entitled in Argentina’ (italics 
added).817 As a result, the Court ordered the state to provide the public with the 
maximum amount of information in order to access to such benefits. The information 
should be provided in a comprehensive, easily understood and simple language.818 
The Court also ordered that, as soon as a person is diagnosed with serious 
problems related to disability, this person should be provided with a charter of rights 
summarizing the benefits available to him or her, the standards for the protection of 
persons with mental disabilities, and the institutions that can provide assistance in 
demanding the fulfilment of their rights.819 Although the right to health is not directly 
protected in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, these measures implicitly 
contribute to the fulfilment of the elements of the right to health.820  
 
 
2.2.1.3 Protection of health related issues through the application 
of the right to personal integrity (Article 5 ACHR) in cases of imprisoned 
people  
                                                             
817 idem para 294. 
818 idem para 294. 
819 idem para 295. 
820 ESCR GC 14 para 18 and 50. 
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The Court has protected some health related elements of the right to health in cases 
related to detention conditions. In Velez Loor v. Panama,821 Vera and other v. 
Ecuador822, Diaz Peña v. Venezuela823 the Court considered the lack of adequate 
medical treatment for people deprived of their liberty. In all cases, the victims were in 
detention and experienced health problems. Even though the victims required urgent 
medical attention, the state did not provide adequate and prompt health care, 
resulting in the deterioration of their health and even in death.   
 
In terms of the justiciability of health related issues, the Court found, in all these 
cases, that the state has a duty to ‘safeguard the health and welfare of prisoners, 
providing them, among other elements, with the required medical assistance.’824 
Also, that the ‘lack of adequate medical treatment for a person who is deprived of 
liberty and in the State’s custody may be considered a violation of Article 5(1) and 
5(2) of the Convention [right to personal integrity] depending on the particular 
circumstances of the specific person’825. In these cases, the lack of adequate 
                                                             
821 Case of Velez Loor v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 218 (23 November 2010).   
822Case of Vera Vera v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 226 (19 May 2011). 
823 Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 24 (26 June 2012). 
824 idem para 135. In the Velez Loor Case the Court established that ‘the State has the duty 
to provide detainees with regular medical checks and care and adequate treatment whenever 
necessary’. Vélez Loor (Merits) para 220.  
825 Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Merits) para 137.  
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medical care in detention centres can be considered a violation of the duty to fulfil 
the right to health.826  
 
Although the facts of the cases, and the reasoning of the Court, are similar, the 
reparation measures adopted in each case varies. The Inter-American Court went 
from ignoring health issues to awarding measures that expressly asked the state to 
provide ‘adequate, decent and timely health care.’827  
 
In Velez Loor v. Panama,828 an Ecuadorian migrant in Panama was detained by 
Panamanian authorities. According to the law of Panama, migrants should be 
transferred to special centres of detention for migrants. The victim, however, was 
transferred to a public prison. He apparently suffered from migraines and dizziness, 
due to a pre-existing cranial fracture. According to the prison physician, a CAT scan 
was required but it was not performed due to its cost.829 In this case, the Court 
ordered the state to provide a sum of money that covered specialized medical and 
psychological treatment for the victim in the place where he lives. In addition to the 
individual measures, and as part of the GNR, the Court ordered the State to: 
 
‘adopt, within a reasonable time, the measures necessary to provide 
facilities with sufficient capacity to accommodate persons whose 
detention is necessary and proportionate, specifically for immigration 
reasons. These establishments must offer suitable physical conditions 
                                                             
826 ESCR GC 14 para 36. 
827 Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Merits) para 154. 
828 Vélez Loor v. Panama (Merits)  
829 idem para 221.  
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and an appropriate regimen for migrants, and the staff working at such 
facilities must be properly qualified and trained civilians.’830 
 
It also ordered the implementation of a training program related to the obligation to 
initiate investigations, ex officio, in cases of torture, directed at the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, the judiciary, the National Police and medical personnel.831 The 
Court rejected the requests of the Commission to order conditions of the prison, 
where the victim was detained, be adapted to international standards.832 It also 
abstained from ordering the state to adequately define the crime of torture in its 
legislation, as a previous judgment from the Inter-American Court had ordered to the 
state.833 The Court also rejected the requests of the representatives to organize an 
event acknowledging the state’s responsibility, to conduct an effective investigation 
against those officials that failed to open investigations for the alleged acts of torture, 
to draft protocols of physical examination, to create a mechanism of daily visits, and 
to implement a mechanism so imprisoned people can denounce acts of aggression 
that they are subjected to.834  
 
In this case, none of the GNR granted are oriented to redressing the terrible health 
conditions of the prison centres where the victim was held. The representatives had 
requested the Court ‘to guarantee that the Panamanian Prison System has sufficient 
doctors, who should be independent in order to properly perform their duties, and to 
draw up protocols for the medical examination of those detained.’835 However, the 
                                                             
830 idem para 272. 
831 idem para 280. 
832 idem paras 273-276. This aspect will be discussed in section 2.2.2.2. 
833 idem para 292. 
834 idem para 293.  
835 idem para 274. 
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Inter-American Court rejected this request by considering that ‘[g]iven that this case 
refers to migrants and that it has been established that they cannot be held in such 
places, […] it is not pertinent to order a measure such as the one requested.’836 As a 
consequence, the Court limited itself to reminding the state of the special position it 
has as guarantor of the right of persons deprived of liberty. This reasoning is quite 
narrow in terms of the protection of the rights of the victims. The decision focuses on 
the main allegations regarding the rights of migrants, forgetting about the impact the 
case has in terms of victims’ health conditions. For example, it does not include any 
recommendation aimed at improving the health conditions of the detention facilities 
where the victim was held. Also, it does not include any of the requests made by the 
petitioners, in terms of the inclusion of more doctors and the drawing up of protocols 
for medical examination. Since the Court focused, in the arguments, on migrants, it 
was blind to the granting of measures for the redress of wider health related issues.    
 
It is certainly true that the state had informed the Court of the adoption of specific 
measures for the improvement of health care conditions in prisons, such as ‘the 
implementation of medical visits to the center of the interior of the country, […] the 
provision of supplies to the clinics of the penitentiary centers, […] [as well as] […] an 
arrangement with the Ministry of Health in order to increase the medical service at 
the clinic at La Joya prison.’837 However, there was no information in the case as to 
whether such measures were adequately implemented by the state. Although the 
burden of proof for such information rests, in principle, with the Commission and the 
victims, the Court could have insisted on the duty of the state to improve the health 
conditions of the prison center where the victim was held, instead of just ensuring 
that the conditions of imprisonment in prison centres conform, in general, to 
                                                             
836 idem para 276. 
837 idem para 275. 
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international standards.838 A higher level of detail in general measures, focusing on 
redress for health related violations, would have forced the state to undertake more 
effective measures in order to provide prisoners with adequate conditions of health 
care.   
 
In Vera and et al v. Ecuador,839 the protection of health related issues is more visible 
in the GNR, but it is still not enough. In this case, a man was detained after being 
followed by a mob that accused him of assaulting people in a public street. As a 
result of the persecution he was shot. Mr Vera was referred to a hospital for 
examination but was discharged without extracting the bullet, because, according to 
the doctors, he did not merit hospitalization.840 After several days in pain, Mr. Vera 
was admitted to the hospital before being transferred to another for an operation. He 
died after the operation.  
 
The Court ordered the payment of compensation for the costs his mother incurred in 
order for her son to receive medical care. In terms of GNR, the Court ordered the 
state to disseminate the judgement ‘within the police and prison authorities as well 
as [with] the medical personnel’841 in charge of caring for persons deprived of liberty. 
Here again the issues related to health are insufficiently protected. Although 
educational measures can be useful in preventing the repetition of these facts, the 
Court could have ordered bolder measures in order to actually change the root 
causes of the violation. In this sense, the victims requested the Commission ‘to 
create a public policy that allows access to healthcare for persons deprived of 
                                                             
838 idem para 276. 
839 Vera Vera v. Ecuador (Merits)  
840 idem para 49. 
841 idem para 125. 
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liberty.’842 The argument was dismissed by the Court because it found that ‘the 
alleged current conditions of the prison system do not form part of the factual basis 
at hand’843 and that there was insufficient evidence to prove there was a generalized 
situation of inadequate medical care for persons deprived of their liberty in 
Ecuador.844 If the evidence was not enough to show there was a pattern of 
inadequate health care in detention centres in Ecuador, the Court could have 
ordered the state to ensure the provision of, at least, adequate measures of health 
care in the Provisional Detention Centre where the victim was held. Although the 
existence of a directly justiciable right to health is not a precondition for the Court to 
award more ambitious measures, the recognition of such a right would help to justify 
the adoption of bolder measures.  
 
In Diaz Peña v. Venezuela,845 the Inter-American Court took a more proactive role in 
the protection of health related issues during the reparation stage. This case 
represents a step forward in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court regarding 
the provision of medical care for detainees. Mr. Diaz Peña was detained in a Pre-
Trial Detention Centre. It was proved that, prior to his detention, he had suffered from 
problems in his ears and that in detention he developed a perianal abscess that 
required an urgent operation. In spite of the urgent need of medical treatment, Mr. 
Diaz Peña did not have the examinations requested by his doctors, and he was not 
given the required medical assistance in an opportune, adequate and complete 
manner. As a result, the Court found that, while detained, there was a progressive 
deterioration in his health.846   
                                                             
842 idem para 138.  
843 idem para 139.  
844 idem para 81. 
845 Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Merits)  
846 idem para 107. 
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The Court ordered the payment of compensation as reimbursement for expenses 
incurred for his previous medical care, and to cover future expenses for specialized 
medical treatment.847 In terms of GNR, the Court ordered the state to adopt all 
necessary measures to ensure that the conditions in the detention centres where the 
victim was held are in accordance with international standards.848 Particularly, the 
Court ordered the State to ensure that people deprived of liberty enjoy ‘[…] 
necessary, adequate, decent and timely health care’ 849 [emphasis added]. The 
express reference to ‘health care’ in the GNR reflects a positive development in the 
protection and adequate representation of health related issues, in the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court. In this case, the lack of a directly justiciable right was 
not an impediment for the Court to award appropriate and extensive GNR. The 
Court, however, could have taken a more ambitious approach, for example, by 
detailing the type of measures that the state should take, such as access to light and 
natural ventilation, access to adequate sanitary installations, access to adequate and 
prompt specialized services, and the provision of adequate instruments to treat 
particular health problems.850 It is likely that in a model of direct justiciability of the 
right to health, more detailed measures addressing specific components of this right 
could, and would, have been awarded by the Court.  
 
2.2.1.4 Protection of health related issues through the application of a 
duty of states to regulate, supervise and control the provision of health 
services                                           
                                                             
847 idem para 161 
848 idem para 154. 
849 idem para 154. 
850 idem para 140. 
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The Inter-American Court has also provided reparations in cases where states are 
responsible for the lack of adequate regulation, supervision, and control, in the 
provision of health services carried out by third parties. This responsibility has arisen 
from the general obligation of states to respect rights and to adopt any provision 
necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms established in the Convention 
(Articles 1 and 2 ACHR). These standards have been identified in several cases by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. For example, in the cases Ximenes 
Lopes v. Brasil (2006),851 Alban Cornejo and others v Ecuador (2007),852 and Suárez 
Peralta v. Ecuador (2013)853 the Court considered the death of patients within 
medical centres operated by private parties. Whereas the first case related to the 
confinement of a person with a mental illness the other cases are related to medical 
malpractice in the performance of health procedures.   
 
In Ximenes Lopes v. Brasil854, the facts of which resemble those in Purohit and 
Moore v The Gambia from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
a mentally ill person was hospitalized in inhuman and degrading conditions, and 
beaten by officers of the ‘Casa de Reposo Guararapes’ (Guararapes Rest Home), 
during psychiatric treatment.855 There was no investigation after the case, leading to 
the impunity of those responsible. The rest home was a private psychiatric clinic 
operated in the public health system of Brazil. In this case, the Court held that there 
                                                             
851 Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits)  
852 Case of Albán-Cornejo et al v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 171 (22 November 2007).  
853 Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C. No. 261 (21 May 2013).  
854 Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits).  
855 idem para 112(9) to (11). 
254 
 
is a state obligation to protect the rights to life and personal integrity of people, by 
regulating and supervising the health care services provided by private institutions. 
The Court found that states are responsible for regulating and supervising the 
provision of services and the implementation of public health care services in order 
to protect the right to life and the physical integrity of the individuals undergoing 
medical treatment.856  
 
In addition to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, the Court 
awarded GNR, mainly related to training public officials and providing courses about 
how to ensure the protection of certain rights. In this case, the Court ordered the 
state to develop a training and education program for physicians and personnel 
working in mental health care institutions about the principles that govern treatment 
of patients with mental illnesses, in accordance with international standards.857 
 
Other GNR with a larger scope were rejected by the Inter-American Court as they 
were considered not necessary for the redress of the violation. In Ximenes Lopes, it 
was proven that the deficiencies in medical care and the use of violence to control 
the patients were not exclusive to the victims of the case, but were part of an 
‘atmosphere of violence, aggression, and maltreatment’ in the rest home.858 As a 
consequence, the representatives requested more extensive GNR, consisting of the 
establishment of procedures for supervising the operation of health units, the closing 
of certain psychiatric units, the approval and implementation of ‘Rules on Persons 
with Disabilities’, and the adoption of all necessary measures to eradicate the use of 
                                                             
856 idem para 99. 
857 idem para 250. As part of the GNR the Court also ordered the state to ‘investigate the 
events that amounted to violations in the instant case’ and to publish the judgement. Idem 
para 246. 
858 idem para 112 (56). 
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cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in psychiatric institutions.859 However, such 
measures were not ordered by the Court as the state proved it had adopted a new 
National Mental Health Policy. The State not only acknowledged partial responsibility 
for the violations but also engaged in a variety of legislative and structural measures 
aimed at improving the conditions of psychiatric care in the region.860 In fact, prior to 
the judgement, the state had developed a process of reforming the model of mental 
care, starting in 1992 with the second National Conference on Mental Health,861 
continuing with the approval of a new law reforming the National Mental Health 
Policy in 2001 (Law 10216/2001), and leading to the closure of the Casa de Reposo 
Guararapes. According to Rosato and Coreia, there have been important advances 
in mental health policies in recent years, but no major training programs 
implemented, except for those ordered by the Court.862  
 
In other cases related to medical malpractice, the Inter-American Court has 
recognised that states have a duty to exercise supervision and control, in those 
                                                             
859 idem para 214 (d). 
860 Such as the creation of a commission to investigate responsibility in the Care Centre, the 
establishment of a Mental Health Care Network, the creation of a Psychiatric Admission Unit 
in the general hospital of the municipality; the creation of a Psychosocial Care Centre; among 
others. The State also enacted a Law (10,216/2001) on the “Psychiatric Reform Law”, and 
provided several seminars and conferences on Psychiatric Care. Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil 
(Merits) para 243. According to Rosato and Correia, the final approval of the Law 10216, after 
12 years of discussion in the Congress was speeded up by the Damiao Ximenes Case. 
Cassia Rosato & Ludmila Correia, ‘The Damiao Ximenes Lopes Case: Changes and 
challenges following the first ruling against Brazil in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ (2011) 15 SUR 91. 
861 Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits) para 46 (2) (d). 
862 Rosato & Correia The Damiao Ximenes Lopes Case 106. 
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cases where private parties perform public services. In Alban Cornejo v Ecuador, a 
person admitted to the Metropolitan Hospital, a private health institution, died, 
allegedly due to negligence. The criminal complaints filed in the case were not 
successful. In one of the criminal complaints, the statute of limitations ran out, 
making any further investigation and punishment impossible.863 The Court held that 
there is a state obligation to protect the rights to life and personal integrity of people, 
by regulating and supervising the health care services provided by private 
institutions. The Court also found that ‘when related to the essential jurisdiction of the 
supervision and regulation of rendering the services of public interest, such as 
health, by private or public entities (as is the case of a private hospital), the state 
responsibility is generated by the omission of the duty to supervise the rendering of 
the public service to protect the mentioned right.’864  
 
The Court ordered the state to ‘disseminate patients’ rights applying both domestic 
and international standards’. It also ordered the implementation of an education and 
training program for justice operators and health care professionals, relating to the 
Ecuadorian legislation on patients’ rights.865 These measures are directly linked with 
the duty to protect the right to health, in as much as they are oriented at making sure 
that both health personnel and patients know their duties and rights.  
 
The Inter-American Court also rejected the request of the Commission and the 
victims, to order the state to enact specific legislation on medical malpractice. The 
state acknowledged the lack of more adequate criminal offences in the criminal code 
                                                             
863 Another complaint was also lodged asking for the investigation of the facts, however, it 
was also unsuccessful as the legal situation of that complaint was still pending a court decree 
when the case went to the Inter-American Court.  
864 Albán-Cornejo et al v. Ecuador (Merits) para 119.  
865 idem para 264. 
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by which to punish physicians and stated its intention to prepare a bill on medical 
malpractice. The Court, however, did not order specific legislative measures in this 
regard taking into account, first, the discretion of the state in including specific 
criminal descriptions for medical malpractice;866 and second, the promise of the state 
to ‘endeavor to improve its health care and adapt its criminal legislation.’867 In this 
decision, the Court was very respectful of the discretion of the state to modify its 
domestic law. One argument that seemed to be decisive for the Court was the fact 
that, unlike genocide, torture, forced disappearance, and other crimes, there are not 
strict criminal definitions for medical malpractice in international law.868 In this regard 
the deference of the Court seems to be justified. 
 
Similarly, in Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador,869 a 22-year-old woman was operated on for 
appendicitis. During the operation, the doctors made several mistakes, causing her 
severe injuries. The victim initiated a criminal procedure against the health 
professionals that performed the operation. Five years after ordering an 
investigation, a Court declared that the criminal action could not be brought because 
of a statute of limitations. The Inter-American Court found that the Ecuadorian 
judicial authorities did not take adequate measures to investigate, prosecute and 
punish those responsible, irrespective of the measures taken by the victims.870 State 
authorities did not act with the due diligence required to investigate and to ensure 
effective judicial protection, which implies a violation of Articles 8 and 25. Moreover, 
the state allowed someone, who did not complete the formal requirements for a 
medical licence, to operate as a medical doctor, which resulted in severe harm to the 
                                                             
866 idem para 133. 
867 idem para 160. 
868 idem para 136. 
869 Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Merits)  
870 idem 
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victim. As a consequence, the Court held there was a violation of the ACHR Article 5 
on personal integrity.  
 
In terms of GNR, the victim requested the state to adopt legislative and other 
measures to strengthen the civil and criminal liability of doctors and health workers. 
The Court did not award such a measure, taking into consideration that the State 
had amended the Ecuadorian Organic Health Act and had already put in place 
structural changes in the health system. The state had also agreed to present a bill 
including the pertinent reforms concerning medical malpractice and patients’ rights. 
The Inter-American Court reiterated the order already awarded in Alban Cornejo, 
requiring the state to comply with education and training programs.  
 
In these three cases, the Court awarded GNR for the redress of health related issues 
directly linked with the violations declared. Although more ambitious measures would 
have been desirable, such as public policy measures in Ximenes Lopes, and 
legislative reforms in Alban Cornejo and Suárez Peralta, the Court seems to justify 
its orders based on the measures already taken by the state.   
 
 
2.2.1.5 Protection of sexual and reproductive health through the 
application of the rights to personal integrity, personal liberty and 
private and family life (Articles 5, 7 and 11 ACHR) 
 
The Inter-American Court has studied one case on the protection of sexual and 
reproductive health. In Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, the Court protected the sexual 
and reproductive rights of the victims by referring to the rights to personal integrity 
(Article 5), personal liberty (Article 7), private and family life (Article 11), and the right 
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to raise a family (Article 17.2). The case relates to the total ban of the practice of in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) in Costa Rica, after a decision in 2000, of the Constitutional 
section of the Supreme Court of Justice. 
 
The Inter-American Court held that the decision to have biological children using 
assisted reproduction techniques is part of the rights to private and family life (Article 
11), to life, and to personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5, respectively). The Court 
considered that the right to private life is related to reproductive autonomy, by 
referring to Article 16(e) of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, according to which women enjoy the right ‘to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have 
access to the information, education and means that enable them to exercise these 
rights.’871 The Court linked the rights to life and personal integrity with the concept of 
‘reproductive health’, and through this concept, to the recognition of the basic right of 
all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and 
timing of their children and to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive 
health.872  
 
The Court also linked the right to private life and reproductive freedom, to the right to 
have access to the medical technology necessary to exercise that right. According to 
the Court, ‘the right to have access to scientific progress in order to exercise 
reproductive autonomy and the possibility to found a family gives rise to the right to 
have access to the best health care services in assisted reproduction techniques 
                                                             
871 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica (Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.257 (28 
November 2012) para 146. 
872 idem para 148. 
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and, consequently, the prohibition of disproportionate and unnecessary restriction, 
de iure or de facto, to exercising the reproductive decisions of each individual.’873  
 
According to the Court, these rights can be restricted by the state, as long as the 
restriction is not arbitrary, is established by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and 
complies with the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality.874 In this 
specific case, the Inter-American Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Justice 
protected the embryo in an absolute manner, without taking into account the rights of 
the victims. This had a disproportionate and discriminatory impact on the rights 
previously mentioned. In particular, the Court analysed the argument of the Supreme 
Court according to which the right to life (Article 4 (1)) established an absolute 
protection of the embryo. According to the Inter-American Court, taking into account 
that there is no life before conception, Article 4 could not be used to justify a total 
ban of IVF treatment.  
 
The Court also found that the decision of the Supreme Court had a discriminatory 
effect on infertile couples whose only way to reproduce is by assisted technologies. 
The Court based its judgment on the opinion of the expert Paul Hunt, for whom 
‘involuntary infertility is a disability.’875 According to the Inter-American Court, 
persons with infertility are protected by the rights of persons with disabilities and, as 
a consequence, have the right to access necessary technologies that allow them to 
resolve their reproductive health problems.876 The Inter-American Court also found 
gender stereotypes affected women, in particular in relation to their reproductive 
                                                             
873 idem para 150. 
874 idem para 273. 
875 Some of the expert witnesses considered infertility as a form of disability only under 
certain conditions and presumptions and in determined cases. See, idem para 289. 
876 idem para 293. 
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capacity.877 Finally, the Court found that some of the victims did not have the 
economic resources to access IVF technologies abroad, which resulted in a 
discriminatory effect in relation to their financial situation.878  
 
As part of the reparation measures, the Court ordered the state to provide 
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, psychological rehabilitation, 
and to publish the decision in an official newspaper. In terms of GNR, the Court 
ordered the state (i) to ensure that the prohibition of IVF is annulled, in order to 
guarantee access to reproduction technology for everyone, (ii) to regulate those 
aspects necessary for the implementation of IVF, taking into account the standards 
settled in the judgement, and (iii) to make IVF available within its health care infertility 
treatments and programs.879 Although the first and second orders can arguably be 
linked to the violations declared by the Court, the third measure seems to exceed 
what was discussed in the decision. The wide scope of the Court’s order will be 
discussed further in section 2.2.2.3 of this chapter.880 
 
2.2.2 Difficulties in the granting of GNR in the jurisprudence on health related 
issues of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
 
The lack of direct justiciability of the right to health in the Inter-American system has 
led to the indirect protection of such rights, mainly through the extensive 
interpretation of some of the rights contained in the ACHR, particularly the rights to 
                                                             
877 idem paras 294- 302. 
878 idem 303-304.  
879 The Court also ordered rehabilitation measures oriented to provide psychological 
treatment to the victims of the case, free of charge, for up to four years.  
880 See, pp. 272-273.  
262 
 
life and personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 ACHR, respectively). The following 
section will show how this strategy has only provided incomplete and limited 
remedies in relation to health. 
 
2.2.2.1 Indirect justiciability of health related issues but not 
protection of the right to health   
 
The analysis of the jurisprudence on health related issues of the Inter-American 
Court showed the Court has moved from ignoring issues related to health to their 
progressive inclusion in both the justiciability and the reparations stage. This 
inclusion has been carried out through several strategies. One of them has been the 
extensive interpretation of the rights to life and personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 of 
ACHR, respectively). Another strategy has been the emphasis on the duty of states 
to regulate, supervise and control the provision of health services by third parties. 
The Court has also protected some elements of sexual and reproductive health, by 
linking the rights to personal integrity, personal liberty, and private and family life.  
 
As outlined in the previous section, this strategy has led the Inter-American Court to 
recognize specific duties of states regarding health. For example, in Instituto de 
Reeducation del Menor v. Paraguay,881 the Court recognised that, in regards ‘to 
children deprived of their liberty and thus in the custody of the State, the latter’s 
obligations include that of providing [the children] with health care and education’882. 
It therefore found a violation of the rights of children. In Xakmok Kasek v. Paraguay, 
the Court referred to the ‘right to a decent existence,’ from which it implied states 
                                                             
881 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay (Merits) 
882 idem para 161. 
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have a duty to guarantee access to health care services.883 In Furlan v. Argentina, 
the Court established that the denial of justice had a huge impact on the adequate 
rehabilitation and health service, which implies a violation of the right to personal 
integrity. In Vera Vera and other v. Ecuador, the Inter-American Court found that the 
lack of adequate and prompt health care was a violation of the rights to personal 
integrity and life. However, in none of these decisions did the Court find an explicit 
violation of the right to health.  
 
Only in Yakie Axa v. Paraguay did the Inter-American Court explicitly mention the 
existence of a ‘right to health’ when stating that, the ‘special detriment to the right to 
health, and closely tied to this, detriment to the right to food and access to clean 
water, have a major impact on the right to a decent existence and basic condition to 
exercise other human rights, such as the right to education or the right to cultural 
identity’884 [italics added]. In this case, however, the Court did not find a violation of 
the right to health, but to the rights to life, property, fair trial and judicial protection. 
 
While the Court has not directly protected the right to health in its jurisprudence, the 
‘indirect approach’ has led to the protection of specific elements of this right, as it is 
defined by the ESCR Committee in its dimensions of respect, protect and fulfil.885 In 
its dimension of respect, the Court has ordered states to abstain from enforcing 
discriminatory practices, such as the total ban of the IVF treatment.886 In this regard, 
the ESCR Committee has stated that the obligation to respect includes ‘abstaining 
from enforcing discriminatory practices as a State Policy.’887  
                                                             
883 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para. 203-208. 
884 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 167. 
885 ESCR GC 14 para 33. 
886 In vitro fertilization para 336. 
887 ESCR GC 14 para 34.  
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In its dimension of protect, the Court has recognized that states are responsible for 
regulating and supervising the provision of services, and the implementation of 
national programs regarding the performance of public quality health care 
services.888 This resembles the duty to protect the right to health established by the 
ESCR Committee, according to which states have a duty to ‘adopt legislation or to 
take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and health related 
services provided by third parties.’889  
 
In its dimension of fulfil, the Inter-American Court has recognized several positive 
duties for states in protecting health.890 For example, it has ordered states to include 
appropriate measures for the establishment of full medical and psychological 
services for children deprived of liberty,891 the immediate and regular provision of 
medical care, including appropriate medicine and adequate treatment to all members 
of an indigenous community, especially the elderly, the children and pregnant 
women,892 to safeguard the health and welfare of prisoners,893 to provide periodic 
vaccination and deparasitation campaigns,894 and to provide information about health 
rights, and the procedures and institutions, to demand the fulfilment of such rights.895  
 
                                                             
888 Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits) para 99. 
889 ESCR GC 14 para 35. 
890 ESCR GC 14  para 36. 
891 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay (Merits)  para 317.  
892 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 221; Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 301.  
893 Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Merits) para 135. 
894 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 301 (b). 
895 Furlán (Merits) para 295. 
265 
 
The indirect protection of particular elements of the right to health through 
mechanisms of indirect justiciability shows the potential that this strategy may have 
in the progressive realization of the right to health in the Inter-American system. 
However, as the right to health remains non-justiciable there are certain problems 
that not even a wide interpretation of the rights contained in the American 
Convention can solve. Such difficulties will be developed in the next section.  
 
2.2.2.2 Limitation of the ‘indirect model’ of justiciability in the 
protection of the right to health  
 
As Tara Melish has argued, the indirect model of justiciability, which allows the 
protection of economic, social and cultural rights (framed in chapter III of the 
American Convention) through civil and political rights (framed in chapter II), bring 
with it risks of ‘underbreadth’ and ‘dilution’.896 
 
In the context of the right to health, the problem of ‘underbreadth’ refers to the fact 
that violations of the right to health are not adequately protected by referring to civil 
and political rights. In Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, for example, the facts of the 
case clearly indicate that there was a systemic violation of children’s rights in 
Guatemala, characterized by the lack of social, educative and health services, which 
created a cycle of exclusion of and criminalization against these children. Analysing 
the case from a right to life perspective led the Court to focus on the death of the 
children, but such analysis did not favour the visibility of the right to health aspects of 
                                                             
896 Tara Melish, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Beyond Progressivity’, in Malcom 
Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (Cambridge, 2009) p. 406. 
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the case. Although there is the reference to ‘dignified life,’897 the Court does not 
elaborate on the specific elements of the right to health. In fact, the only references 
that the Court makes to ‘health problems’ are related to the mothers of the children 
and the suffering that they experienced after learning about their children’s deaths.898 
In this case, the Court did not address the systemic violations of the right to health 
and education, experienced by the children, who lived on the street and in extremely 
poor conditions. As a consequence, in this case, no specific measures, either 
individual or general, were awarded to redress the violations of the right to health. 
 
Similarly, Velez Loor v. Panama, discussed previously, shows how the focus on the 
justiciability of civil and political rights may lead to an inadequate protection of the 
right to health, and therefore to inappropriate redress. In this case, the duty to 
provide health care was indirectly recognized through the analysis of the right to 
personal integrity (Article 5 ACHR). As a consequence, the award of reparation 
measures only indirectly redresses the harm caused, in terms of lack of health care. 
As for individual measures of redress, the Court ordered the state to cover the 
expenses of the specialized medical and psychological treatment in the place where 
the victim resided.899  
 
However, when it came to GNR, the analysis of the case from a ‘rights of migrants’ 
perspective, led the Court to focus all the measures on preventing migrants from 
being detained in prison centres, but it did not grant general measures in order to 
protect the right to health of migrants once they were so detained.900 As outlined in 
                                                             
897 Villagrán Morales et al (Merits) para 146.  
898 idem paras 65 (a) and 172. 
899 Velez Loor v. Panama (Merits) para 263. 
900 The Court ordered the state to adopt the measures necessary to provide facilities with 
sufficient capacity to accommodate persons for immigration purposes; to secure that the 
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section 2.2.1.3, above,901 the Court did not award any GNR that directly tackle the 
problems of lack of access to potable water, and the provision of adequate health 
conditions in detention centres were the victims were held. According to the Court, 
‘[g]iven that this case refers to migrants and that it has been established that they 
cannot be held in such places, […] it is not pertinent to order a measure such as the 
one requested.’902 As a consequence, the Court limited itself to reminding the state 
that it ‘is especially obliged to guarantee the rights of persons deprived of liberty and, 
in particular, ensure an adequate supply of water at La Joya-La Joyita Prison and 
that the conditions of imprisonment there as well as in La Palma Prison conform to 
international standards.’903 The strict focus of the Court on the rights of migrants 
blinded the Court to granting measures that adequately redress their right to health. 
Although in other cases related to the health condition of imprisoned people, the 
Court has taken a more proactive role in the protection of the health aspects of the 
case,904 the risk of ‘underbreadth’ is still present, in as much as the adequate 
protection of health still relies on the elaborate reasoning of the Court.  
 
A second risk with this model of justiciability is the ‘dilution’ of the right to health in 
the broad categories of life, human dignity and access to judicial protection. As 
Melish has pointed out, the right to health includes several dimensions that cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                              
conditions of imprisonment in La Palma Public Prison conform to international standards on 
the matter; to implement training programs on the prohibition of torture; and to adopt all 
necessary measures to ensure that the process of application of its provisions, relating to 
immigration, conforms to the American Convention.  
901 See, pp. 245. 
902 Velez Loor v. Panama (Merits) para 276. 
903 idem para 276.  
904 Díaz Peña v. Venezuela (Merits) 
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be addressed under the generic concept of ‘right to life.’905 Specific elements of the 
provision of medical care, such as quality, availability and affordability, are not 
necessarily covered by this concept.906 For example, in Yakie Axa v. Paraguay, the 
Inter-American Court links health to the right to a dignified life, in order to state that 
the ‘special detriment to the right to health, […] [has] a major impact on the right to a 
decent existence and basic conditions to exercise other human rights.’907 In the 
decision, the Court found proven that there was a ‘lack of access to health care for 
the members of the Community for physical and economic reasons.’908 According to 
the facts of the case, the closest hospital was 70 kilometres away and the regional 
hospital was 200 kilometres away.909 Although the Court recognized that there was a 
violation of the elements of physical and economic accessibility, the Court did not 
actually develop such elements in its decision. The Court did not develop either the 
elements of acceptability and quality, beyond the reference to the CESCR General 
Comment 14, according to which ‘indigenous people have the right to specific 
measures to improve their access to health services and care.’910  In a model of 
direct justiciability the Court could have more easily awarded detailed measures to 
directly tackle specific components of the right to health, instead of sticking to 
ordering generic measures that require providing ‘regular medical care and 
appropriate medicine.’911 
 
                                                             
905 Melish The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Beyond Progressivity 406 (see footnote 
226). 
906 idem. 
907 Yakye Axa (Merits) para 167. 
908 idem para 165. 
909 idem para 50.98. 
910 ESCR GC 14 para 27. 
911Yakye Axa para 221. 
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A final risk of the indirect approach is limiting the analysis of right to health cases to 
the violation of more ‘serious’ human rights violations, such as disappearances, 
arbitrary killings, torture and inhuman treatment. In its first cases on health related 
issues, the Court did not address any case in which the right to health was the main 
or only violation. In most of its jurisprudence the Court considered cases where the 
victim(s) had been seriously ill-treated or were killed. Most recently, in Suárez 
Peralta v Ecuador and Artavia Murillo v. Chile, the Court was involved in cases 
where the victims had not experienced any ‘serious’ ill-treatment or torture and did 
not die. 
 
Recognizing that the Court has made important progress in the protection of health 
within a framework of indirect justiciability, a more direct approach to the analysis of 
health issues would contribute to a more adequate protection of the rights of victims. 
For example, in the Ecuadorian cases related to medical malpractice, such as Alban 
Cornejo and Suárez Peralta, the Inter-American Court has usually found violations to 
the rights to life, personal integrity, and to the duty to provide due diligence. As a 
consequence, it has ordered mainly the training of health providers, and the 
dissemination of information about the rights of patients.912 A more direct analysis of 
these cases in terms of the right to health would have allowed the Court to provide 
direct protection to the victims by recognizing a violation of the duty of states to 
protect the right to health, instead of creating artificial links with other rights. This 
would have also allowed more adequate reparation measures that directly tackle the 
harm caused to the right to health of victims. For example, direct justiciability would 
have allowed the Court to examine the request for the modification of the legislation, 
applicable to medical malpractice, in a more open way, understanding that states 
                                                             
912 Albán-Cornejo et al v. Ecuador (Merits) para 157; Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Merits) para 
207. 
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have a duty to protect people in those cases where private operators provide health 
services, by establishing appropriate legislative frameworks.913  
 
Moreover, in the cases of indigenous communities where health related issues were 
analyzed, such as in Yakie Axa v. Paraguay and Xamok Kasek v. Paraguay, a direct 
approach to the justiciability of the right to health would have allowed the Court to 
provide clearer protection by recognizing states have a duty to fulfill the right to 
health. This means, to provide a service that is physically and economically 
accessible and that is acceptable and of a good quality.  
 
As explained in section 2.2.1 of this chapter,914 some authors have argued that 
article 26 of the American Convention can be interpreted to provide direct 
justiciability to economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health.915 By 
                                                             
913 For a similar argument, see Separate opinion of judge Sergio Garcia-Ramirez regarding 
the judgment rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Alban-
Cornejo et al (Ecuador) (22 November 2007). 
914 See, p. 230. 
915 Melish Rethinking; Julietta Rossi & Victor Abramovich ‘La Tutela de los Derechos 
Económicos, Sociales y Culturales en el Artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre 
Derechos Humanos’ (2009) 9 Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 34; Oscar Parra-Vera, 
Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales and el Sistema 
Interamericano (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, México, 2011) available at 
http://200.33.14.34:1033/archivos/pdfs/DH_89.pdf , pp. 11-34; Christian Courtis, ‘La 
Protección de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales a través del Artículo 26 de la 
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos’, in Christian Courtis et al (eds), 
Protección Internacional de Derechos Humanos, Nuevos Desafíos (México, Porrúa-ITAM, 
2005) [pp.1-66]. 
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explicitly protecting the right to health, the Court would find it easier to award 
corresponding and effective reparation measures, including GNR. 
 
In his concurring opinion in the case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Judge Eduardo 
Ferrer Mac-Gregor explained how the Inter-American system should approach its 
jurisprudence, explicitly from a right to health perspective, instead of referring to 
other rights or concepts, such as the right to life or a ‘dignified life’. In order to 
support the direct justiciability of the right to health, he developed three arguments: 
first, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, are 
interdependent and indivisible with civil and political rights. This means there is a 
reciprocal dependence between rights and that any separation, categorization or 
hierarchy among rights should be denied.916 Second, there is no article in the 
Protocol of San Salvador that reduces or limits the scope of the American 
Convention. On the contrary, the Protocol of San Salvador can give interpretative 
guidance about the scope of the right to health, contained in Article 26 of the 
American Convention.917 Third, Article 26 should be interpreted in accordance with 
an evolutive interpretation that recognizes the advances in both international human 
rights law and constitutional law.918 This means recognizing that constitutional norms 
and the decisions of superior national courts should be taken into account in order to 
provide full content to article 26. In conclusion, according to Ferrer Mac-Gregor, the 
full recognition of Article 26, interpreted in the light of other international instruments 
and constitutional norms, should lead to the protection of the right to health as a 
social right in the Inter-American system.  
 
                                                             
916 Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (Merits) (Concurring Opinion Mac-Gregor) para 24 
917 idem para 47. 
918 idem para 97. 
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2.2.2.3 The protection of health related issues through 
rehabilitation measures and its limitations 
 
The Inter-American Court has awarded measures related to the protection of health 
as both rehabilitation and GNR. As for rehabilitation measures, the Inter-American 
Court has usually ordered health care and psychosocial treatment to victims of 
serious human rights violations (disappearances, arbitrary killings, torture and 
inhuman treatment).919 Such measures usually include the provision of medicines 
and health care, not just for the direct victims of the case, but also for the next of kin.  
 
Although these reparation measures are indirectly linked with the protection of the 
right to health,920 they do not make the right to health directly enforceable. In all of 
these cases, the Court held civil and political rights had been violated, while the 
protection of health arose as a result of the redress of these rights. In spite of the 
                                                             
919 For a full presentation of rehabilitation measures in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, see Clara Sandoval, Rehabilitation as a form of reparation under international law 
(Redress, 2009) pp.47-  available at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/The%20right%20to%20rehabilitation.pdf   
920 Ruiz-Chiriboga has called this the “reparation approach” to the enforceability of ESCR. 
According to this author, this approach ‘understands ESCR as enforceable through the 
implementation of reparations measures ordered by the Court in contentious cases’. Osvaldo 
Ruiz-Chiriboga, ‘The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two 
Intertwined treaties. Non enforceability of economic, social and cultural rights in the Inter-
American System’ (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 159 [footnote 9]. For 
other authors who have also referred to this approach, see: Monica Feria-Tinta, ‘Justiciability 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human 
Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 431, 
p.456-458. 
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relevance that this approach may have in the protection of the right to health, it 
cannot be the ideal model of protection. An approach like this masks the relevance 
of the right to health and makes it subsidiary to the protection of civil and political 
rights. Someone may argue this is just a formalistic problem about how to title the 
request of a specific remedy. However, the fact that the Court is blind to the 
protection of health issues may force the Court to use more artificial arguments to 
protect this right which may not be helpful for the protection of this right and in the 
long term do not tackle the main problem that originate the violation.  
 
For example, in the case Sebastián Furlán v. Argentina, finding a violation to the 
‘right to health’ instead of a violation to his ‘quality of life’ would have allowed the 
Court to justify in a clearer way the measures ordered. The Court could have referred 
to the duties of states to provided adequate access to health care to people with 
disabilities in order to mandate the provision of medical, psychological and 
psychiatric treatment to the victim, instead of referring to the broader term of ‘quality 
of life’. It could have also referred to the duty of states to guarantee the right to 
everyone to seek, receive and impart health-related information in order to oblige the 
state to provide the maximum amount of information in its case law, instead of 
referring to the interesting but less known duty of ‘active transparency’. In the long 
term, emphasising the case as a case of a violation to the right to health would have 
allowed the creation of more effective measures to the protection of the rights 
contained in the Argentinian legislation.  
2.2.2.4 The protection of health related issues through GNR and its 
limitations  
 
Since the justiciability of the right to health in the Inter-American system is still 
uncertain, the Court has granted extensive GNR in order to protect some dimensions 
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of health. This approach is also problematic. One particular problem of this approach 
is the absence of an adequate causal link between the violations declared and the 
measures awarded by the Court. This was particularly clear in Artavia Murillo and 
others v. Costa Rica, where the GNR awarded by the Court went beyond the 
violations declared.  
 
In this case, the Inter-American Court found that the total ban of IVF treatment in the 
Costa Rican legal system, represented a violation of the rights to private life, 
intimacy, reproductive autonomy, access to reproductive health services, and to 
found a family for those persons whose only possible treatment for infertility is IVF. In 
order to redress the violation the Court ordered the state to:  
 
‘1) take the appropriate measures to ensure that the prohibition of the practice of 
IVF is annulled’; 2) ‘regulate those aspects it considers necessary for the 
implementation of IVF, taking into account the principles established in this 
judgment’; and 3) ‘the Costa Rica Social Security Institute must make IVF 
available within its health care infertility treatment and programs, in accordance 
with the obligation to respect and guarantee the principle of non-discrimination. 
The State must provide information every six months on the measures adopted 
in order to make these services available gradually to those who require them 
and on the plans that it draws up to this end.’921 
 
As established by the Court, the violation by the state consisted of prohibiting a 
medical treatment which, according to the Court, should be allowed. Applying the 
traditional respect/protect/fulfill framework for the analysis of ESCR, this violation can 
be understood as an infringement of the duty to respect the rights established in the 
                                                             
921 In vitro fertilization (Merits) paras 336-338. 
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Convention.922 The measure awarded by the Court, in ordering the state to remove 
the prohibition (order 1), keeps a natural causal connection with the violation, since it 
focuses on the restitution of a freedom that was previously restricted.  
In contrast, the last order, (order 3), granted in this case is controversial since there 
is no clarity as to whether there is a causal link between the violations found by the 
Court and the measures awarded. The order to make IVF available within its health 
care infertility treatment and programs (order 3) is oriented towards protecting the 
duty to fulfill the right to health. However, there was not debate in the case whether 
the state had the appropriate resources to make IVF available within its health care 
infertility treatment. This may have implied the duty of the state to, for example, 
progressively realize the duty to provide IVF treatment to couples within the country. 
Such a duty, although plausible, was never analyzed in the decision. Nevertheless, 
the Court ordered the state to make the treatment available. As a consequence, 
such a measure goes beyond the violations declared by the Court due to lack of 
connection with the decision. The next table presents the link between the 
dimensions of the right of access to sexual and reproductive health services, and the 
reparations awarded: 
An adequate GNR to redress the barriers found by the Court in the access to IVF 
treatment should have focused on preventing the repetition of the facts by tackling 
the root causes of the violation but, at the same time, maintaining a causal link with 
the violations declared by the Court. For example, assuming that the ban was a 
result of the lack of awareness of the judicial power on sexual and reproductive 
health, the Court could have focused, as it did it in other sections of the judgment, in 
the awarding of educational measures, such as courses on human rights, 
                                                             
922 According to the ESCR Committee the obligation to respect entitles the obligation to 
‘abstaining from imposing discriminatory practices relating to women’s health status and 
needs’. CESCR GC 14 para 34.  
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reproductive rights and non-discrimination, addressed to judicial employees and 
members of the judiciary.923 However, making IVF available within its health care 
fertility program is a measure that, although enhancing the sexual and reproductive 
health of couples in Costa Rica, was not discussed by the Court and, therefore, 
should not be awarded.   
Table No. 5 
 
Causal links between the violations found by the Court and the reparations awarded - Case of 
Artavia Murillo et al. (in vitro fertilization) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
 
Dimensions of the right 
to access to sexual and 
reproductive health 
services 
 
The violation was 
discussed and 
declared by the 
Court 
Individual 
reparation 
measures 
awarded 
Possible 
guarantees 
of non-
repetition 
Existence of a 
causal link 
Duty to respect 
Facts: The state 
restricted in a 
disproportionate way 
access to medical 
treatment. 
The Court 
discussed this 
violation and found 
these facts violated 
articles 5(1), 7 11 
(2) and 17(2) of the 
ACHR.  
 
Annulment of the 
restriction. 
Educational 
measures 
addressed to 
the judiciary. 
Yes, reparation 
measures have 
a causal link 
with the 
violation. 
Duty to protect 
Potential facts: Lack of 
regulation in the provision 
of a service or treatment. 
 
Neither discussed 
nor found violation.  
Reparation 
measures 
ordered an 
adequate 
regulation in the 
provision of a 
service. 
 
 Reparation 
measures do 
NOT have a 
causal link with 
the violation. 
Duty to fulfill 
Potential facts: The state 
does not provide a 
service or treatment that 
is necessary for the 
realization of the right to 
health. 
Neither discussed 
nor found violation.  
Reparation 
measures 
ordered the states 
to make the 
services gradually 
available. 
 
 Reparation 
measures do 
NOT have a 
causal link with 
the violation. 
 
2.2.2.5  Conclusion 
 
The Inter-American Court has protected health related issues through the wide 
interpretation of the right to life and personal integrity in what has been called the 
‘indirect model of justiciability’. This model has allowed the protection of health in 
                                                             
923 idem para 267. 
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cases related to children, indigenous people, detained people, medical malpractice, 
and reproductive health. It has also allowed the Court to order states to undertake 
similar measures to the ones required by the right to health, in terms of: the provision 
of health services (duty to fulfil), the protection of people from the action of third 
parties (duty to protect), and the stopping of undue interferences to the access of 
health services (duty to respect).  
However, the indirect model of justiciability is still insufficient in terms of the full and 
adequate protection of the right to health. Problems of ‘underbreadth,’ in which the 
right to health is not visible in the analysis of the Court, or ‘dilution,’ in which the 
different components of the right to health are not adequately addressed by generic 
terms such as ‘dignified life’ or ‘personal integrity,’ are the most common. The 
indirect model of justiciability is also problematic in terms of the awarding of 
remedies. In some cases, it has allowed the awarding of remedies that are beyond 
the violations found by the Court.   
Whereas some authors and judges of the Inter-American Court have proposed a 
direct model of justiciability by referring to article 26 ACHR, this is still a minority 
view. However, the openness of the Inter-American Court, in its recent case law, to 
the analysis of health is a step towards the progressive recognition of a directly 
justiciable right to health in the Inter-American system.   
 
2.3 General measures in the redress of health related issues: an analysis of 
the jurisprudence of the European System on Human Rights  
 
2.3.1  The European Social Charter and the limited scope for the award of 
general measures and GNR 
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In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, which establishes the 
protection of mainly civil and political rights, the European system of human rights 
establishes a European Social Charter for the protection of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The Social Charter explicitly incorporates a ‘right to protection of 
health’ in Article 11, according to which:  
‘the Parties undertake, either directly or in cooperation with public or 
private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia: 
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; 2. to provide 
advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the 
encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health; 3. to 
prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as well 
as accidents’. 
Other rights in the Social Charter also concern the right to health: Article 3 
establishes ‘the right to safe and healthy working conditions’; Article 7 establishes the 
duty to provide ‘special protection against physical and moral dangers to which 
children and young persons are exposed’; Article 8 ensures ‘the effective exercise of 
the right of employed women to the protection of maternity’; Article 17 provides ‘the 
right of children and young persons to grow up in an environment which encourages 
the full development of their personality and of their physical and mental capacities’; 
and Article 23 introduces ‘the right of elderly persons to social protection’.  
The European Committee of Social Rights is the institution in charge of monitoring 
whether or not states are in conformity, in law and in practice, with the provision of 
the European Social Charter. From the beginning, a system of states’ periodic 
reporting was established in order to oversee compliance with the Charter. In 1995, 
an Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter was introduced, allowing trade 
unions, employers’ organisation and NGOs to bring collective complaints before the 
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European Committee.924 In the analysis of collective complaints, the Committee 
considers the merits of the complaint and decides whether or not the respondent 
state has complied with the ‘satisfactory application of the provisions’ of the 
Charter.925 The conclusion is not binding as the Committee has to transmit the case 
to the Committee of Ministers, which decides the final disposal of the case.926  
Regarding the award of reparations, nothing in the European Social Charter, nor in its 
Additional Protocol, establishes whether the European Committee is entitled to award 
or suggest compensation in cases of non-compliance with the Charter. According to 
Churchill and Khalia, the European Committee is not entitled to do so, as that request 
is not in accordance with the nature and purpose of the Protocol.927 In the case of 
Confédération Française de l’Encadrement (CFE-CGC) v. France, the complainant 
trade union asked the Committee to order the state to pay the sum of EUR 9,000 as 
compensation for the expenses incurred in preparing the complaint. The European 
Committee considered that the sum was excessive and transferred the matter to the 
Committee of Ministers, inviting it to recommend the payment of 2,000 EUR. The 
Committee of Ministers rejected the proposal.928 In spite of the relevance of this 
mechanism for the protection of the right to health, it appears that the Charter and the 
                                                             
924 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints(1995) article 1. 
925 idem article 8 (1). 
926 Robin Churchill and Khaliq Urfan, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European 
social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social 
Rights’ (2004) 15 EJIL 417, p.437.  
927 idem p.437. 
928 Committee of Ministers, Resolution ResChS (2005)7, Collective complaint No. 16/2003 ( 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 4 May 2005 at the 925th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies) available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=856675&Site=CM  (consulted 27 
August 2015) 
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Committee have limited potential in terms of the awarding of any reparation 
measures, including general measures or GNR. 
Once a case is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, it may issue, by a majority 
of two-thirds, a recommendation to the respondent state to secure compliance with 
the decision.929 Because these recommendations or resolutions are not legally 
binding,930 the use of these mechanisms for the award of general measures or GNR 
for the protection of right to health is very limited. Thus, this research will focus on the 
mechanisms established under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
2.3.2 The European Court of Human Rights: the application of general 
measures in the redress of health related violations 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights focuses on the protection of civil and 
political rights. The inclusion of the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, and the right 
to education, in Articles 1 and 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter Protocol No. 1) 
are exceptions.931 The European Social Charter, adopted in 1961, was intended to fill 
this gap by establishing a list of economic, social and cultural rights to be 
protected.932 The difference between these two instruments is marked. Whereas the 
European Convention on Human Rights allows any person claiming to be victim of a 
                                                             
929 Additional Protocol to the European Social charter providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints, Strasbourg, 1995, article 9 (1). 
930 Churchill & Urfan The Collective Complaints System 339 
931 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11(1952) 
932 European Social Charter (1961) article 21. 
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violation to bring individual applications before the European Court of Human 
Rights,933 the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter only in 1995 
established a collective complaints procedure.934  
In spite of the lack of visibility of economic, social and cultural rights in the European 
Convention, the Court has protected certain economic, social and cultural rights 
indirectly, through the application of civil and political rights, in what can be called an 
‘integrated approach.’935 By using this approach, the Court has protected the right to 
health through the protection of Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibition of torture). The 
European Court of Human Rights has developed an extensive jurisprudence, finding 
that insufficient medical care in prisons,936 the existence of inadequate conditions of 
detention,937 the lack of appropriate medical treatment of persons deprived of 
liberty,938 or the failure to provide psychiatric treatment for those detainees in need of 
                                                             
933 European Convention on Human Rights, article 34.  
934 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a 
System of Collective Complaints (adopted 9 November 1995) ETS 158 
935 Referring to this approach, see Nifosi-Sutton The Power of the European Court 60. For a 
similar perspective, see Ellie Palmer, ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the 
European Convention on Human rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2009) 2 Erasmus Law Review 397. 
936 Istratii and Others v Moldova App. nos. 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05 (ECtHR, 27 March 
2007); Gorodnichev v Russia  App. no. 52058/99 (ECtHR, 24 May 2007); Mechenkov v 
Russia, App. no. 35421/05 (ECtHR, 7 February 2008).  
937 Dougoz v Greece, App. no. 4907/98 (ECtHR, 6 March 2001); Kalashnikov v Russia App. 
no. 47095/99 (ECtHR, 15 July 2002); Poltoratskiy v Ukraine, App. no. 38812/97 (ECtHR, 29 
April 2003); Mayzit v Russia, App. no. 63378/00 (ECtHR, 20 January 2005); Novoselov v 
Russia, App. no. 66460/01 (ECtHR, 2 June 2005). 
938 Popov v Russia, App. no. 26853/04 (ECtHR, 13 July 2006); Aleksanyan v Russia App. no. 
46468/06 (ECtHR, 22 December 2008). 
282 
 
psychiatric care,939 can amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and are 
contrary to Article 3. In other cases, the Court has also referred to Article 6 of the 
ECHR in order to protect health related issues. In Taşkin and Others v. Turkey, the 
Court established that the lack of compliance with a judgement that annulled the 
Ministry of the Environment’s decision to issue a permit for a gold mine, which 
caused health and environmental problems for people, was a violation of the right to 
fair trial (Article 6 ECHR).940   
However, as discussed in chapter II, Section 3.1.1,941 most of the reparation 
measures awarded by the European Court in these cases refer to ‘just satisfaction’, 
and sometimes compensation, but do not normally award any general measure. 
Exceptionally, in some pilot judgements the Court has awarded more extensive 
measures of redress. The next section will consider the award of these remedies.     
 
2.3.2.1 Pilot judgments and the award of general measures in the redress of 
health related issues  
 
Chapter II analysed how the European Court of Human Rights has applied a more 
extensive approach in the award of reparations, mainly through pilot judgments. 
Although the first pilot judgments focused on violations of the right to property, other 
pilot decisions have indirectly given important protection to ESCR through an 
‘integrated approach’. In this way, the Court has awarded general measures in some 
                                                             
939 Riviere v France, App. no. 33834/03 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006); Kucheruk v Ukraine, App. no. 
2570/04 (ECtHR, 6 September 2007). 
940 Taşkin and Others v. Turkey Application, App. no. 46117/99 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004) 
para 138. 
941 See, pp. 94. 
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health related cases, basically through the justiciability of Article 6 on the right to a 
fair trial, and Article 3 on the prohibition of torture. 
 
2.3.2.1.1 Awarding general measures in health related cases through 
Article 6 on the right to a fair trial   
 
The Court allowed the protection of health related issues through Article 6, on the 
right to a fair trial, in Burdov v. Russia, which related to the prolonged failure of the 
state to enforce several domestic judgments awarding social benefits. In this case, 
the applicant was with the military authorities which took part in emergency 
operations after the nuclear plant disaster in Chernobyl. The applicant suffered from 
poor health after his involvement in the events.942 As a result of the exposure to 
radioactive emissions, the applicant was entitled to several social benefits. In order 
to access such benefits, the applicant sued the state authorities several times, and 
domestic Courts ordered the payment of benefits in several instances. The 
judgments, however, remained unenforced for long periods of time. The Court found 
that the delay in the execution of the judgments, which ordered the payment of 
certain benefits to the applicant, represented a violation of the right to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time (Article 6 (1) of the ECHR), in conjunction 
with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions (Article 1 Protocol No. 1). 
The Court ordered the payment of 3,000 Euros for non-pecuniary damages, to be 
paid within three months from the date the judgment became final.943 
In spite of the decision in Burdov v. Russia (2002), the case had not been complied 
with by 2009. In 2009, the Court decided Burdov v Russia (No. 2), on the same case. 
                                                             
942 Case of Burdov v. Russia (ECtHR, 7 May 2002) para 8. 
943 idem operative paragraph, para 4. 
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The Court noticed that the problem of non-enforcement, or delayed enforcement of 
judgments, in Russia, was not exclusive to this case but was actually a recurring 
problem. More than 200 judgments had not been complied with since the first case, 
affecting not just the victims in Chernobyl but also other vulnerable groups.944 Since 
none of the remedies exercised by the applicant were effective in providing adequate 
and sufficient redress to the applicant, the Court found there was a violation of the 
right to an effective remedy (Article 13). As a consequence, the Court ordered the 
state to take general measures consistent with setting up, within six months, ‘an 
effective domestic remedy or combination of such remedies which secures adequate 
and sufficient redress for non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic 
judgments.’945  
In terms of the provision of health care, the Court could have awarded more precise 
measures, such as the provision of health services to the victim. However, as the 
case is related to the protection of Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial) and the 
European Convention does not provide direct protection of the right to health, such 
measures were, understandably, not considered by the Court. The lack of 
justiciability of the right to health under the European Convention is one of the 
factors that prevents the award of general measures for the protection of this right.  
Regarding the follow-up of the decision, and in spite of the short period provided by 
the Court for its implementation (six months), Russia managed to adopt a reform 
introducing a remedy for the non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions. This 
                                                             
944 Case of Burdov v. Russia (No 2), App. no. 33509/04 (ECtHR, 15 January 2009) para 133. 
945 idem operative paragraph, para 6.  
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has been considered a successful case of cooperation between Russia and the 
Court.946  
 
2.3.2.1.2 Awarding general measures in health related cases through 
the application of Article 3 on the prohibition of torture  
 
The Court has also indirectly applied general measures in health related issues, 
through an expansive interpretation of Article 3 on the prohibition of torture, in cases 
related to detained people in overcrowded prisons. As demonstrated by Nifosi-
Sutton, between 2002 and 2009 the Court did not order specific, non-monetary 
reparations, concerning the consequences on the health of prisoners and detainees 
imprisoned in overcrowded conditions.947 The Court limited itself to providing 
declaratory relief, together with pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. However, 
this trend was first modified by the Court in 2010, with the semi-pilot decision of 
Orchowski v. Poland (2010), and then with the pilot judgements Ananyev and others 
v. Russia (2012) and Torreggiani and others v. Italy (2013).  
In Ananyev and others v. Russia and Torreggiani and others v. Italy, the applicants 
alleged they were held in overcrowded cells with less than four square meters per 
person948 and with inadequate sanitary conditions.949 In both cases, the Court found 
                                                             
946 Maria Issaeva, Irina Segeeva and Maria Suchkova, ‘Enforcement of the Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Russia: Recent Developments and Current Challenges’ 
(2011) 15 SUR 67, p.77. 
947 Nifosi-Sutton The Power of the European Court of Human Rights 66. 
948 In the Anayev Case it was reported that one of the applicants was held in a prison cell of 
less than two square metres, while Mr. Ananyev had less than one square metre. (Ananyev 
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that the lack of personal space, together with the inappropriate sanitary conditions, 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.950 It also held that states must ensure that detention conditions respect 
human dignity, that detainees are not subject to excessive distress or hardship, and 
that prisoners’ ‘health and well-being are adequately secured.’951 The Court also 
found that these problems were not exclusive to certain prisons but were actually 
part of a structural and systemic dysfunction in the prison system, characterized by 
the lack of personal space in cells, a deficient number of sleeping places, limited 
access to natural light and fresh air, and inadequate sanitary facilities.952 As a result, 
in both cases, the Court ordered the state to establish, within a specific time 
framework, an effective domestic remedy, or a combination of effective remedies, 
capable of affording sufficient redress in these cases.  
The Court also discussed some general measures for the protection of health related 
issues of prisoners, in the semi-pilot cases Orchowski v. Poland (2009), Mandic and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and others v. Russia, App. nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012) para 
162). 
949 In the Ananyev and others Case, the Court also found that, for most of the time, the 
applicants remained inside the cell and had just one-hour for outside exercise. Regarding the 
sanitary conditions of the prisons, the dining table and the lavatory pan were located, 
sometimes, less than one and a half metres, distance from each other (Ananyev paras 165-
166).  
950 In the Ananyev and others v. Russia Case the Court also stated that the lack of an 
effective domestic remedy that prevent the alleged violation and its continuation, and also 
provided the applicants with adequate redress was a violation of article 13 of the Convention. 
Ananyev para 117. 
951 Ananyev para 141. 
952 Ananyev paras 185 and 187, Torregiani and others v. Italy case, App. no. 43517/09 
(ECtHR, 8 January 2013) para 96. 
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Jovic v. Slovenia (2012), and Iacov Stanciu v. Romania (2012). In these cases, the 
Court considered the applications of several detainees who were imprisoned in 
overcrowded facilities, with less than four square metres of living space per person, 
which is the minimum standard established by the Court for living conditions in 
prisons. In all cases, the applicants also alleged inadequate sanitary and detention 
conditions which had a negative effect on their health. According to the Court, these 
situations attained the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited in 
Article 3. The Court applied Article 46 in all cases and, at least in the cases against 
Poland and Romania, the Court indicated that the cases were not isolated but were 
part of a structural problem.953 However, unlike the decisions issued against Russia 
and Italy, the Court did not order the state to take specific general measures in the 
operative paragraphs of the decisions, but limited itself to awarding just satisfaction 
in the form of compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, as well as 
costs and expenses. Although in all cases the Court recommended that the state, in 
order to comply with the Convention, set up adequate and effective domestic 
remedies for the resolution of complaints,954 none of these recommendations were 
actually incorporated into the operative paragraphs of the decision.955   
This recent jurisprudential trend of the Court challenges the thesis of Nifossi-Sutton, 
according to which the innovative remedial powers of the Court have focused on 
cases of the right to property and the right to liberty and security, but without 
                                                             
953 Orchowski v. Poland, App. no. 17885/04 (ECtHR, 22 October 2009) para 147; and Iacov 
Stanciu v. Romania, App. no. 35972/05 (ECtHR, 24 July 2012) para 195. In the case of 
Mandić and Jović  v. Slovenia, App. no. 5774/10 and 5985/10, (ECtHR, 20 October 2011) the 
Court explicitly stated that it could not conclude that there exists a ‘structural problem’ (para 
127).  
954 Orchowski para 154; Mandić and Jović para 128 and Iacov Stanciu para 197.  
955 This aspect of the decisions will be commented upon the next section of this chapter.   
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considering the health care of prisoners. On the contrary, the decisions in Ananyev 
and others v. Russia, Torreggiani and others v. Italy, Orchowski v. Poland, Mandic 
and Jovic v. Slovenia, and Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, shows that the Court has, in 
the last years, increasingly engaged in the health care of prisoners by linking health 
related violations with article 3.  
In spite of the importance of this jurisprudential approach, the Court has kept a very 
conservative view on remedies. For example, the Court could have included other, 
more innovative, individual, and non-monetary remedies, such as ordering the 
provision of more personal space in cells, increasing the number of sleeping places, 
improvements in natural and fresh air, adequate sanitary facilities, and the 
enactment of specific standards for the treatment of prisoners. In terms of the 
protection of the health care of prisoners, and following Nifossi’s suggestions, the 
Court could have also ordered, on the basis of article 3, regular and adequate 
provision of medical treatment to detainees, the transfer of detainees to civil 
hospitals with better equipment, and the transfer of prisoners in critical condition to 
individual cells.956 Moreover, most of these cases were not isolated but were part of 
a structural situation of precarious conditions in detention centres, requiring more 
extensive GNR, beyond the mere recommendation of the provision of adequate and 
effective domestic remedies. As Nifossi has proposed, the Court could have also 
awarded: 
1. ‘Adoption of a plan of action with a timetable putting forward 
temporary and permanent solutions to overcrowding and lack of 
sanitation in pre-trial detention facilities and prisons; 
2. Creation of mechanisms for the effective implementation of 
regulations and legislation detailing medical care for prisoners and 
                                                             
956 Nifosi-Sutton The Power of the European Court of Human Rights 71. 
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detainees with serious and life-threatening medical conditions and 
mandating separation of juveniles from adult inmates; 
3. National strategy to address lack of medicines, medical assistance, 
and mismanagement of medical care in prisons and pre-trial 
detention centres; 
4. Regular inspections to verify that adequate medical care is provided 
to persons deprived of their liberty; 
5. Human rights training for medical officers of detention facilities; and  
6. Human rights training for detention facilities staff.’957     
These measures are, however, improbable from the Courts’ perspective, not just 
because the Court may not adjudicate the right to health, but also because the Court 
has not developed the practice of awarding such ambitious general measures. 
Unlike the Inter-American and the African courts, which have been characterized by 
the awarding of very general and overreaching measures, the European Court has 
been extremely deferential to states, adopting a strict interpretation of its duty to 
provide ‘just satisfaction.’958  
 
2.3.3 Difficulties in the granting of general measures in the jurisprudence on 
health related issues of the European Court of Human Rights  
 
In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, there are also certain 
challenges that need to be addressed with the application of ‘general measures’ in 
health related issues. Perhaps the biggest problem is the Court’s lack of consistency 
in the application of these remedial measures. In the cases discussed in the previous 
                                                             
957 idem 71-72. 
958 European Convention on Human Rights, article 41 (1). 
290 
 
section, relating to overcrowding and inadequate conditions in prisons in Poland,959 
Russia,960 Romania,961 and Italy,962 the strong remedial powers formulated by the 
Court were justified when taking into account that such situations represented a 
systemic problem in those countries. Also, the high number of pending applications 
relating to the same problem before the Court, confirms that the situations analysed 
were not isolated cases but part of a structural problem.963 However, in other cases 
where poor conditions of detention and overcrowding conditions have been 
documented as a generalized practice, the Court has not taken the same 
progressive remedial measures. In the cases of Greece, Ukraine, and other 
countries from Western Europe where, in recent years, high overcrowding conditions 
have been documented, and repetitive decisions have been issued by the Court, the 
Court has still not awarded general measures.964  
Another point that is not clear in the jurisprudence relates to the criteria of the Court 
when granting either pilot, or semi-pilot, decisions in cases of similar violations. 
Whereas in the cases Ananyev and others v. Russia and Torreggiani and others v. 
Italy, the Court granted pilot judgements ordering states to set up an effective 
domestic remedy that gives redress to victims of overcrowding, in cases against 
                                                             
959 Orchowski.  
960 Ananyev.  
961 Iacov Stanciu.  
962 Torregiani and others  
963 Orchowski paras 150 and 152; Ananyev paras 59-60; Iacov Stanciu para.196; Torregiani 
and others v. Italy case, App. 43517/09 (ECtHR, 8 January 2013) Press Release ECHR 007 
(2013) p.3. 
964 Marcelo F. Aebi and Natalia Delgrande, Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics: 
SPACE -2010, Survey 2010 (Strasbourg, 23 March 2012) available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDPC/CDPC%20documents/SPACE-
1_2010_English.pdf , p.51. 
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Poland, Slovenia and Romania, the Court applied article 46 and discussed some of 
the measures that should be adopted by the states in order to redress the situation, 
but without actually incorporating these into the operative paragraphs of the 
decision.965 The Court did not recognize the situation in Slovenia as a structural 
problem,966 but it expressly recognized that the situations in Poland and Romania 
were either a part of a ‘structural problem’967 or constituted a ‘recurrent problem’ 
which would potentially justify the application of general measures.968  
The lack of consistency in the application of general measures by the Court is not a 
problem exclusive to the application of measures in health related cases, but a 
general problem related to the application of expansive remedial powers by the 
Court. As discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, there is not a clear standard within 
the Court in applying this type of measure. Most of the time, the criteria corresponds 
to a political decision that does not necessarily take into account the best protection 
of rights, and is not consistent with the rest of the Court’s jurisprudence. In future, the 
Court will have to clarify in which circumstances these expansive remedial powers 
should be applied. 
According to PIL, it is arguable that GNR should be applicable at least in cases of 
systemic violations of human rights, gross violations of human rights, and cases of 
imminent repetition.969 If the Court applies the same standard, it would also be 
                                                             
965 In Iacov Stanciu para 97. The Court considers that in order to comply with the Convention 
‘an adequate and effective system of domestic remedies should be put in place’ in order to 
grant appropriate relief.  
966 Mandić and Jović para 127  
967 Orchowskv paras 147. 
968 Iacov para 195.  
969 UNGA, Sixth Committee (54th Session) ‘Summary of the Discussions’ (15 February 2001) 
A/CN.4/513, para. 57. 
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arguable that violations of a systemic character under article 3, should be redressed 
with general measures. Although this may imply an extension of the number of cases 
that are awarded with general measures, contrary to the exceptional character of this 
remedy, it would allow a more coherent and consistent application of the remedial 
powers of the Court.  
 
2.3.4 Conclusion on the award of general measures in the jurisprudence on 
health related issues of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
The analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court demonstrates the strengths 
and difficulties in the award of general measures in the protection of health related 
cases. The mechanisms established under the Convention, in particular the 
application of pilot judgments, allows the potential awarding of general measures to 
the protection of health related cases. However, as the protection of health is 
allowed only in an indirect way, the reparation measures do not adequately focus on 
the protection of this right. If the right to health were justiciable, the European Court 
could have made additional efforts to provide more adequate forms of protection. 
However, the strict view of the European Court regarding the award of general 
measures makes this improbable. Moreover, even if the right to health were 
justiciable, the inconsistency of the European Court in the application of general 
measures, especially through the mechanism of pilot judgments, makes the award of 
general measures in regards to right to health cases unlikely. 
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3. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined the right to health in international human rights law. It has 
also explained how GNR and general measures have been increasingly applied in 
the protection of health related issues within the regional systems. Whereas the 
Inter-American system of human rights and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights have developed broader reparation measures, the European Court 
of Human Rights has been more restrictive, showing a more deferential attitude 
towards states. Still, the European Court has applied its ‘pilot procedure’ and 
awarded ‘general measures’ in many health related cases by linking them to the 
protection of the prohibition of torture and right to a fair trial (articles 3 and 6 ECHR). 
The increasing application of these measures in health related cases among these 
regional systems suggests that the international law on human rights is open to the 
possibility of GNR in right to health and health related cases.   
In spite of this openness, there are still difficulties for the award of general measures 
in right to health cases. One of the main problems is the lack of justiciability of the 
right to health in the Inter-American and European systems. Whereas in the African 
system the right to health is directly justiciable, making clearer the application of 
GNR, the situation is quite different in the Inter-American and European systems. As 
discussed in this chapter, the African Commission has rightly distinguished between 
the duties of respect, protect and fulfill in relation to the right to health, which has 
contributed to the adequate provision of reparation measures. In contrast, as we 
have seen, in the Inter-American system, the lack of direct justiciability of the right to 
health has led to several problems in the implementation of GNR. Problems of 
‘underbreadth’, ‘dilution’, and subordination to more ‘serious’ violations were 
presented in this chapter. Similarly, in the European system, the lack of direct 
justiciability of the right to health, as well as the lack of clarity in the criteria for 
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deciding pilot judgments, has made difficult the application of general measures in 
health related cases, making it available only in very specific cases in which the 
European Court has agreed to provide a pilot judgment. Still the analysis showed 
that the European Court has ordered some general measures in pilot judgments 
related to the protection of cases where health issues were involved.  
In this way, the awarding of GNR in health related and right to health cases does not 
distinguish itself from the awarding of GNR in civil and political rights. If the right to 
health were directly justiciable in all different regional systems, there would not be 
any theoretical barrier to award adequate reparation measures, including GNR. This 
seems to be coherent with the idea that every breach of international law creates an 
obligation for the state to repair the violation.970 It also seems to be in line with the 
idea of the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights, according to which all human rights (civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights) should be treated ‘in a fair an equal 
manner.’971  
Besides these general principles, there is a lack of clarity, in both the literature and 
international law, about the way in which GNR should be granted when used for the 
protection of ESCR, particularly in right to health cases. None of the regional 
systems have developed a clear analytical framework for how GNR should be 
adequately awarded for the particular protection of ESCR. For example, does the 
fact that ESCR are subject to progressive realization have an impact on the way that 
GNR are granted? In order to provide some insights into these issues, the next 
section will discuss how GNR could be applied in right to health cases. In particular, 
                                                             
970 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Edition, 2005) p. 51. 
971 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, para 5. 
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it will discuss the analytical framework in which the right to health should be granted, 
the type of measures that should be awarded for the violation of each duty implied by 
the right to health, as well as some of the characteristics that these measures should 
have. The next section will also analyze whether the progressive nature of the right 
to health makes a difference in the way that GNR should be granted. 
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CHAPTER V:  HOW CAN GNR BE APPLIED IN 
THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter IV described how the practice of regional tribunals has been increasingly 
awarding GNR and general measures for the redress of violations to the right to 
health and health-related issues. It also showed the difficulties of awarding 
appropriate reparation measures in a context where the right to health is not 
justiciable, and how it is necessary to think of a clear criterion for the awarding of 
GNR. Based on the experience developed by regional tribunals and domestic courts, 
this chapter will develop an analytical framework on how GNR or general measures 
could be awarded in the redress of violations to the right to health, particularly by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or ‘the Committee’). 
The CESCR is one of the few mechanisms in international law that allows individual 
complaints to be brought for direct violations to the right to health.972 In this regard, it 
                                                             
972 Other mechanisms that allow the protection of the right to health are established in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 14) 
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (Article 2). 
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offers a window of opportunity for the adequate redress of violations to the right to 
health. 
The chapter will focus on the nature, scope, circumstances, and the specific 
remedies to be granted, alongside the characteristics that the CESCR should take 
into account, in the awarding of GNR and general measures. As already mentioned, 
the chapter will draw on the experiences of regional tribunals in order to show the 
potential of general measures in the redress of right to health and health-related 
violations.  
 
1. Addressing structural problems from a preventive and 
future-looking approach 
 
The main characteristic of GNR is their future oriented approach. In chapter I, it was 
discussed how GNR are different from other types of reparation measures, such as 
compensation, restitution, and satisfaction, in us much as they are future oriented.973 
This characteristic has been recognized by several bodies. The ILC Draft Articles 
states that GNR ‘focus on prevention rather than reparation.’974 Similarly, in 
international human rights law, GNR have clearly been considered as a form of 
prevention. In the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy it was 
established that ‘Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any 
                                                             
973 See Chapter I Section 2.1, pp. 34-35. 
974 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries’ (2001) Doc. A/56/10 in II ILC Yearbook (2001) Part two, article 30, para. 9. 
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or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention’975 [emphasis 
added]. Also, the Inter-American Court has stated that states are obliged to ensure 
that human rights violations ‘never again occur in its jurisdiction.’976 Its future-looking 
and preventive dimension clearly distinguishes GNR from other forms of reparations 
such as restitution, which are clearly oriented to the past, in as much as they look for 
the ‘establishment or reestablishment of the situation that would have existed if the 
wrongful act had not been committed.’977 
Another difference of GNR is related to the type of harm that they deal with. Whereas 
compensation and rehabilitation are usually oriented to deal with individual harm, 
GNR focus on the harm created to the society as a whole. In the case of the Inter-
American system, Schoinsteiner has argued how GNR are implicitly linked to the 
concept of ‘society as a whole’ in as much as they are ‘directed to society and ha[ve] 
an implicit, exemplary component.’978 
Applying this understanding of GNR to the redress of right to health violations, it is 
easy to see how the awarding of GNR or general measures in such cases is not an 
exclusive feature of the crafting of remedies in right to health or socio-economic 
                                                             
975 UNGA, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147, para 23.  
976 Case of Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparation and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No. 44 (20 January 1999) para 106; and Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et 
al. v Perú (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 
No. 52 (30 May 1999) para 222. 
977 ILC Draft Articles, article 35, para. 2. 
978 Judith Schonsteiner, ‘Dissuasive measures and the Society as a Whole: A working theory 
of reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 23 American University 
International Law Review (2007) p.145. For a discussion of this topic see Chapter III, p. 145. 
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rights. Instead, it is a general characteristic of the application of the standards of 
reparations in all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Kent Roach has 
explained how socio-economic rights, in general, have been targeted with a common 
critique, the argument that the crafting of reparation measures for socio-economic 
rights, usually requires the awarding of future oriented, complex remedies, that 
obstruct the competence of other branches of power, and are difficult to 
implement.979 The analysis of GNR in international human rights law shows that this 
type of remedy is, by nature, future oriented, closer to a principle of distributive 
justice, and oriented to redress the general harm against the society. In these 
circumstances, the awarding of GNR in ESCR does not distinguish itself from the 
awarding of the same type of measures in CPRs. In both cases, GNR aim to redress 
the root causes of the violation by awarding measures with a structural component. 
Assuming that the redress of ESCR exclusively requires the awarding of GNR or 
general measures, ignores the fact that GNR, or general measures in the form of 
GNR, is a category already present in international human rights law, one that is 
applicable to all human rights.  
 
2. Scope of the measures 
 
Measures awarded under the form of GNR or general measures can be very broad 
in scope. Following the model established in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, they may include: human rights training, institutional reforms, 
updating of manuals for public servants, creation of public policies, setting of 
                                                             
979 Kent Roach, ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic 
Rights’ in, Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law(Cambridge, 1th edition, 2008) p.2. 
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budgets, and creation of specific offices in charge of the implementation of a specific 
matter. As long as a causal link between the facts of the case, the violations 
declared, and the damage attributed, is proved, nothing prevents the application of 
these measures in right to health cases. 
The awarding of GNR should be oriented to redress the root causes of the violation. 
Such causes are linked, not just to institutional factors, (i.e. inadequate or deficient 
legislative frameworks;980 inadequate manuals for public servants;981 lack or deficient 
programs and public polices982) but also cultural factors (i.e. general preconceptions 
in society that create stereotypes and discrimination).   
When awarded in right to health cases, GNR have an enormous potential in the 
modification of legislative, institutional, and cultural factors. In terms of legislation, 
GNR have proved to be effective in the modification of both constitutional and legal 
                                                             
980 In the Decision T-760-2008 the Constitutional Court found structural inequalities in the 
design of the health system in Colombia. As a consequence it ordered several governmental 
institutions to carry out specific actions in order to modify the health system in Colombia. 
981 Case of Fernández-Ortega et al v. Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.215 (30 August 2010) para 
256; Case of Rosendo-Cantú and other v. Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 216 (31 August 
2010) para 242. 
982 In the Rosendo Cantú Case the Court argued that, since the state provided information 
about some public policies in place, and that the Commission did not object to the validity of 
the measures, there was not enough evidence or argumentation to grant the measures. See 
Rosendo-Cantú (Merits) paras 237-238. In the Cotton Field Case, the Court argued that 
without information about any structural defects and problems of implementation and impact, 
it was unable to order such measures. See Case of González et al. (Cotton Field”) v. Mexico 
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No.205 (16 November 2009) para 495). 
301 
 
provisions.983 For example, GNR can play an important role in the modification of 
domestic law that does not respect minimum standards for the protection of the right 
to health.984  
In institutional terms, GNR have been beneficial for the creation of databases,985 the 
strengthening of certain state institutions,986 and even the allocation of specific 
budgets in order to secure human rights training.987 Similar measures can also be 
requested in the redress of right to health cases in order to update databases of 
beneficiaries, improve the coordination of a specific matter, and allocate budgets for 
the realization of certain core obligations of the right to health.  
In respect of cultural factors, GNR have usually been requested in order to provide 
human rights courses to public servants,988 members of the judiciary989 and to 
                                                             
983 Case of ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 73 (5 February 
2001)  para  103 (4) 
984 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica (Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.257 (28 
November 2012) para 336. 
985 Cotton Field (Merits) Orders, (20) and (21). 
986 Case of Ticona-Estrada et al v. Bolivia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No.191 (27 November 2008) para 173; and Case of 
Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No.186 (12 August 2008) para 263. 
987 Case of Fornerón and daughter v. Argentina (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 242 (27 April 2012) para 182. 
988 Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.209 (23 November 2009) para 
347. 
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society in general.990 Similar measures could be requested in right to health cases in 
order to provide adequate training to public servants in charge of running health 
systems, and to health practitioners. This type of measure could be beneficial in, for 
example, changing patterns of discrimination and ill-treatment in the provision of 
health services in prisons and public hospitals. The specific definition of the 
measures will depend on the circumstances of the case, the request of the plaintiffs, 
and the ability of adjudicative mechanisms to draft appropriate remedies. 
However, other type of factors that are at the base of the violation, especially those 
linked with the existence of a particular economic system, have not always been 
adequately repaired by GNR. This is particularly clear in the redress of violations to 
the right to health that are linked with the existence of a particular economic system. 
Economic systems (capitalism, socialism, communism) have an inevitable impact on 
the way that health systems operate. However, GNR can not tackle these root 
causes as they go beyond what these legal remedies can redress. In this regard, the 
CESCR has expressed that ‘the rights recognized in the Covenant are susceptible of 
realization within the context of a wide variety of economic and political systems, 
provided only that the interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of human 
rights, […], is recognized and reflected in the system in question.’991  
The inability of GNR to modify a structural economic system is clear in the 
Colombian judgment, T-760/2008. In this case, which will be discussed further, the 
health system was largely based upon neoliberal principles that trusted in the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
989 Case of Nadege Dorzema et al v. Dominican Republic (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.251 (24 October 2012) para 267. 
990 Cotton Field (Merits) para 543. 
991 UN, CESCR, General Comment No 3, The nature of States parties’ obligations (1990), 
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990), para 8. 
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efficiency of the market to allocate health services.992 The Colombian Constitutional 
Court, however, did not order any measure that would have modified the underlying 
economic structure of the health system. For example, the Court did not change the 
system of private insurance companies which provide health services, and whose 
policy of denial of health services993 is the cause of the high number of tutelas on 
health issues. Instead, the Colombian Court focused on verifying the general 
mandates of the health model, established in law 100/1993, stating the minimum 
standards that the health system should take into account in order to be in 
accordance with the Constitution.  
Thus, in spite of the impact that GNR can have in the modification of legislative, 
institutional and cultural factors that are at the base of right to health violations, they 
have a limited role in the modification of economic systems. In this regard, legal 
measures are generally insufficient in order to deal with socio-economic structures. 
 
3. Circumstances for the awarding of GNR in right to health 
cases  
 
                                                             
992 Alicia Ely Yamin and Oscar Parra-Vera, ‘Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in 
Colombia: From Social Demands to Individual Claims to Public Debates’ (2010) 33 Hastings 
International & Comparative Law Review 101, p.103; Daniel Alzate Mora, ‘Health Litigation in 
Colombia: Have we Reached the Limit for the Judicialization of Health?’(2014) Health and 
Human Rights Journal.  
993 A tutela is an easy, accessible writ for the protection of constitutional fundamental rights 
which should be solved by a judge within 10 days. See Patrick Delaney, ‘Legislating for 
Equality in Colombia: Constitutional jurisprudence, Tutelas, and Social Reform’ (2008) 1 The 
Equal Rights Review 50.  
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Chapter III showed how international human rights law has increasingly recognized 
the awarding of GNR in at least three circumstances: i) gross or serious violations of 
international human rights law; ii) large-scale or systemic violations, and iii) cases 
where there is a risk of repetition. These criteria should also be taken into account in 
the redress of right to health violations. The application of such criteria was awarded 
in order to avoid two extremes: on the one hand, awarding GNR for every human 
rights violation could be onerous in political, administrative and budgetary terms, 
making it impractical. On the other hand, not to award GNR at all would be too 
restrictive in terms of the rights of the victims in each case. Since GNR are already 
part of international human rights law, denying victims the possibility of access to this 
type of remedy would be a step back in the protection of human rights. 
This chapter will propose that the same criteria can be applied in the redress of right 
to health cases.  
3.1 Gross and serious violations of the right to health 
 
The work of UN experts has clearly shown that the category of ‘gross and serious’ 
violation can also be applied for the redress of violations of ESCR. Previous to the 
publication of the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines’, several UN experts indicated that 
the definition of gross human rights violations is not restricted to an specific category 
of rights, but also refers to gross violations of ESCR.  
In 1992, in the Conclusions of the Maastricht Seminar on the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, several academics and experts concluded that:  
‘violations of other human rights, including violations of economic, social 
and cultural rights, may also be gross and systemic in scope and nature, 
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and must consequently be given all due attention in connection with the 
right to reparation.’994  
Similarly, in 1993, Theo van Boven emphasized in his Study concerning the right to 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, that:  
“Given also the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, 
gross and systematic violations of the type of human rights cited above 
frequently affect other human rights as well, including economic, social 
and cultural rights.”995  
In the same vein, in 1999, the study by Chernichenko, regarding the Definition of 
gross and large-scale violations of human rights as an international crime, referred to 
the Maastricht Seminar, reiterating that violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights, may also be gross and systematic in scope and nature, and should thus be 
adequately redressed.996 In view of this, it is possible to say that nothing prevents the 
                                                             
994 ´Conclusions of the Maastricht Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and 
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 
Seminar on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental rights (Maastricht, 11-15 March 1992) 12 
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM) Special 17, para 11. 
995 UNCHR ‘Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Final report submitted 
by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur’ (21 January 1993) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, para 
12. 
996 UNCHR, ‘Definition of gross and large-scale violations of human rights as an international 
crime, Working paper submitted by Mr. Stanislav Chernichenko in accordance with Sub-
Commission decision 1992/109’ (8 June 1999) E/CN.4/sub.2/1993/10 para 14. 
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application of the concept of ‘gross violations of international human rights law’ to 
violations of ESCR.   
However, in practice, few international tribunals have recognized violations to ESCR 
as being ‘serious and gross’. Exceptionally, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ and Human Rights, recognized in Darfur, that ‘the destruction of homes, 
livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells exposed 
the victims to serious health risks’997 and constituted a ‘serious and massive’ 
violation of human rights.998 In this case, the African Commission recommended the 
state to ‘rehabilitate economic and social infrastructure, such as education, health, 
water, and agricultural service, in the Darfur provinces in order to provide conditions 
for return in safety and dignity for the IDPs and Refugees.’999 
Similarly, in the Akayesu Case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) recognized that ‘subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, 
systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services 
below minimum requirement’ can be used for the purpose of interpreting the crime of 
                                                             
997 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Cohre) v. 
Sudan, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 279/03, 296/03 (2009) para 212. 
998 COHRE  v. Sudan para 102. Similarly, Louise Arbour has stated that ‘in Darfur, the 
systematic burning of houses and villages, the forced displacement of the population, and the 
starvation caused by restriction on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the 
destruction of food crops are deliberately used alongside other gross human rights violations 
–such murder or rape- as instruments of war’. Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice 
for Societies in Transition’ (2007-2008) 40 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 
p.9. 
999 COHRE v. Sudan para 229 (5). 
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genocide.1000 As this was a criminal case, the ICTR did not award specific remedies 
for the redress of these violations. 
Apart from these two cases, no other cases in international law have referred to 
ESCR violations as gross violations of human rights. This is indicative of the lack of 
full recognition of ESCR in international law and the difficulties in making them 
directly justiciable. 
However, much more has been done in protecting ESCR indirectly, by awarding 
reparation measures to protect a dimension of the right to health in cases where the 
main violation has been considered a gross violation of civil and political rights (e.g. 
massacres, large displacements of people).1001 In this regard, international tribunals 
have emphasized the impact that the redress of gross violations of human rights may 
have on health. In Mapiripan, a case related to the massacre of civilians by 
paramilitary forces in Colombia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated 
that the displacement of people is a grave violation of human rights.1002 The 
representatives of the victims alleged that the displacement contributed to the lack of 
access to health care.1003 The Court did not make any reference to this argument or 
recognise the violation of a ‘right to health’.  However, the Inter-American Court did 
order the state to pay non-pecuniary damages, and to provide psychological 
                                                             
1000 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Judgment) Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 
1998), para 506.  
1001 For a full analysis of the indirect ways that the Inter-American Court has used to protect 
the right to health, see Chapter IV, Section 3. 
1002 Case of the ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 134 (15 September 2005) para 304. 
1003 Mapiripán (Merits) para 165 (e) and 280 (a). 
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treatment, free of cost, to the next of kin of those victims who had been executed or 
made to disappear.1004  
In Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Court considered 
the massacre of 268 people of Mayan origin, by members of the Guatemalan Army. 
The Court recognized that victims of, or witnesses to, serious violations of human 
rights could result in serious afflictions in the mental health of the victims and the 
wider community.1005 As part of the reparation measures, the Court ordered the state 
to provide a specialized program of psychological and psychiatric treatments, free of 
charge. In both cases, even though the Inter-American Court did not identify right to 
health violations as gross violations of human rights, it did recognize that gross 
violations of human rights have serious implications for peoples’ health. Similarly, in 
the same case, the Inter-American Court also ordered the implementation of a 
sewage system and potable water supply, as well as the establishment of a health 
centre in the village which included adequate personnel and conditions. These last 
measures were established under the title ‘other measures’ but could be labelled as 
GNR, in as much as they were oriented to prevent violations of the health-related 
rights of this community.  
One of the problems of this indirect approach to protecting ESCR is that, as the right 
to health is not expressly recognised as one of the violated rights, the Inter-American 
Court cannot award reparation measures that directly protect all the violated 
dimensions of the right to health. As a consequence, if any reparation measure ends 
up protecting a dimension of the health of victims, it is just in an indirect manner. For 
example, in the previously mentioned case Mapiripan, the Court ordered 
rehabilitation measures consistent with providing adequate psychological treatment 
                                                             
1004 Mapiripán (Merits) para 312.  
1005 Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No. 116 (19 November 2004) para 106. 
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to the next of kin of the victims.1006 Although these measures have a direct impact on 
the mental health of the next of kin and, therefore, in their enjoyment of the right to 
health, this is simply the indirect result of the protection of the rights to freedom of 
movement and residence, as the victims were forcibly displaced.1007 The fact that the 
right to health had not been recognized as one of the violated rights by the Court, is 
not just a theoretical problem in the argumentation of the case, but has particular 
consequences in terms of reparations. As the right to health was not one of the rights 
violated, the Inter-American Court did not award specific GNR to enable access to 
healthcare services for the displaced people. For example, the Inter-American Court 
could have ordered the establishment of a health centre in the municipality of 
Mapiripan for those who decided to return, or a general policy or program to provide 
mental health care for the returnees. None of these measures were awarded though.  
International human rights law has not, often, recognized right to health violations as 
gross and massive violations of human rights, making it difficult to award any type of 
remedies, including GNR. More often, international courts have recognised that 
gross and massive violations of human rights have an impact on people’s health. 
Through this indirect approach, international courts have awarded both rehabilitation 
and GNR which have an indirect impact in the protection of the right to health. 
However, there is nothing in theory that prevents the use of the term ‘gross and 
mass violations’ to violations of ESC rights in general, and the right to health in 
particular. International courts should be more open to use this term for the 
protection of ESC rights in order, not just to make visible different violations of the 
right to health, but also in order to provide adequate and more effective reparation 
measures. 
                                                             
1006 Mapiripán (Merits) para 312. 
1007 Mapiripán (Merits) paras 188 and 189. 
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 3.2 Large-scale or systemic violations of the right to health 
 
The special quantitative character of large-scale and systemic violations of right to 
health would justify the awarding of general measures of redress. First, since large-
scale violations usually involve the activity of more than one authority or state 
institution, general measures can be beneficial in the redress of this situation, in as 
much as they are oriented to provide general orders to more than one state 
institution, who will have to work in a coordinated manner in order to tackle the 
violation. Second, large-scale violations affect a large number of victims who are not 
always identified or easy to identify. In this sense, GNR or general measures can be 
an effective way to provide redress in cases where individual redress is difficult to 
achieve. Third, the redress of large-scale violations may usually require the creation 
of plans of action, policies, budget allocation, and measures with a general wider 
scope. In this way GNR or general measures are a significant means for providing 
such general redress.  
In practice, however, few cases in international law have dealt with large-scale 
violations of right to health or even ESCR. The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has made a step forward by recognizing that the destruction, by 
security forces, of Ogoni houses and villages, together with the harassment, beating 
and killing of people who attempted to return to their homes, constitutes ‘massive 
violations of the right to shelter.’1008 As a result, the African Commission 
recommended the state to ‘ensure adequate compensation to victims of the human 
rights violations, including relief and resettlement assistance to victims of 
government sponsored raids, and [the] undertaking a comprehensive clean-up of 
                                                             
1008 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (SERAC) v. Nigeria, African Comm Hum & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (27 
October 2001) para 62. 
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lands and rivers damaged by oil operations.’1009 In addition to compensation 
measures, the Commission also recommended that the Government carry out 
appropriate environmental and social impact assessments for any future oil project, 
and that oversight bodies guarantee the safe operation of any such projects. The 
Commission also recommended the state to provide information on health and 
environmental risks to the communities affected by oil projects, as well as access to 
regulatory and decision-making bodies. These measures can be considered as GNR 
and constitute an important step forward in the redress of large-scale violations of 
the right to health.  
Interestingly, domestic courts have increasingly dealt with large-scale and mass 
violations of the right to health, awarding extensive reparation measures. As shown 
in section 4 of this chapter, the domestic experiences of Colombia and South Africa 
show how GNR can be awarded for the protection of large-scale and systemic 
violations of the right to health.1010 In each of these cases the right to health of large 
numbers of people were affected by either the existence of inadequate 
policies/regulations or the absence of adequate laws. In the TAC Case, 1011 the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa recognised HIV/AIDS is a pandemic in South 
Africa, and that the lack of an adequate policy that allows the distribution of the 
retroviral Nevirapine affected millions of people. In the Colombian Case, T-760-2008, 
the Constitutional Court analysed the systemic problems of the national health 
system related to the type of health services included or not in the Obligatory Health 
Plan, among others; the services required by minors; access to high cost health 
                                                             
1009 SERAC v. Nigeria Recommendations para 69. For a full presentation of this case see 
Chapter V, Section 2.1. 
1010 For a full presentation of these cases see Chapter V, Section 4.3.1, pp. 320. 
1011 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC). 
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services; and treatments of catastrophic illnesses.1012 In India, the High Court of 
Delhi ordered measures that affect a whole cluster of schemes designed by the 
Indian Government in order to reduce infant and maternal mortality in the country. 
Although the courts do not refer to these violations as large-scale violations, and to 
the reparation measures as GNR, they can be considered as such, as they are all 
reparations measures with a wider scope and a structural dimension.  
3.3 Risk of repetition  
 
It can also be argued that, whenever there is a risk of repetition, GNR should be 
applicable for the prevention of future violations. For example, in those situations 
where, despite individual reparations, legislation, programs and policies, that violate 
rights are still in place, GNR should be provided to order the state to modify or enact 
new legislations, programs and policies. Also, in those cases where the violation 
happened because of a particular context (e.g. inequality, prejudice, violence, 
impunity, corruption, among others) GNR should be oriented, as far as is possible, to 
the transformation of such situations. In this regard, a directive of human rights 
training in order to combat stereotyping,1013 or the design of specific programs to 
reduce impunity, 1014 are good examples of measures to be taken. In this regard, 
violations to the right to health are no different from other type of violations to civil 
and political rights. In both cases, GNR are positioned to tackle the root causes of 
the violation in order to prevent their future occurrence.  
In the context of health related violations, the risk of repetition can be seen in the 
cases Alban Cornejo v. Ecuador, and Suarez Peralta v. Ecuador. In these cases, 
                                                             
1012 Judgment T-760/2008 (31 July 2008) Constitutional Court of Colombia. 
1013 Cotton Field (Merits) para 543. 
1014 Ticona-Estrada (Merits) para 173; and Heliodoro-Portugal (Merits) para 263. 
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which were related to medical mal-practice and lack of due diligence of the state in 
the prosecution of crimes, the Inter-American Court ordered the state to disseminate 
patients’ rights, applying both domestic and international standards, as well as an 
order to implement an education and training program for justice operators and 
health care professionals to inform them of Ecuadorian legislation on patients’ 
rights1015. The measures ordered by the Court are justified, as the cases occurred 
within the context of a lack of knowledge by the population on how to exercise their 
rights, and knowledge by justice operators of patients’ rights. Without effective 
measures that tackle these situations, the risk that these type of cases will happen in 
future, increases. The facts in these two cases are very similar, showing that, 
besides the order awarded in Alban Cornejo, the state did nothing to adequately 
redress the situation. This forced the Court in Suarez Peralta to reiterate the order 
provided in Alban Cornejo, to comply with an education and training program.  
 
4. GNR for violations of specific duties of the right to health 
 
The analysis provided in previous sections, shows that the practice of regional 
tribunals of human rights, mainly the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, have not hesitated in awarding 
GNR and general measures for the redress of health related, and right to health, 
cases. As a corollary of these, this section will discuss whether the awarding of GNR 
in health related cases is similar or different to the awarding of GNR and general 
measures in civil and political rights. This question is particularly important when 
                                                             
1015 As part of the GNR, the Court also ordered the state to publish the judgement. Case of 
Albán-Cornejo et al v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No. 171 (22 November 2007) para 157. 
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taking into account that the right to health is subject to progressive realization and 
maximum available resources. GNR frequently imply a high expenditure of resources 
that are not always easy to find in low income countries. In those cases of gross, 
large-scale and systemic violations of the right to health, how would it be possible to 
award GNR that are compatible with the progressive nature of this right, as well as 
with the clause of maximum available resources? 
 
This thesis will maintain that GNR are a specific form of reparation that can be 
awarded for the redress of any violation of human rights in all their different duties, 
including violations of the duty to respect, protect, and to fulfil the right to health. In 
those cases of violations of minimum core obligations, GNR or general measures 
should oblige the provision of such specific minimum, core obligations within a short 
term. Also, in those violations of obligations of progressive realization, special 
considerations should be taken into account in order to provide GNR that are 
respectful of this concept. In those cases, GNR should allow the state to develop the 
right in a ‘progressive’ manner, allowing the state to act with more flexibility. When 
GNR and general measures take the form of legislative reforms or the design of 
public policies, the orders should include opportunities for public participation and 
deliberation. In order to support this argument, I will analyse the awarding of GNR 
regarding each of the duties related to the right to health. Examples of GNR in each 
obligation will be presented, showing the variety of forms that GNR may take in the 
protection of this right. 
4.1 GNR and violations to the duty to respect   
 
As was discussed in section 1.2 of chapter IV,1016 the duty to respect ‘requires states 
to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to 
                                                             
1016  See, p. 203. 
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health.’1017  In relation to this duty, the previously discussed case, IVF v. Costa Rica, 
can provide some relevant examples. In this case, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights found that the total ban by the state on the practice of In Vitro 
Fertilization (IVF) represented a violation to the rights to private and family life; 
personal integrity; sexual and reproductive health; the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific and technological progress; as well as the principle of non-discrimination. 
As a consequence, the Inter-American Court ordered the state to adopt necessary 
measures to ensure that the prohibition of IVF was annulled.1018  
 
In addition to redress the duty to respect, the Court, in what can be a controversial 
decision, ordered GNR oriented to redress the duties to protect and fulfil. Regarding 
the duty to protect, the Court awarded GNR by ordering the state to adopt training 
programs and courses on human rights, reproductive rights and non-discrimination 
for judicial employees, at all levels of the judiciary.1019 This measure directly tackles 
one of the root causes of the problem, as the violations occurred in a context of 
conservatism and strong influence of the Catholic Church, in several levels of the 
judiciary system. The measure has a preventive dimension as it is oriented to 
influence the knowledge that judges have about international law and, therefore, to 
avoid judicial decisions based on religious arguments. Measures are also directly 
                                                             
1017  UN, CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (2000) ‘The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health’, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2000/4, para 33. 
1018 In the IVF Case, the Inter-American Court ordered the state to i) ensure that the 
prohibition is annulled; ii) regulate those aspects necessary for the implementation of IVF and 
iii) to gradually make IVF available within its health care infertility treatments and programs. 
Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica (Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No.257 (28 
November 2012) paras 336-338. 
1019 Artavia Murillo (Merits) para 341  
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linked to redress and avoid the repetition of the main violation declared by the Court, 
namely, the duty to respect the rights to private and family life, personal integrity, 
sexual and reproductive health and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific and 
technological progress.  
 
As part of the GNR, the Court also awarded measures oriented to protect the duty to 
fulfil the right to health, by ordering the state to regulate those aspects necessary for 
the implementation of IVF, taking into account the standards settled in the 
judgement, as well as to make IVF available within its health care infertility 
treatments and programs.1020 Some authors have criticized this last measure for 
clearly exceeding the competence of the Court.1021 In chapter IV, it was discussed 
how these measures went beyond the redress of the violations declared by the Court 
in the decision (the duty to respect), and is actually oriented to redress other 
obligations (the duties to protect and fulfil) which were neither discussed nor 
declared violated in the decision. GNR, as any other form of reparation, should have 
a clear connection between the facts and the violation declared.  
 
When studying individual communications under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, the CESCR could follow the example established in this case related to the 
adoption of GNR oriented to redress the duties to respect. However, the CESCR 
should be careful in not awarding additional measures oriented to redress other 
duties (protect or fulfil) that are not adequately linked with the proved facts. Thus, for 
                                                             
1020 The Court also ordered rehabilitation measures oriented to provide psychological 
treatment to the victims of the case, free of charge, for up to four years. Artavia Murillo 
(Merits) para 252-255. 
1021 See Álvaro Paúl Díaz, ‘La Corte Interamericana in Vitro: Comentarios sobre su Proceso 
de Toma de Decisiones a Propósito del Caso Artavia’ (2013) 2 Revista Derecho Público 
Iberoamericano 303,  p.338. 
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example, the CESCR could, among others, engage in ordering the repeal of specific 
legislation that contains discriminatory provisions, prohibits the use of traditional 
preventive care, or allows the commercialization of unsafe drugs. In all these 
measures, a direct link between the measures recommended and the violation 
should be made in order to justify their adoption. A failure to do so may result in the 
CESCR exceeding its authority, by ordering measures that are not related to the 
violations declared.  
 
4.2 GNR and violations to the duty to protect  
 
The duty to protect the right to health ‘requires States to take measures that prevent 
third parties from interfering in the enjoyment of the right to health.’1022 In relation to 
this obligation, reparation measures, including GNR, should be oriented to prevent 
third parties continuing to violate the right to health. In this regard, the Inter-American 
Court has also developed both individual and general reparation measures for 
violations to the duty to protect, in cases related to medical mal-practice. In the Alban 
Cornejo Case, as discussed in chapter III, a person admitted to a private health 
institution in Ecuador died due to alleged medical negligence. Although the relatives 
of the victim filed a criminal complaint, this was unsuccessful as the statute of 
limitations made a criminal action impossible. The Inter-American Court underlined 
the responsibility of the state in terms of the duty to protect, by stating that ‘the state 
responsibility is generated by the omission of the duty to supervise the rendering of 
the public service to protect the mentioned right.’1023  
 
                                                             
1022 ESCR GC 14 para 33. 
1023 Albán-Cornejo (Merits) para 119. 
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In the section of the ruling on reparations, the Inter-American Court ordered, not only 
compensation for the death of the person due to presumed mal-practice by a doctor, 
but also GNR consistent with the dissemination of a booklet about patients’ rights, to 
be available in all hospitals.1024 As part of the GNR, the Inter-American Court also 
ordered the state to implement an education and training program for officers and 
civil servants of the judiciary system, and health care professionals, about the laws 
enacted by the state in relation to patients’ rights, together with the appropriate 
punishment for violating them.1025 The training measures are clearly oriented to 
ensure that people know their rights, and can have access to an effective remedy. In 
this way, reparation measures are directly linked to the main violation contained 
within the case, namely, the duty to protect people when accessing health services 
carried out by third parties.  
 
Similarly, in Ximenes Lopez v. Brasil, discussed in chapter III, a mentally ill person 
was admitted to a mental hospital under ‘inhuman and degrading conditions’. He was 
also beaten and finally died whilst being held under psychiatric care. The Inter-
American Court found the state responsible for failing to protect the public interest in 
the provision of health care services, and particularly for failing to regulate and 
supervise the rendering of health services. In the section on reparations, the Inter-
American Court ordered the state to pay compensation to the next of kin, as well as 
to publish the decision. In addition to this, and as part of GNR, the Court ordered the 
state to continue developing a training and education program for physicians and all 
other persons working in mental health institutions in the country.1026 In these cases, 
the measures are also justified as they are designed to let health workers know their 
                                                             
1024 Albán-Cornejo (Merits)  para 162. 
1025 Albán-Cornejo (Merits) para 164. 
1026 Case of Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C. No. 149 (4 July 2006) para 250. 
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obligations, in terms of human rights and, in such a way as to prevent the repetition 
of such illegal acts. In this case, more ambitious measures (e.g. policy reforms, the 
creation of appropriate mental health services, the establishment of monitoring 
bodies, and the enactment of legal frameworks in accordance with international 
standards) were not awarded, as the state had already adopted measures aimed to 
improve conditions of psychiatric care in the institutions of the Sistema Único de 
Saúde [Uniform Health System], the SUS being the acronym used in Portuguese.1027   
 
The CESCR could take into account these examples from the Inter-American 
System, in order to recommend that states adopt general measures that prevent the 
repetition of such violations by private parties. In this regard, the Committee could 
recommend measures such as: the creation of monitoring bodies at the domestic 
level in order to make private health providers and health practitioners accountable; 
the establishment of adequate mechanisms of redress for individual victims; and the 
setting up of programs and public policies oriented to prevent harmful practices 
carried out by private parties. In all these situations, GNR and general measures 
should be linked to the facts and the violation found.  
 
4.3 GNR and violations to the duty to fulfil  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the obligation to fulfil requires the state to 
‘adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and 
other measures towards the full realization of the right to health.’1028 In this respect, it 
is important to distinguish between the awarding of GNR for the redress of minimum 
                                                             
1027 idem para 243. 
1028 CESCR  GC14  para 33. 
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core and non-core obligations. As presented in chapter IV, section 1.3,1029 the 
CESCR has recognized the existence of minimum core obligations of states 
regarding the right to health. The Committee has also recognised that, in those other 
aspects that do not represent minimum core obligations, states have the obligation, 
within the limits of available resources, to take steps in order to progressively realise 
the full content of the right to health.1030 As such, informed by the experiences of the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia, the Supreme Court of Delhi, and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the next section will develop some examples of 
how the Committee could award individual and general measures in the protection of 
cases on the right to health and the duty to fulfil.  
 
4.3.1 GNR and violations of minimum core obligations: minimum core v 
reasonableness 
 
In recommending individual measures, the Committee could make use of all forms of 
individual redress, such as compensation,1031 restitution1032 and rehabilitation1033 
which have been increasingly afforded by the different UN human rights treaty-
                                                             
1029 See, p.205. 
1030 CESCR GC14 para 30. 
1031 CEDAW, V.P.P. v. Bulgaria, (2012) Comm. No. 31/2011, CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011, para 
10 (1); CEDAW, Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria (2012) Comm. No. 32/2011, 
CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011, para 8.8; CRDP, Zsolt Bujdosó and five others v. Hungary (2013) 
Comm. No. 4/201, CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 para 10 (1); CRDP, Szilvia Nyusti and Péter Takács 
(2013) Comm. No. 1/2010, CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010, para 10 (1).  
1032 CEDAW, Cecilia Kell v Canada, (2012) Comm. No. 19/2008, 
CEDAW/C.51/D/19/2008, para 11 (a) (i). 
1033 CEDAW, T.P.F. v. Peru, (2011) Comm. No. 22/2009, CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009, para 9.1. 
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bodies. Whereas restitution measures will be more frequently awarded in those 
cases of violations to the duty to respect, (e.g. the imposition of restrictions in the 
enjoyment of a medicine that was freely available1034), compensation measures 
would be recommended when restitution is not possible. 
 
When awarding recommendations related to the duty of states to ensure access to 
minimum essential food, basic shelter, housing and sanitation, adequate supply of 
safe and potable water, and essential drugs, the Committee should be able to also 
recommend the provision of positive measures. Although these are not technically 
restitution measures,1035 their awarding is defensible in as much as they are oriented 
to effectively redress the inaction of the state in the provision of a duty. In this regard, 
the CEDAW Committee, and the Committee on the Rights of the Persons with 
Disabilities, have consistently recommended measures which order a state to adopt 
positive actions for the adequate redress of rights. Such measures include: providing 
measures of protection;1036 guaranteeing the physical and mental integrity of a 
person;1037 ensuring that someone is given a safe home;1038 remedying the deletion 
                                                             
1034 Minister of Health v TAC. 
1035 Restitution measures were originally designed to remove the consequences of a 
violation, by restoring the victim to the previous state before the violation happened. In cases 
of violations to the duty to fulfil the right to health, when no action has been taken by the state 
to comply with its duties, returning the victim to the state that he/she was in before, is 
condemning the victim to remain in a state of dispossession. 
1036 CEDAW, Ms. Zhen Zhen Zheng v. The Netherlands (2009) Comm. No. 15/2007, 
CEDAW/C/42/D/15/2007, para 9.1 (I). 
1037 CEDAW, A.T. v. Hungary (2005) Comm. No. 2/2003, CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003   
1038 idem  
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of someone’s name from the electoral registers;1039 remedying the lack of access of 
an individual to banking card services;1040 and reconsidering the application of 
someone for a building permit for a hydrotherapy pool.1041   
 
However, the awarding of general measures will also depend on the concept of 
‘minimum core’ adopted by the Committee. As presented in chapter IV, section 
1.3,1042 the ESCR Committee has supported the existence of a minimum core of 
obligations in the understanding of the right to health, in its general comments Nos. 3 
and 14. In defining this minimum core, the CESCR has made reference, in General 
Comment No. 14, to obligations that were established by international experts and 
conferences, as well as to other obligations, in terms of access to food, shelter, 
housing, sanitation and potable water. However, its understanding of whether states 
can refuse to comply with the minimum core in contexts of lack of resources, or in 
the occurrence of natural disasters, is not clear. In General Comment No. 3, the 
Committee established that, in order to evaluate whether a state has not complied 
with its minimum core obligation obligations in respect of resource constraints, it 
must demonstrate ‘that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition’ in order to comply, in a priority manner, those minimum obligations. Even 
if resources are inadequate, the state should demonstrate that it has made every 
effort to guarantee the ‘widest possible enjoyment’ of the rights under the prevailing 
circumstances.1043 However, in General Comment No. 14, the Committee took a 
                                                             
1039 CRDP Zsolt Bujdosó and five others v. Hungary (2013) Comm. No. 4/201, 
CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011, para 10 (1). 
1040 CRPD Szilvia Nyusti and Péter Takács v. Hungary (2013) Comm. No. 1/2010, 
CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010, para 10 (1). 
1041 CRPD H.M. v. Sweden (2012) Comm. No. 3/2011, CRPD/C/7/D/3/2011, para 9(1). 
1042 See, pp. 205. 
1043 CESCR GC 3  paras 10 and 11. 
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more strict view by stating that the non-compliance of minimum core obligations is 
not justifiable and that the core obligations set by it are non-derogable.1044 In order to 
answer the criticism against the affordability of such obligations in difficult contexts, 
the Committee emphasized the condition of the duty of states and other actors to 
provide ‘international assistance and cooperation.’1045 Whether the non-compliance 
of minimum core obligations can be justifiable under certain contexts, certainly needs 
clarification by the Committee. As Craven has asked, if the obligations established as 
minimum core can be justified due to resource constraint, how are these obligations 
distinguishable from other obligations established under Article 2(1)?1046  
Recently, Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established that the Committee shall consider 
the reasonableness of the steps taken by states in the implementation of the rights 
set forth in the Covenant. Although the interpretation of this provision is not totally 
clear, in a 2007 Statement, the CESCR, following the criterion of General Comment 
No. 3, established that:  
‘in order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet its core 
obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate that 
                                                             
1044 CESCR GC 14  para 47.  
1045 CESCR GC 14  para 45. 
1046 Matthew Craven, ‘Assessment of the Progress on Adjudication of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ in John Squires, Malcolm Langford and Bret Thiele, The Road To A Remedy: 
Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNSW Press,2005) 
p. 41. 
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every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal in 
an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those core obligations.’1047 
Regarding the argument of ‘resource constraints’ in cases of violations of minimum 
core obligations, the Committee stated that such information should be considered 
on a country-by-country basis, and that the severity of the breach, and the guarantee 
of minimum core should be taken into account.1048 In assessing the reasonableness 
of the measures, the Committee should also take into account factors such as the 
country level of development, the severity of the breach, the existence of a special 
‘context’ such as a natural disaster or an armed conflict, whether the state has made 
the effort to identify low-cost options, and whether the state has sought for 
international assistance and cooperation.1049  
In the interpretation of these provisions the CESCR can make use of two models: on 
the one hand, the standard of reasonableness of the South African Court, which 
helped to create the wording of Article 8 of the Optional Protocol. On the other hand, 
the standard of ‘minimum core’ followed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, the 
Indian Court, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which has developed 
interesting standards on how to provide remedies in violations to minimum core 
obligations. These two models will be explained as follow. 
 
4.3.1.1  Standard of reasonableness 
 
                                                             
1047 UN, CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available 
Resources’ under an optional protocol to the Covenant’ (10 May 2007) U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2007/1, para 6.  
1048 idem para 10 (b). 
1049 idem para 10.  
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A good example of how courts have applied the standard of reasonableness in the 
award of GNR is in the case Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). 
In this case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa analysed the implementation of 
the drug Nevirapine, which was used in the prevention of the Mother-To-Child-
Transmission of HIV/AIDS. Although the drug had been offered to the state for free, 
the government decided to introduce the anti-retroviral only in two pilot sites, leaving 
most mothers without access to this treatment. The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa decided that the decision to implement the treatment only in the pilot sites was 
unreasonable and violated constitutional rights. As a consequence, the Court 
ordered restitution measures oriented to solve the specific case by demanding the 
state to ‘remove the restrictions that prevent[ed] Nevirapine from being made 
available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and training sites,’1050 and to 
permit and facilitate its use when medically indicated1051 These measures should be 
taken ‘without delay.’1052  
 
The Court also ordered general measures, oriented to prevent future violations, in 
the form of a supervisory injunction, ordering the state to: 
 
‘(a) […] to devise and implement within its available resources a 
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively the 
rights of pregnant women and their new born children to have access to 
health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
                                                             
1050 TAC Orders, para 135 (3) (a). 
1051 idem, para 135 (3) (b). 
1052 idem, para 135 (3). 
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(b) The programme to be realised progressively within available 
resources must include reasonable measures for counselling and testing 
pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant women on 
the options open to them to reduce the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV, and making appropriate treatment available to them 
for such purposes’1053 [emphasis added].  
 
The approach taken by the Court of South Africa is coherent with its own 
understanding of the character of the violation. Since the Court understands the 
case to be a violation of a reasonable duty, general measures are subject to the 
principle of progressive realization and maximum available resources. The Court of 
South Africa also engaged in what Tushnet has called, ‘weak remedies’,1054 
ordering the state to develop a ‘comprehensive and co-ordinated programme’ but 
without establishing exactly what the content of such a program should be. 
 
4.3.1.2  Minimum core standard 
 
The approach of the South African Court is clearly different from the one taken by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, and the High Court of Delhi, who applied a stricter idea of 
‘minimum core’ when awarding GNR. Having established that there was a violation 
of minimum essential levels of health care, sanitation or food, in especially 
vulnerable people, these Courts engaged in the awarding of both specific 
measures, oriented to provide individual relief, and general measures, oriented to 
                                                             
1053 TAC Orders, para 135 (2). 
1054 Mark Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2004) 82 Texas 
Law Review 1895. pp. 1910-1911. 
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prevent the repetition of the violation. In the awarding of both types of measures, 
the Courts ordered the immediate provision of services, without making their 
implementation conditional on progressive realisation, or maximum available 
resources. They also employed what Tushnet calls ‘strong forms of remedies,’1055 
usually by way of structural injunctions, ordering the state to design a completely 
new policy or program, and implementing strict provisions and deadlines. 
 
In Xakmok Kasek v. Paraguay, discussed in chapter IV, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights studied how the lack of access to, and entitlement of, ancestral 
territories, forced communities in Paraguay to live in temporary settlements, where 
access to water, appropriate sanitary conditions, food, health and education were 
restricted.1056 In this case, the Inter-American Court found that the right to life 
included the ‘right to conditions that guarantee a decent existence.’1057 According to 
the Court, the measures taken by the state were not sufficient to correct the situation 
of vulnerability of indigenous communities, and the state had not guaranteed to the 
members of the community, physical or geographical access to health,1058 all of 
which implied a violation of the right to a decent existence or dignified life. In addition 
                                                             
1055 Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review 1911-1912. 
1056 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 214 (24 August 2010) paras 74, 164-
213; Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 125 (17 June 2005) paras 50.15, 
50.92-50.105. 
1057 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) paras 182. 
1058 idem paras 208. 
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to this, the Court also found the state responsible for the deaths of thirteen members 
of the community, caused by illnesses that were easily preventable.1059  
 
In this case, the Court engaged in both individual and general relief for the 
community. As part of the individual measures of reparation, and under the title 
‘rehabilitation’, the Court ordered the state to immediately and regularly provide 
medical care, including appropriate medicine and adequate treatment, for all 
members of the community, especially the elderly, children, and pregnant women.1060 
It also ordered the provision of ‘psychosocial-attention’ and ‘periodic vaccination and 
deparasitization campaigns that respect their ways and customs;’1061 and 
emphasized that medical care for women should include ‘both pre and post-natal 
[care] and [care] during the first months of the baby’s life.’1062 The Court was 
emphatic that these measures should be adopted ‘immediately’ and undertaken on a 
regular basis.1063 The call for immediate compliance with these measures is 
understandable, as the Inter-American Court had previously considered that, in order 
                                                             
1059 Such illnesses include tetanus, pneumonia, tuberculosis, anaemia, whooping cough, 
dehydration, and serious complications during labour. idem paras 231. 
1060 In the case of Xakmok Kasek (Merits), the Court ordered the state to provide ‘medical 
and psycho-social attention to all members of the Community, especially children and the 
elderly, together with periodic vaccination and deparasitization campaigns, that respected 
their ways and customs; [and the provision of] specialized medical care for pregnant women, 
both pre and post-natal and during the first months of the baby’s life’; idem para 301. 
1061 idem para 301. 
1062 idem paras 301. 
1063 In the Xamok Kasek, the Court’s wording was that the measures should be taken 
‘immediately, periodically, or permanently’. idem paras 301 and 302.  
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to ensure the protection of the right to life, states should generate the ‘minimum 
living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person.’1064  
 
The Inter-American Court did not stop there, but it also granted general relief. Under 
the ‘titles’ of rehabilitation and GNR, the Court ordered the state, within six months of 
notification, to prepare a study that established ‘(i) the frequency required for medical 
personnel to visit the Community; (ii) the main illnesses and diseases suffered by the 
members of the Community; (iii) the medicines and treatment required for those 
illnesses; (iv) the required levels of pre- and post-natal care; and, (v) the manner and 
frequency with which the vaccination and deparasitization programs should be 
carried out.’1065   
 
It is important to note that, in contrast to the South African Court, the Inter-American 
Court does not make this order subject to progressive realisation. In fact, the Inter-
American Court ordered that measures should be complied to within a specific time-
frame (six months)1066 thus, making sure that the implementation of the order was 
almost immediate.  
 
A similar approach was taken by the Colombian Constitutional Court in the Decision 
T-760/2006.1067 In this case, the Constitutional Court joined twenty-two tutela actions 
                                                             
1064 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 125 (17 June 2005) para 162.  
1065 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) para 303 (b). 
1066 idem para 303. 
1067 For comments on this case see Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, ‘How do Courts set 
Health Policy? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court (2009) 6 PLoS Medicine 2; 
and, Yamin & Parra-Vera, Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia […]. 
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with common situations of complaint in the Colombian health system.1068 The tutela 
actions revealed structural problems within the Colombian health system.1069 One 
such problem related to the existence of a two-tier program of benefits: the 
‘contributory’ system, available for workers, and a ‘subsidized’ system available for 
those people with limited resources and who could not afford the contributory 
system. Whereas the contributory system includes a full package of benefits, the 
subsidized system includes only a basic and simpler package of health benefits. 
Although this obligation is, in principle, of a progressive character,1070 the 
Constitutional Court argued that the need to unify the system was more urgent for 
health benefits in respect of children, as the Constitution recognized them as subject 
to special protection, acknowledging that they have a fundamental right to health.1071   
In this respect, the Constitutional Court also engaged in both individual and systemic 
relief provision. As for the individual cases, the Court ordered the state to protect the 
right to health of the children in the individual cases considered.1072 For example, in 
the case of a 15 year old girl who required a mammoplasty, the Constitutional Court 
                                                             
1068 T-760/2008. 
1069 Structural problems related to: access to health services included in the Obligatory Health 
Plan (POS); access to health services not included within the Obligatory Health Plan but that, 
according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, should be paid by the health 
system; access to health services required by minors; access to high-cost health services; 
and treatments of catastrophic illnesses, such as the provision of diagnostic examinations. T-
760/2008, Title II Numeral 2. 
1070 Even though the law obliges the state to progressively unify these two regimes in practice 
such unification had not been carried out. Law 100, Article 157. 
1071 Colombian Constitution, article 44. 
1072 T-760/2008 section 5.4.3. 
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ordered the local authorities to fulfill the right of the girl to health, by providing the 
requested treatment.1073  
The Court, however, did not confine the award to the provision of individual relief, but 
also engaged in the awarding of general measures. According to the Court, the 
individual measures awarded did not sufficiently remove the structural barriers that 
some children faced in accessing health services, particularly those children who are 
not covered by either of the health systems described.1074 As a result, the Court 
imposed a stronger measure for children than it did for adults, ordering the 
Regulatory Commission on Health ‘to unify the benefit plans for the boys and girls of 
the contributory and subsidized regimen by the 1 October 2009’ (fourteen months 
after the decision was issued).1075  
As the general relief related to the protection of an obligation that is considered 
‘fundamental’, the Constitutional Court issued a measure that should be complied 
with within a specific period of time. Moreover, as the measure is related to the 
protection of what can be called a minimum core obligation, the Court ordered that, 
if, by the indicated date, the state had not taken the necessary measures to 
guarantee the unification of the plan of benefits for children, ‘it will be [automatically] 
understood that the contributory system will cover the children of both the 
contributory and the subsidized system.’1076 Thus, the Court provided an order that, 
although general, is of almost immediate implementation. Clearly, as the Court is 
dealing with what can be considered a minimum core obligation, it does not subject 
the order to progressive realization. This is, again, clearly distinctive from the 
approach taken by the South African Court.  
                                                             
1073 idem section 5.4.3.1. 
1074 idem section 5.4.3.1. 
1075 idem 21st Order.  
1076 idem 21st Order. 
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Likewise, in the Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital & Ors Case1077, the 
High Court of Delhi considered two cases regarding reproductive health. The cases 
related to the systemic denial of benefits to two women living below the poverty line, 
during and after their pregnancies, despite the existence of extensive benefit 
programs that would have allowed them to receive medical care, food supplements, 
and cash assistance. In both cases they were not able to access such benefits 
because they could not provide the relevant documents to certify their status. In the 
case of Shanti Devi, she was forced to carry a dead foetus for several days, having 
been denied attention by several hospitals. The hospitals alleged that her husband 
was not able to show a valid ration card for medical services, even though she 
qualified for one. Two years later, Devi died after giving birth at home to a premature 
baby girl, without receiving any medical attention. The second case related to 
Fatima, a poor, uneducated woman who delivered her child under a tree, in full 
public view. She did not receive any assistance from a hospital, in respect of nutrition 
or health care for her and her daughter, in spite of having informed the maternity 
home of the delivery, and going to it for vaccinations.  
 
According to the Court, the failure to implement the schemes in both cases, implied a 
violation of the rights to health, the reproductive health rights of women, and to food, 
all closely linked to the right to life.1078 In its decision, the Constitutional Court stated 
that the right to health includes the right to ‘receive a minimum standard of treatment 
and care’1079 [italics out of text] and that it formed an inalienable component of the 
                                                             
1077 Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital & ORs, W.P. © Nos. 8853 of 2008.  
1078 idem paras 19-20. 
1079 idem para 19. 
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right to life.1080 As part of the reparation measures the High Court ordered individual 
compensation measures to the victims, consisting of the refund of expenses, 
provision of benefits cards and scholarships, payment of a sum of money, as well as 
the provision of food, kerosene, and medicines, and the transfer of benefits to the 
next of kin.1081  
 
In addition to these compensation measures, the High Court argued the cases were 
linked to several structural problems in the implementation of the schemes, relating 
to, among others: the lack of ‘portability’ of the schemes across states; confusion 
about the cash assistance under two of the schemes; overlapping of the schemes; 
problems in the administration of some of the scheme’s programs; difficulties in the 
system of referral to private health institutions; lack of recognition of women as 
‘primary bread winners’ that would allow them to award compensation to their 
partners in case of death; and a deficit in the statistics furnished by the State 
Government on the implementation of the programs.  
 
As a consequence, the Court issued several general measures, ordering the state: to 
ensure that, if a person is below the poverty line, such a person will be assured the 
                                                             
1080 idem para 20. 
1081 In the first case a refund of the expenses, made by Shanti’s husband for her treatment, 
was ordered. Likewise it was ordered that: a benefit card should be awarded to the family for 
her baby; a sum of money for an annual scholarship should be ensured for the child during 
the growing years, and that her daughter will receive the benefits for the annual scholarship; 
and, that a sum of money should be awarded to the husband for Shanti’s avoidable death. As 
for Fatima, the High Court ordered the state to make sure that she received her full quota of 
grains, sugar and kerosene oil, her medication for epilepsy, and a sum of money for being 
compelled to give birth under a tree. Her daughter, Alisha, should also be granted benefits 
under the appropriate schemes.  
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continued availability of health services in any part of the country;1082 to make sure 
that the state did not deny pregnant women cash assistance;1083 to make sure that 
there is an identified place which women can approach to be given the benefits;1084 
to establish ‘specific measures to improve the operation of centres for the delivery of 
food for children;’1085 to guarantee ‘safe and prompt transportation of pregnant 
women from their places of residence to public health institutions;’1086 that, in cases 
of maternal death, the family should get the cash benefit established for the death of 
the ‘primary bread winner;’’1087 to collect statistics on the performance of the 
implementation of the schemes;1088 and, to take measures in order to secure that 
migrant, pregnant women could access all of the benefit programs.1089  
 
In the previous cases, the Inter-American Court, the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
and the Court of Delhi, did not make any of this measures subject to progressive 
realisation. These courts seem to understand the minimum core as part of an 
‘essential minimum’ of a particular right.1090 According to this view, the essential 
minimum elements of a right are selected in accordance with its link to a foundational 
norm, such as the right to life. In all cases, the courts linked the protection of the right 
to health directly to some dimension of the right to life. The Inter-American Court, for 
                                                             
1082 idem Order (i). 
1083 idem Order (ii). 
1084 idem Order (iii). 
1085 idem Order (iv). 
1086 idem Order (v). 
1087 idem Order (vi). 
1088 idem Order (vii). 
1089 idem Order (viii). 
1090 Katharine G. Young, ‘The minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in 
Search of Content’(2008) 33 The Yale Journal of International Law 113, pp. 126-140. 
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example, found that the right to life included the ‘right to conditions that guarantee a 
decent existence’1091 and, as a consequence, the state should guarantee adequate 
access to health to the members of the indigenous community. The Colombian Court 
identified the right to health as a fundamental right based on its intrinsic nexus with 
the undeniable right to life.1092 Similarly, the Court of Delhi emphasised that the 
cases involved violations to the rights to health and reproductive rights which are 
‘inalienable survival rights that form part of the right to life.’1093   
 
The CESCR may wish to learn from the experiences of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the Colombian Constitutional Court, and the High Court of Delhi, 
when recommending both individual and general measures, in cases of violations of 
minimum core elements of the right to health. As in cases previously discussed, if the 
CESCR wants to follow the ‘minimum core’ approach, it could imitate the strong 
remedial powers and structural injunctions used by these courts. The Committee 
could order changes in public policies and benefit programs, and the development of 
studies and reports that inform the situation of compliance regarding the specific 
element of the right to health, as well as demanding human rights training programs, 
in order to comply with minimum core obligations of the right to health. In all cases, 
the Courts established measures that went beyond the mere declaration of designing 
a new policy. They actually engaged in ‘strong remedies’,1094 in the form of structural 
injunctions, by providing detailed orders oriented to build adequate policies. This 
contrasts with the South African model in which ‘weak remedies’1095 were awarded, 
ordering the state ‘to devise and implement […] a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
                                                             
1091 Xákmok Kásek (Merits) paras 182. 
1092Young, The minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights 125-40. 
1093 Laxmi Mandal para 2. 
1094 Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review 1911-1912. 
1095 Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review 1910-1911. 
336 
 
programme’ without providing specific guidance on how such programs should be 
carried out. Although the orders are certainly bolder than in the South African model, 
the Inter-American Court, as well as the Colombian and Indian Courts, are respectful 
of the freedom that the state has in the selection of the means by which it complies 
with its obligations. 
Moreover, in each of the three cases presented, the orders were not conditional 
upon progressive realisation and maximum available resources, as the measures 
dealt with violations to core obligations. In fact, in the cases of the Inter-American 
Court, and the Constitutional Court of Colombia, they provided very strict deadlines 
for the implementation of the measures, thus ensuring compliance within a relatively 
short amount of time.  
This distinction between the different approaches to the understanding of ‘minimum 
core’ and reasonableness has been largely discussed in the relevant literature.1096 
As Lemaitre and Young explained, whereas the Colombian Constitutional Court has 
opted for a substantial approach, finding dignity and life more important than 
economic rationality, even in cases of high-cost illnesses, the Constitutional Court of 
South African has opted for a procedural approach, one that focuses on the type of 
interests that were taken into account, and the justification of the government to act 
                                                             
1096 For a discussion about the minimum core v. reasonableness approach, see: Katharine G. 
Young & Julieta Lemaitre, ‘The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health: Two Tales of 
Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 179; 
Mesenbet Assefa, ‘Defining the Minimum Core Obligations-Conundrums in International 
Human Rights Law and Lessons from the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2010) 1 
Mekele University Law Journal 1; and Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, ‘Human Rights and 
Remedial Equilibration: Equilibrating Socio-Economic Rights’(2010-2011) 36 Brookling 
Journal of International Law 453. 
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in certain way.1097 The approach of the minimum core taken by the Constitutional 
Court has been criticized as being insensitive to its context. 1098 In fact, as Amartya 
Sen has argued, the requirements for survival are not always clearly identifiable, 
and may change depending on the group and the region.1099 In turn, the approach 
of reasonableness taken by the South African Court may be seen as a way to 
empty the concept of ‘minimum core’ of all meaning, and as creating a ‘culture of 
justification’ in favor of government policies.1100  
 
The CESCR will have to clarify exactly how to make coherent its interpretation of 
minimum core in General Comment No. 3 and 14, with its interpretation of 
reasonableness set in Article 8 of the Optional Protocol. If, following the Statement 
issued in 2007, the CESCR wants to follow a model of ‘minimum obligations’1101 it 
could take into account the models of the Colombian, Indian, and Inter-American 
Courts, by including the criterion of affecting vulnerable populations, such as 
children, pregnant women or indigenous people, as a way to determine the 
reasonableness of the measures. In the cases analyzed, the Colombian and Indian 
Courts seem to justify the special protection of ‘minimum core’ obligations based 
upon the fact that the violations affected people who should be specially protected. 
In the Colombian Case, the fact that the violation occurred against children, who 
                                                             
1097 Young & Lemaitre, The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health 210-211 
1098 Young, The minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights 130-131. 
1099 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1982), [cited in Katharine G. Young, ‘The minimum Core of Economic and 
Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’, 33 The Yale Journal of International Law, p. 
131] 
1100 Etienne Mureinik, ‘Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution’ 
(1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 464, pp. 470-474. 
1101 Young, The minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights 151. 
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should be especially safeguarded, was determinant in creating the strict measures 
applied. Similarly, the Court of Delhi emphasized that the petitions involved two 
mothers and their babies. Also, in Xamok Kasek, the Inter-American Court 
recognized that the measures taken by the state were not sufficient to correct the 
situation of vulnerability of indigenous communities. In all of these cases the 
protection of a ‘minimum core’ of rights was justified, among other reasons, 
because it affected vulnerable people. 
 
Applying this rationality in the analysis of individual communications by the CESCR, 
in cases of violations to minimum core obligations, the CESCR will have to take 
appropriate measures in order to secure the compliance of such minimum core. 
Following the model of remedies of the Colombian and Indian Courts, as well as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the CESCR could engage in strong forms of 
remedies, ordering states to adopt programs and policies that comply with the 
minimum core obligations on the right to health. In ordering such measures, the 
CESCR could provide clear details of the general elements that such programs 
should include, or, outline some of the steps that authorities should take in dealing 
with this, as per the actions of the Inter-American Court, and the Supreme Court of 
Delhi, but always allowing the state to choose the final means of compliance. The 
measures would not be subject to progressiveness and maximum available 
resources, but instead should be complied with in a relatively short time.  
 
4.3.2  GNR and the redress of violations of progressive realization  
 
In those cases of violations of non-core obligations, states would have an obligation 
to take steps up to the maximum of their available resources, in order to achieve 
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progressively the full realization of the rights established in the Covenant.1102 The 
expression ‘up to the maximum of available resources’ implies that states should be 
able to demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all available resources in 
order to fulfil the obligations established under the Covenant.1103 In turn, the duty to 
achieve ‘progressively’ the protection of ESC rights implies states have a duty to take 
steps in order to achieve this goal.1104 This duty also implies that any retrogressive 
measures should be avoided unless they are adequately and proportionately 
justified, in reference to the totality of the rights established in the Covenant.1105  
 
In these situations, reparation measures should also address the specific harm 
originated in duties of progressive realization. For example, if the Committee finds 
that a certain state has not taken measures up to the maximum of the available 
resources in order to provide access to non-core elements of the right, or that it has 
undertaken retrogressive measures that are not adequately justified, the Committee 
could get involved in both individual and general relief.  
 
In defining general relief, the Committee should also be consistent with the principles 
of progressive realization and maximum available resources. This is particularly 
important taking into account that GNR are broad in scope (taking the form of, 
                                                             
1102 ICESCR, Article 2.1  
1103 CESCR GC 14  para 47.  
1104 Other circumstances for the evaluation of progressive obligations are: the extent that the 
measures are targeted towards the fulfilment of ESC rights; whether the measures are non-
discriminatory; that the allocation of resources was in accordance with international human 
rights standards; that the policy adopted corresponds to the option that least restrict rights, 
and that the measures take into account the situation of disadvantaged and marginalized 
people. See, E/C.12/2007/1, para 8. 
1105 CESCR GC 3  para 9.  
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among others, legislative reforms, educational measures addressed to state officials, 
adoption of manuals, and the creation of databases) and may imply a high 
expenditure of resources that are not often easily available in low income countries, 
where the right to health is violated.  
Examples of both individual and general relief in an obligation of progressive 
realisation can also be found in the previously discussed decision, T-760/2008. In 
this decision, the Colombian Constitutional Court looked at cases of several adults 
who required different health services, not included in the plan of benefits.1106 Unlike 
the previously discussed minimum core obligation to provide right to health services 
to children, the Constitutional Court concluded that the obligation to actualize the 
plan of benefits for adults is, in principle, an obligation of progressive realization.1107 
The Court considered that, in those specific cases where the services were required 
(or indispensable) in order to maintain the petitioners’ health, and could not be 
afforded by the petitioners themselves, there was a duty of the state to provide such 
services.1108 As a consequence, in the cases analyzed in the decision, the 
Constitutional Court ordered the government to protect the individual rights of the 
petitioners by guaranteeing their effective access to health services.1109 
                                                             
1106 The claimants required access to medicines for diabetes (Case T-1328235) and to 
diagnostic, magnetic resonance images (T-1337845). 
1107 According to the Constitutional Court, since these services were required for adults, as 
opposed to children, they were not part of a minimum core of the right to health. T-760/2008 
Section 6.1.2.1.1.  
1108 The Constitutional Court has established that the right to health includes the right to 
access to health services that are required or indispensable in order to maintain the health of 
a person or that compromise the right to a dignified life and personal integrity. T-760/2008 
Section 4.4.3. 
1109 See orders 8th and 10th, protecting the right to health of the petitioners and confirming the 
precautionary measures by which it authorized the effective access to the health services.   
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The decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court does not stop at the provision of 
individual relief, but also engages in general measures. According to the Court, 
these cases related to a more structural problem, linked to lack of updating and 
unification of the plans of benefits. In the Court’s opinion the state had a legal 
obligation to actualize1110 and progressively unify both the ‘subsidized’ and 
‘contributory’ systems of health by 2000.1111 By the time the case was considered by 
the Constitutional Court, the government had not undertaken a systemic and 
comprehensive update in fourteen years of validity of the Obligatory Plans of Health 
(POS),1112 and had not carried out any program, or prepared any schedule with 
specific plans, to show any effort in the unification of such plans.1113 As a 
consequence, the Constitutional Court ordered both the unification and 
comprehensive updating of the POS.1114  
In the awarding of general measures, the Court also gave full application to 
progressive realisation and maximum available resources. It ordered the National 
Commission on Health Regulation that, in the process of updating, it should indicate 
‘the services that are excluded, as well as those that will be gradually included.’1115 
The National Commission should also take into account the economic sustainability 
                                                             
1110 Law 100/1993, Republic of Colombia, Article 162, para 2. 
1111 The Constitutional Court founded its decision in Article 157 of Ley 100/1993, which states 
that ‘from 2000 onwards, every Colombian ought to be part of the Health System through 
either the contributory or subsidized regimen, in which progressively the systems will be 
unified in order that all inhabitants of the national territory receive the Obligatory Health Plan 
established in article 162’. T-760/2008 Section 6.1.2.1.1.  
1112 T-760/2008 Section 6.1.1.1.2. 
1113 T-760/2008 Section 6.1.2.1.1. 
1114 T-760/2008 Order 7th. 
1115 T-760/2008 Order 7th (ii). 
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of the system.1116 Regarding the Unification, the Court also ordered the National 
Commission on the Regulation in Health to adopt a program and timetable to 
gradually and sustainably unify both systems, taking into account (i) the priorities of 
the population according to epidemiological studies and (ii) its financial 
sustainability.1117  
It is highly important to note here how, in both individual and general orders, the 
Constitutional Court integrates the principle of progressive realization by including 
gradual obligations. In both cases, the Court also refers to the need to make the 
updating and unification process economically sustainable, consistent with the 
concept of maximum available resources.  
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court did not specify exactly what should be the 
concrete content of the unification. Instead, it established some procedural principles 
and general standards that the Government should take into account. The 
Constitutional Court established, for example, that, in addition to being gradual and 
economically sustainable, the comprehensive updating of health packages should 
take into account the principles of ‘integrality’ and ‘required attention.’1118 In this 
regard, the Court was also aware that, as such actions are complex in their definition 
and require the coordinated effort of different branches of power, the legislative and 
the executive are the ones with more democratic legitimacy to define the content of 
such policies. Moreover, in order to provide a truly democratic meaning to the 
process, it ordered the National Commission to offer opportunities for the direct and 
                                                             
1116 T-760/2008 Order 7th (iv). 
1117 T-760/2008 Order 22nd. 
1118 T-760/2008 Section 4.4.6.1. 
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effective participation of organizations that represent the interests of users and the 
medical community.1119  
This dialogic approach, one that enhances the participation of beneficiaries of 
policies in the creation of such policies, seems to be a good way of reconciling the 
deferential respect to the state in the drafting of its own policies, and the need to 
award meaningful remedies to the victims of violations. This resulted in several 
internet-based consultations, meetings with local authorities, consultations with 
experts, and the publication, on the internet, of details of the project to update the 
health plan.1120Even though the process of consultation has resulted in practical 
difficulties,1121 the order of the Constitutional Court could be seen, in Tobin’s words, 
as a facilitator between the state and the right-holders, regarding the direction, 
content and speed of the steps taken by the state in order to fulfill their 
obligations.1122  
 
 
                                                             
1119 T-760/2008 Sections 6.1.1.2.3 and orders 17th and 22nd. 
1120 Resolution No. 005521(27 December 2013) Republic of Colombia, Preamble. 
1121 The problems were related to the complexity of the procedures, the formal nature of the 
requirement to be invited to participate, and the fact that the procedure was internet-based; 
this imposed a barrier, especially for those not living in the cities. In addition to this, the 
procedure was seen as mere ‘socialization’ rather than decision-making. Camila Gianella-
Malca, ‘A Human Rights Based Approach to Participation in Health Reform: Experiences 
from the Implementation of Constitutional Court Orders in Colombia’ (2013) 31 Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights 84, p.100. 
1122 John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 
2012) p. 233. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
This section analyzed how GNR have, in fact, been applied by different international 
and domestic tribunals in the redress of different duties of the right to health. 
Concretely, they have been used for the redress of violations of duties to respect, 
protect and fulfill the right to health. In all cases, GNR or general measures have 
been awarded, in addition to individual forms of reparation, as a way to prevent 
future violations.  
Careful differentiation needs to be made when awarding GNR for the redress of the 
duty to fulfill the right to health. In those cases of violations to minimum core 
obligations, and following the model of the Inter-American Court, as well as the 
Colombian and Indian Courts, GNR or general measures are usually quite detailed in 
content and are designed to make sure that, in the future, the minimum core of the 
right to health is protected. They are also subject to strong form of remedies that call 
for almost immediate application of the measures. For example, in Xakmok Kasek 
and T-760-2008, the Court ordered the state to provide the specified general 
measures within six months of the enactment of the decision. In contrasts, when 
awarding GNR for the protection of duties subject to progressive realization, GNR 
are drafted in more generic terms, ordering the state to take measures in order to 
progressively realize the fulfilment of the right. The distinction between the different 
forms of GNR is compatible with the understanding that the Committee has about the 
nature of obligations on the right to health. In its general comments, the Committee 
has traditionally recognized that there is a minimum core of obligation on the right to 
health that states must comply with. If the Committee wants to be consistent with this 
understanding of the obligations, it should apply the same model in the awarding of 
general measures.  
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Table 6 provides a summary of the GNR awarded in relation to each type of 
violation: 
 
Table No. 6. 
General measures awarded in relation to each type of violation of the right to health 
 
Obligations Violation 
(Example) 
Individual redress 
(compensation, 
restitution, rehabilitation) 
 
General measures (GNR) 
Respect  
Refrain from 
denying access to 
contraception or 
sexual or 
reproductive life. 
The state enacts a 
law banning access 
to a form of assisted 
reproduction 
(IACHR, IVF v 
Costa Rica). 
To provide access to IVF 
treatment to the couples 
that could not benefit from 
such form of assisted 
reproduction. 
To withdraw the restriction. 
To set up courses on 
sexual and reproductive 
rights addressed to 
members of the judiciary 
and legislative in order to 
avoid the restrictive 
interpretation or the 
enactment of restrictive 
laws in the future. 
Protect 
To ensure that 
privatization of the 
health sector does 
not constitute a 
threat to the […] 
quality of health 
facilities, goods and 
services. 
Lack of appropriate 
legislation, and 
mechanisms of 
accountability  
allowing private 
actors to fail to 
guarantee health 
services of good 
quality (IACHR, 
Ximenes Lopez v. 
Brasil) 
To provide adequate 
access to justice and 
accountability mechanisms 
in order that people can 
access to adequate health 
services. 
To draft the necessary 
policies, legislation, and 
mechanism of 
accountability needed in 
order to make private 
actors accountable in the 
provision of health 
services in that country. 
Fulfill 
 
Minimum core  
To guarantee 
minimum core 
obligations in the 
right to health. 
The state did not 
provide minimum 
health care to 
vulnerable 
populations 
(indigenous people, 
children and 
pregnant women) or 
minimum levels of 
food (Xakmok 
Kasek v Paraguay; 
T.760-2006 and 
PUCL v Union of 
India & Ors). 
To provide access to 
health services or 
minimum levels of food to 
the claimant(s) in all cases. 
Measures should be 
precise and immediately 
enforceable. 
To provide measures 
oriented to tackle the root 
causes of the violations 
(reports, changes in 
legislation, public policies, 
programs, etc. wherever is 
needed and keep a causal 
link with the violation) 
Measures should be 
precise but can be 
enforceable within certain 
time framework. 
Progressive 
realization 
To guarantee in a 
progressive manner 
and in accordance 
with maximum 
available resources 
non-core health 
services.  
The state did not 
guarantee adequate 
access to non-core 
health services in 
spite the fact that 
under a test of 
reasonableness 
there is an 
obligation of the 
state to protect such 
right. (TAC Case 
and some sections 
of T-760-2006). 
Under the circumstances 
stated by the case the 
state should provide 
access to non-core health 
services to the claimant(s). 
Measures should be 
precise but can be 
progressively achieved. 
To provide a plan that 
tackles the root causes of 
the violation and that 
progressively realizes that 
specific aspect of the right 
to health (i.e. to adopt a 
plan to progressively 
update the plan of 
benefits).  
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5. The need for a participatory process 
 
The awarding of GNR or general measures can be very restrictive in terms of the 
margin of discretion that states have in defining its public policies and programs, 
particularly in obligations of progressive realisation. In order to balance this situation, 
domestic courts have increasingly awarded measures of a participatory nature, 
allowing relevant stake holders to participate in the definition of a particular 
legislation, program or public policy.   
As mentioned in the previous section, the Colombian Case is emblematic in this 
regard. In T-760/2008, the Constitutional Court ordered the National Commission on 
the Regulation in Health to (integrally) update the Obligatory Health Plans 
(subsidized and contributive) according to the parameters established by law and the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.1123 In doing this, the Court ordered that ‘the 
Commission must ensure direct and effective participation of the medical community 
and the users of the health system.’1124 The Court also ordered that, in the 
progressive unification of the benefits offered in the two benefit plan (subsidized and 
contributive), direct and effective participation of both the medical community and the 
users of the health system should be allowed.1125 The Constitutional Court did not 
specify which institutions and actors should be invited in the participatory process but 
retained jurisdiction in order to verify whether the relevant authorities comply or not 
with the standards proposed.1126  
                                                             
1123 T-760/2008,order 17th. 
1124 idem 
1125 idem, Order 22nd.  
1126 idem 
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In order to comply with the decision, between 2008 and 2010, the Minister of Social 
Protection undertook seminars with experts, workshops with relevant actors, and 
public consultations open to any citizen, mainly via internet. According to Gianella-
Malca, this process suffered from a lack of clarity of the procedures, absence of an 
inclusive methodology for participation, lack of participation of groups entitled to 
special protection, and a lack of information about human and financial resources.1127 
Since 2010, the process has been led by the Health Regulation Commission, but still 
several problems remained.1128  
In spite of the difficulties in the process of participation, the order provided by the 
Court has been recognized as an important opportunity for the creation of a 
‘democratic deliberative process’ in which people can discuss the type of health 
system they want.1129 The decision has been used as an historic moment to discuss, 
for the first time, the characteristics of the health system in Colombia.1130  
Although it is unrealistic to think that a single judicial decision may ‘fix’ the structural 
problems of a health system, the establishment of participatory mechanisms in the 
judicial decision may contribute greatly in creating mechanisms that help to tackle 
                                                             
1127 Gianella-Malca, A Human Rights Based Approach 99. See also, Camila Gianella-Malca, 
Oscar Parra-Vera, Alicia Ely Yamin, and Mauricio Torres-Tovar, ‘¿Deliberación democrática 
o mercadeo social? Los dilemas de la definición publica en salud en el contexto del 
seguimiento de la sentencia T-760 de 2008’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights: An 
International Journal 1, p. 8-9.  
1128 The complexity of the procedures, a formal requirement to be invited to participate, and 
the internet-based procedure, created a barrier, especially for those living in cities that had 
less internet access. In addition to this, the procedure was seen as mere ‘socialization’ rather 
than decision-making. Gianella-Malca, A Human rights Based Approach 100. 
1129 Gianella-Malca (et al), ¿Deliberación democrática o mercadeo social? 8.  
1130 Yamin  & Parra-Vera Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia […] 127. 
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the problems. As Rodriguez-Garavito has argued, unlike unilaterally imposing 
judges’ criteria, structural and dialogical judicial decisions ‘promote the transparent, 
public and reasoned deliberation about difficult decision of prioritization in the health 
system.’1131 As a consequence they ‘promote efficiency, transparency and 
accountability in decision-making within the health system.’1132   
An adequate model for the awarding of GNR or general measures, in the redress of 
right to health violations, should take into account that the participation of stake 
holders is necessary in order to facilitate the creation of legislation, programs and 
policies from a human rights perspective. Without establishing specific ways to draft 
them, allowing the participation of victims in the definition of such measures may be 
the best way to provide adequate relief, in those cases where public policies are 
either non-existent or inadequate, in terms of human rights standards. In fact, 
CESCR has already recommended states to take appropriate measures with the 
participation of local actors in some of its concluding observations.1133 This is an 
interesting practice in which the CESCR could engage when deciding cases under 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. 
 
                                                             
1131 Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘The judicialization of health care: symptoms, diagnosis, and 
prescriptions’ in Randall Peeremboom and Tom Ginsburg, Law and Development of Middle-
Income Countries. Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap, (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 
268. 
1132 idem. 
1133 UN, CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Mexico’ (1999) UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.4  para. 44. For a similar proposal see, 
Viviana Krsticevic and Brian Griffey, ‘Remedial Recommendations’ in Malcom Langford & 
others (eds), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria University Law Press, 2004). 
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6. Implementation and monitoring  
 
The enforcement of the decision is very often the most difficult part of any litigation 
strategy. This is particularly problematic in the awarding of GNR which frequently link 
to structural measures and measures with wide scope. Whereas some other 
reparation measures are quickly implemented (e.g. the payment of compensation), 
GNR have a more complex implementation process usually requiring the 
coordination of several institutions, the carrying out of legal processes, and the 
appropriation of a specific budget (e.g. legislative reform and human rights training). 
As a result, states usually delay the implementation of this type of measures. 
Baluarte analyzed 91 reparation decisions issued by the Inter-American Court of 
Human rights between 1989 and 2009, and found that the payment of compensation, 
together with some symbolic measures of admission of responsibility (e.g. publishing 
pertinent parts of the decision and carrying out public events of acknowledgment of 
responsibility), are the measures with the highest level of compliance.1134 In contrast, 
GNR usually have a lower level of fulfillment. Among several forms of GNR, different 
levels of compliance can be identified: the order to carry out human rights training 
has 38% compliance; legislative measures were implemented in 19% of the cases 
analyzed, and the establishment of development funds was carried out in just 11% of 
the decisions.1135  
                                                             
1134 Whereas compensation measures were complied with in 60% of the cases analysed (126 
out of 2008), symbolic admissions of responsibility were implemented in 64% of the cases 
(84 out of 131). David Baluarte, ‘The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of Inter-American 
Court litigation and the Strategic imperative for victims Representatives’ (2011-2012) 27 
American University International Law Review 263, p. 284. 
1135 idem 293, 297 and 303. 
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Similar figures were found in a study by Hawkings and Jacoby, according to which, in 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the payment of material and moral 
damages have a higher level of implementation in comparison with measures 
ordering the amendment of domestic law.1136 The same study revealed that, in the 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘just satisfaction has been [usually] paid but 
individual and/or general measures are very often stalled.’1137  
The awarding of GNR in the redress of violations to the right to health is not very 
different. GNR may usually imply the coordination of several institutions and the 
appropriation of specific budgets. As a consequence, the enforcement of these 
measures can be even more complex and usually take more time.1138 Whereas it is 
understandable that the implementation of GNR or general measures is very costly 
for the states and therefore difficult to implement, this should not be a reason to deny 
granting them. There are several reasons that support this position.  
First, there is a normative reason. GNR are part of the international law of human 
rights. As developed in chapters I, II and III, GNR are established in both the ILC 
Comments and in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations for victims of Gross Violations: both are ‘soft law’ documents that 
provide content in the interpretation of international law. In addition to this, regional 
                                                             
1136 Payment of material and moral damages has 40% and 43% compliance, respectively. In 
contrast, the amendment of domestic law was complied with in just 7% of the cases 
analysed. Darren Hawkings and Wade Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the 
European and inter-American Courts of Human Rights’, (2010-2011)  6 Journal of 
International Law and International Relations 35.  
1137 idem 71. 
1138 No specific studies have been found showing whether there is a difference in the 
enforcement of GNR depending on whether it is a civil and political right, or an economic, 
social and cultural right.  
351 
 
courts of human rights have, in practice, affirmed the existence of such measures. 
Denying their existence would be to deny binding obligations that states undertake to 
fulfill. The normative existence of GNR does not mean that such measures should be 
awarded in all cases of violations of human rights. In chapter III, it was shown how a 
defensible theory for the awarding of GNR should focus the awarding of these 
measures on three circumstances: gross and serious violations of human rights, 
large-scale violations, and risk of repetition. Restricting the application of GNR to 
only these specific circumstances, would help to reduce the number of applications 
to those cases that strictly need GNR.  
Second, the fact that GNR require money and effort should not be a reason to deny 
its application. Other reparation measures, such as compensation and rehabilitation 
measures, also require large expenditure by the state. It is true that the enforcement 
of GNR may require large amounts of money, especially when they are related to the 
compliance of general, overall programs and policies that, for example, require the 
provision of basic services. However, this should not be the case for the enforcement 
of all GNR. The enactment of specific legislation, the elaboration of reports about the 
state of compliance of a specific element of a right, the establishment of human 
rights courses, and the dissemination of information, do not require extensive 
financial sums and can be easily achieved when there is the political will.  
In order to tackle this problem, international and domestic courts have, increasingly, 
invited local actors to participate in the monitoring of the decision by, for example, 
providing information about the level of its implementation. Although this may extend 
the process of following up decisions, and eventually increase the workload of 
tribunals, it may have the potential to provide the tribunal with different point of views 
about the difficulties of the process of implementation.  
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In this regard, the Colombian experience can be also relevant. In T-760/2006, the 
Constitutional Court invited several organizations, including health institutions, 
NGOs, users’ organizations, universities and academics, to be part of the follow-up 
groups to discuss the implementation of the decision.1139 The Constitutional Court 
also issued specific orders to the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Attorney General, 
the Minister of Social Protection, and the National Superintendence of Health, to 
collect and provide information about the compliance of the decision.1140 This order 
resulted in the establishment of hearings where different stakeholders have had the 
opportunity to present their views.  
Similarly, in the Inter-American system extended follow-up hearings have contributed 
to the implementation of measures. In these meetings both the state and the 
representatives of the victims are invited to express their views about the level of 
compliance with the decision, and to the Inter-American Commission to present 
observations of both the state and the victims’ reports.1141 As part of the hearings, 
the Court notes the advances made, draws the attention of the states in those cases 
where the lack of compliance arises from the lack of political will, and proposes 
alternatives to reach agreements. During these hearings the Court can also propose 
the undertaking of timetables for the compliance of decisions. The Inter-American 
Court has used this power in an innovative manner by carrying out joint hearings 
                                                             
1139 Colombian Constitutional Court, Order 09 (December 2008), Order 03 (December 2009); 
and Order 095 (21 May 2010). 
1140 T-760/2008 orders 20th; 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 26th.  
1141 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (approved by the Court 
during its LXXX Regular Period of Sessions held from November 16 to 28 of 2009) Article 69. 
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related to the compliance of measures issued in different Colombian cases, all 
related to medical and psychological attention.1142   
An adequate model for the compliance of GNR or general measures should include 
measures to facilitate the involvement of the relevant stake holders in the 
implementation and monitoring process. In this regard, CESCR has extended 
invitations to non-governmental organizations to monitor the implementation of 
concluding observations, and to report back to the Committee.1143 This practice, 
could be extended by the CESCR to facilitate compliance of measures arising from 
the Optional Protocol to ICESCR.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter aimed to develop some of the standards on how GNR or general 
measures could be awarded by the CESCR, in the redress of violations to the right to 
                                                             
1142 Resolution, 29 April 2010, related to reparation measures about medical and 
psychological attention, in the Colombian cases: 19 Merchants, Mapiripán Massacre, 
Gutierrez Soler, Pueblo Bello Massacre, La Rochela Massacre, Ituango Massacre, Escué 
Zapata y Valle Jaramillo, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Resolution cited in 
Resolution of the 8th of February 2012, Monitoring Compliance with the measures of 
Reparation Concerning the Medical and Psychological Attention ordered in Nine Colombian 
Cases – Notice of a Private Hearing, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/comerciantes_08_02_12_ing.pdf)    
1143 UN, Economic and Social Council, ‘Report on the Twenty-second, Twenty-Third and 
Twenty-Fourth Sessions’ (7 June 2001) E/2001/22, Annex V, para 27.Cited in M. O’Flaherty, 
‘Concluding Observations of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law 
Review, p. 51. 
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health. It analysed the nature, scope, circumstances, the specific remedies to be 
granted depending on the duty violated (respect, protect, fulfil), the level of 
participation that they should include and some of the difficulties in compliance.  
 
After the analysis of each of these elements, several lessons can be drawn for the 
Committee, the CESCR could i) understand general measures as future oriented 
measures, oriented to tackle the root causes of the violation; ii) learn from the wide 
scope of measures available in the awarding of GNR by different regional and 
domestic tribunals; iii) be motivated by the examples presented to award adequate 
and effective measures for violations to the duties to respect, protect and fulfil; iv) 
particularly in cases of violations to duties of the minimum core, CESCR could 
engage in ‘strong remedies’ that call for the implementation of public policies and 
programs that guarantee the fulfilment of the right to health; v) in cases of violations 
to duties of progressive realization, the Committee could learn from the participatory 
model proposed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, in order to provide measures 
that are both deferential to the state and meaningful to the victims; and vi) explore 
the development of new mechanisms for following up decisions, so as to allow the 
participation of social organizations and civil society in the adoption of general 
measures, as well as during their implementation process.  
 
When comparing the awarding of GNR in the right to health and health-related 
cases, with the awarding of similar measures in civil and political rights, it was clear 
that there were not major differences. Regardless of the type of right to which they 
are assigned, GNR have a similar nature and scope, and are granted under similar 
circumstances. As a consequence, the common critique is overstated, i.e. the 
argument that the redress of right to health violations, and ESCR violations in 
general, require complex remedies involving the redistribution of scarce resources, 
obstruct the competence of other branches of power, and are difficult to implement. 
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This critique ignores the fact that GNR and general relief are increasingly deployed 
mechanisms of reparations in international human rights law that are applicable to all 
human rights.   
 
However, when discussing the specific remedies to be granted depending on the 
type of duty violated, some differences were found. Whereas the awarding of GNR or 
general measures in the redress of violations to minimum core obligations may 
require, following the Colombian model, measures of almost immediate compliance, 
the awarding of GNR in violations of duties of progressive realisation should be 
subject to progressive realisation and maximum available resources. This differs 
significantly from the awarding of GNR and general measures in civil and political 
rights, which are not subject to progressive realisation and maximum available 
resources and, therefore, are not subject to this differential treatment.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest by international bodies to award 
reparation measures of a general scope either in the form of GNR or as general 
measures. Both, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have consistently ordered or 
recommended states to adopt GNR. The European Court of Human Rights has also 
awarded general measures in the analysis of pilot judgments. Similarly, the CEDAW 
Committee and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities have 
consistently recommended states to adopt general measures in order to comply with 
their obligations. Despite the increasing use of GNR, there is not yet a clear 
understanding of what they are, how to award this type of remedies and even less of 
how to do it in cases concerning violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
such as the right to health. This thesis aimed to make a critical contribution to the 
understanding of remedies in international law as there was little literature in the field 
of GNR. It also aimed to go further by studying its application in right to health cases. 
This also represented a key contribution to the literature as most of the academic 
work had focused in showing the difficulties of granting remedies for socio-economic 
rights but there were no contributions explaining how GNR could be actually 
awarded in the redress of this type of rights.  
The research questions of this thesis can be summarized as follows. First, what is 
the nature and characteristic of the concept of GNR in both international law and 
international human rights law? Second, how can this type of remedy be applied to 
the redress of violations of the right to health? In order to answer these questions the 
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thesis was divided in two parts. Whereas the first part (chapters I to III) explored the 
nature and characteristics of GNR; the second part (chapters IV to V) explored its 
application to cases related with the right to health. 
Nature, scope and circumstances for the award of GNR in 
international law and international human rights law 
 
The first half of this thesis (chapters I to III) explored whether there is an obligation 
under international law to provide GNR; under what circumstances it applies, how 
GNR should be crafted, and what is the scope of the measures. The analysis of the 
concept of GNR in PIL (chapter I) showed GNR is a concept established in the ILC 
Draft Article of State Responsibility and the ICJ’s case law. Besides the Draft Articles 
do not have binding force, so there is no clarity as to whether there is an 
international customary law obligation of states to offer GNR, the chapter showed 
there is an increasing practice of both international tribunals and states, as well as 
treaty law, recognising the existence of such duty. In addition to LaGrand which is 
perhaps the most important case in the ICJ’s case law showing the recognition of 
GNR in a particular case, this thesis showed how other tribunals, mainly, human 
rights tribunals have increasingly incorporated this concept in their catalogue of 
reparation measures. At the same time, states have showed an increasing 
acceptance of the concept, not just by tacitly supporting the work of the ILC, but also 
by increasingly requesting GNR in their diplomatic use. Moreover, treaty law, 
particularly, as recognised in article 24 of the ICPPED, has also recognised GNR as 
a form of reparation. The detailed work incorporated in this thesis shows that even 
though GNR are not clearly recognized as customary law in PIL, there is an 
increasing practice in international tribunals, state practice and treaty law moving in 
that direction.    
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Chapter II analyzed the concept of GNR in global human rights instruments and UN 
human rights bodies. GNR were first developed in the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law. Such guidelines find its origin in the reports 
authored by Theo van Boven and Luis Joinet as UN rapporteurs. The basic 
principles and Guidelines became in the most authoritative source on the right to a 
remedy and reparation under international human rights law. More recently, and as it 
was previously stated, core human rights treaties, such Article 24 (5) of the ICPPD, 
have also recognised GNR as a form of reparation.  
In turn, UN Human rights bodies have also engaged in the adoption of GNR when 
recommending general measures in the analysis of individual communications. Both, 
CEDAW and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities have been the 
most prolific ones in the application of such measures. The Human Rights 
Committee have been increasingly recognising the existence of such measures in its 
case law. In turn, the Committee against Torture has recognised the content of GNR, 
in its General Comment No. 3 on the ‘Implementation of article 14 by States parties’, 
although it has not incorporated the practice of recommending general measures in 
its case law. UN Committees have recommended a very wide scope of measures 
going from legislative changes to the formulation of policies, and from the provision 
of training to judges to the investigation and reparation of human rights violations. 
There are not, however, clear criteria as to in which cases should GNR be awarded.  
This chapter also analysed the concept of GNR in the pilot judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Pilot Judgments were created as an exceptional 
procedure to deal with repetitive complaints coming from structural or systemic 
violations of human rights. This mechanism has allowed the European Court to 
award general measures usually in the form of legislative changes, adoption of 
mechanisms of redress or compensation. Besides the European Court has been 
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very cautious in the application of this type of procedure applying it, just to very 
exceptional cases, and after a process of previous consultation with the state, 
general measures resemble in nature and function to GNR. In this regard, the 
chapter explained how the European Court could apply a more progressive 
understanding of reparations according to international standards by applying 
general measures in cases of gross violations of human rights and by expanding the 
scope of the measures recommended. 
Finally, this chapter studied the concept of GNR in the case law of the African Court 
and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. While the African Court has 
awarded GNR in the forms of legislative reform in just one case, the African 
Commission has developed an extensive case law. In these cases, the African 
Commission has recommended measures with a large a varied scope such as to 
modify the domestic legislation, to carry out assessments, to establish specific 
institutions or expert bodies to deal with a particular situation, and to undertake 
changes in state institutions such as the judicial power or the police. Here again, 
GNR or general measures were understood as a form of reparation with a preventive 
nature oriented to impact the root causes of human rights violations.  
Chapter III was dedicated exclusively to the analysis of GNR in the Inter-American 
system of Human Rights. As one the human rights systems that has developed more 
ambitious reparations measures in the world, it deserved a whole chapter for its 
analysis. GNR have been present in the work of both the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, particularly in friendly settlements, and the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights when deciding contentious cases. The chapter 
analysed the origin, development and characteristics of the concept of GNR in the 
case law of the Court finding four relevant moments in its development: a moment of 
early reparations jurisprudence (1987-1998) where the Court did not get involved in 
the award of GNR, a second moment of development of measures (1998-2001) 
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where the Court ordered some legislative reforms and other structural measures but 
did not call them GNR, a third moment or ‘contemporary’ era (2001-2008) where the 
Court explicitly made use of GNR to a large extend of its jurisprudence and engaged 
in several forms of GNR; and an era of consolidation of remedial measures (2008-
onwards) were the Court consolidated its jurisprudence about reparations and 
granted important GNR in high profile cases. The chapter also analysed the scope of 
the measures awarded by the Court being one of the most diverse. As for the 
circumstances of its awarding the chapter analysed both the substantive and 
procedural rules implicitly used by the Court. The chapter concluded with some 
recommendations as to how the Court can limit the application of GNR to the most 
serious violations in order to make these measures more efficient.  
The analysis of GNR in chapters I, II and III confirmed this type of remedy is by 
nature future oriented, closer to a principle of distributive justice and aimed at 
redressing the harm of the ‘society as a whole’. One important conclusion of this part 
of the thesis is that, besides some courts are still timid in the awarding of GNR and 
states are sometimes reluctant to enforce these measures, the analysis developed in 
these chapters showed that GNR are an increasing form of redress in international 
law. They are not any more considered an exceptional measure applicable in very 
few cases but a well known form of redress largely accepted in both international 
and domestic courts. The second important conclusion is that, while most of the 
cases analysed in chapters I to III in which GNR and general measures have been 
awarded dealt with violations of civil and political rights, this section also showed 
there is nothing in the nature of the concept that prevent its application to other type 
of rights such as the right to health. These two findings were fundamental for the 
development of the second part of this thesis. 
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The award of GNR in violations to the right to health and health 
related cases 
 
Aware of the potential of GNR in the structural redress of all type of human rights 
violations, the second half of the thesis (chapters IV and V) explored the application 
of GNR in the particular context of the right to health. As it was presented in chapter 
IV, the lack of a richer jurisprudence on the right to health in some regional human 
rights bodies largely relies on the lack of recognition of the full justiciability of this 
right. For example, whereas in the Inter-American system of human rights the right to 
health is indirectly justiciable making the awarding of remedies vague, in the African 
system of human rights the right to health is directly justiciable, allowing a clearer 
and more adequate awarding of remedies. A direct justiciability of the right to health, 
particularly in the Inter-American System, will facilitate the awarding of reparations 
including GNR. In finding so, this thesis has demonstrated that GNR are applicable 
to violations of all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. As it was 
already mentioned, there is nothing in the nature of the concept of GNR that prevent 
its application to the redress of violations of the right to health. If human rights 
tribunals want to take seriously the protection of the right to health they must 
encourage, not just, its direct justiciability, but also the awarding of GNR for its 
protection. 
As it was presented in chapter V, this finding also overthrows the traditional objection 
against the crafting of remedies for violations to socio-economic rights according to 
which, they require the awarding of complex remedies that are usually future 
oriented, aimed to distribute resources among large groups of people, obstruct the 
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competence of other branches of power and are difficult to implement.1144 In Kent 
Roach’s words such assumption ‘dramatically underestimates the remedial 
complexities that are already present in the enforcement of political and civil 
rights.’1145 The dichotomy between the simplicity of redressing civil and political rights 
and the inherent difficulty of crafting remedies for violations to socio-economic rights 
just deepens in the distinction between categories or families of rights (first v second 
generation of rights; civil and political v socio-economic rights) which is more a 
political rather than a normative difference. The advancement of the right to health 
as a human right requires the recognition that the right to health is not just fully 
justiciable but also that it is entitled to the same type of remedies. As a 
consequence, the question should not be whether GNR are applicable to the right to 
health but rather, how GNR can be adequately crafted for the adequate protection of 
these rights.  
In defining the how of GNR, chapter V analyzed what should be the circumstances in 
which this type of remedies should be awarded and some of the elements that the 
CESCR should take into account when awarding general measures in the redress of 
violations of the right to health. With the entry into force of the Optional ProtocoI to 
the ICESCR, the CESCR has a remarkable opportunity to recommend states the 
adoption of general measures oriented to provide systemic relief in cases of gross, 
serious, systemic or large-scale violations of the right to health, when studying 
individual communications. As it was explained in chapter V, the CESCR could use 
the extensive scope of measures provided by different UN bodies, particularly the 
CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as 
                                                             
1144 Kent Roach, ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic 
Rights’ in Malcom Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge, 2008) p.46. 
1145 Idem. 
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well to domestic courts in the redress of right to health cases. Moreover, the CESCR 
could explore the use of mechanisms of participation with local actors as it has 
already made when inviting NGOs to monitor and report back to the Committee 
during its concluding observations on States’ periodic reports,1146 or when 
recommending states to take appropriate measures with the participation of local 
actors.1147  
This thesis has shown that the awarding of GNR can be an important window of 
opportunity for the transformation of gross, serious, systemic, and large-scale 
violations of the right to health around the world. When used within an organized 
litigation strategy, GNR are an important window of opportunity, among others, for 
the transformation of root causes of human rights violations. By referring to GNR, 
courts could order states legislative changes, human rights training, institutional 
modifications, and even the establishment of public policies and programs. It would 
be up to the petitioners to creatively request more and more diverse measures, to 
the courts and tribunals to adequately award these measures, and to the states to 
secure is prompt implementation.  
                                                             
1146 Viviana Krsticevic and Brian Griffey, ‘Remedial Recommendations’ in Malcom Langford & 
others (eds), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria University Law Press, 2004) (citing M. O’Flaherty, 
‘Concluding Observations of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law 
Review , pp. 27-52, at 51)  
1147 UNCESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Mexico, 12/08/1999 (18 December 1999) UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.4, para. 44. For a 
similar proposal see, Krsticevic and Griffey Remedial Recommendations.  
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Further research 
 
This thesis unpacked a particular form of reparation: GNR, and its application to 
violations to the right to health. The thesis understand that besides GNR and general 
measures cannot secure per se the transformation of a particular situation; they are 
a first step in the modification of the root causes of violation of human rights. Other 
factors such as social mobilization1148, involvement of domestic institutions and 
courts1149 as well as the participation of stake holders in the design of remedies 
measures1150 may have also an impact in the adequate implementation of these 
measures and, consequently, in the modification of the root causes of violations. 
Such factors were not, however, studied here. Further research would be required in 
order to understand how GNR and general measures could be fully complied by 
states and what the best practices are in order to secure the adequate follow-up by 
international courts and tribunals. In the meantime, courts, litigants and victims could 
benefit of the emerging international trend in reparations awarding and requesting 
GNR and general measures that allow a more adequate protection of the right to 
health. The research carried out in this thesis empowers all relevant stakeholders as 
                                                             
1148 Siri Gloppen, ‘Public Interest Litigation, Social Rights, and Social Policy’ in Anis A. Dani 
and Arjan de Haan (eds) Inclusive States Social Policy and Structural Inequalities (World 
Bank, 2008) p. 345. 
1149 Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s 
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights´ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493. 
1150 Camila Gianella-Malca, ‘A Human Rights Based Approach to Participation in Health 
Reform: Experiences from the Implementation of Constitutional Court Orders in Colombia’ 
(2013) 31 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 84. 
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it provides a clear legal understanding of GNR under international law and important 
principles to craft them in the future.        
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